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
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31 January 1985

# USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

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31 January 1985

## USSR REPORT

### MILITARY AFFAIRS

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MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

DOCUMENTS FROM 3RD UKRAINIAN FRONT: FALL 1944

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 17, Sep 84 (signed to press 20 Aug 84) pp 39-41

[Article: "History Testifies: New Documents on the Liberation Mission of the Soviet Armed Forces"]

[Text] It is autumn 1944.... For the fourth year the Soviet Armed Forces are smashing the fascist aggressors. Our troops reached the foothills of the Carpathians, reached the approaches to the Balkans, initiated operations for the liberation of Roumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, and set foot on Polish soil. The dawn of freedom broke over the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe who had been enslaved by the Hitlerites.

The Institute of Military History of the USSR Ministry of Defense has prepared a collection, "The Liberation Mission of the Soviet Armed Forces in Europe during World War II," which will be published next year by the Military Publishing House. We publish some of the documents of this collection.

APPEAL OF THE COMMANDER OF THE 3RD UKRAINIAN FRONT TO THE BULGARIAN PEOPLE AND THE BULGARIAN ARMY CONCERNING THE GOALS OF THE SOVIET ARMY'S ENTRY INTO BULGARIA

The Active Army

7 September 1944

To the Bulgarian People  
To the Bulgarian Army

Bulgarians!

The Red Army does not intend to fight the Bulgarian people and their army since it considers the Bulgarian people a fraternal people.

The Red Army has one mission--to smash the Germans and accelerate the time for the onset of universal peace. For this, it is necessary that the Bulgarian government cease serving the cause of the Germans, that it immediately break any relations with the Germans, and come over to the side of the coalition of democratic countries.

The Red Army is seeing that the German soldiers and officers who have taken refuge in Bulgaria are immediately interned and turned over to the Soviet troops as prisoners of war.

The Red Army is seeing further that all German ships which departed from northern ports for Bulgaria are immediately turned over to the Soviet Union, and if it turns out that some of them have been sunk the Red Army demands that the Soviet Navy be given the opportunity to extract them.

Only with the implementation of these conditions can the state of war be terminated and talks of an armistice be begun.

Army General Tolbukhin,  
Front Commander

FROM THE REPORT OF THE 37TH ARMY'S POLITICAL DEPARTMENT CONCERNING THE FRIENDLY ATTITUDE OF THE BULGARIAN POPULATION TOWARD THE SOVIET ARMY

The Active Army

9 September 1944

...In talks Bulgarian soldiers express great joy on the occasion of the arrival of Red Army units in Bulgaria and express the desire to help the Russian army by the joint struggle against the Germans.

The population of Bulgaria greeted Red Army units with great joy and rejoicing. When vehicles with troops stopped they were surrounded by the population. Everyone was drawn toward the men and officers, desiring personally to shake their hands. Red Army units which were passing through were greeted everywhere with shouts of "Hurrah." Vehicles passing through were greeted with bouquets of flowers which the population threw at the vehicles in motion....

Lieutenant Dimov read out the appeal of Army General Tolbukhin from the body of a vehicle on various streets in the cities of Dobrich and Varna. In all cases the appeal was greeted with applause and shouts of "Hurrah." The Bulgarian population greeted the words of the appeal especially strongly--that the Bulgarian people are a fraternal people and that the Red Army has one mission: to smash the Germans and accelerate the onset of universal peace. It was with applause and joyous exclamations that the population greeted the proposal of Army General Tolbukhin--to intern the German troops immediately and turn them over to the Soviet troops as prisoners of war....

On the Dobrich-Varna highway near the village of Yeni-Makhle the vehicles passing through were greeted by a column of demonstrators with a red flag and the singing of the song "Cavalryman" in the Bulgarian language.

In the city of Varna a large number of people assembled on Theatrical Square for the reading of Army General Tolbukhin's appeal. During the reading of General Tolbukhin's appeal the slogans, "Long live our liberator--the Red Army!" resounded from the crowd of those assembled.

Major Vasil'yev, senior instructor of  
section of 37th Army political department

FROM THE COMMEMORATIVE APPEAL OF THE 3RD UKRAINIAN FRONT'S POLITICAL DEPARTMENT  
TO THE MEN OF THE FRONT IN CONNECTION WITH THE ENTRY INTO YUGOSLAV TERRITORY

October 1944

To the Red Army Soldier About Yugoslavia

Comrade fighting man, sergeant, and officer! You have entered the territory of Yugoslavia which is related to us in spirit and blood--you entered to overtake and finish off the wounded fascist beast who has crawled away to his lair under your blows.

The inexhaustible might of the Soviet Union and the spiritual strength of the Soviet people determined the final outcome of the war against Hitlerite Germany. The German war machine began to crack under the mighty blows of the Red Army....

Your mission, comrade, is to intercept the German-fascist troops who are withdrawing along the Yugoslav roads and whom you smashed in Roumania and Bulgaria as well as those who are trying to break through into Germany from Greece, Albania, and Yugoslavia itself....

Red Army Serviceman!

...Cherish the love and respect of the Yugoslav people to whom you are bringing liberation. Respect their customs, laws, and family!

Remember always and everywhere that you came to Yugoslavia not to impose your laws and procedures on Yugoslavia, but to overtake and destroy the German brigands who are running under your blows.

Render assistance and aid the Yugoslav population, soldiers, and officers of the Yugoslav Peoples-Liberation Army in everything that helps our struggle against the common enemy--the German-fascist aggressors!

FROM THE REPORT OF THE 57TH ARMY'S POLITICAL DEPARTMENT TO THE POLITICAL DIRECTORATE OF THE 3RD UKRAINIAN FRONT CONCERNING THE FRIENDLY ATTITUDES OF THE YUGOSLAV SOLDIERS AND POPULATION TOWARD THE MEN AND COMMANDERS OF THE RED ARMY DURING THE PERIOD OF THE BELGRADE OPERATION

The Active Army

17 October 1944

Continuing the attack on 28 September the army's troops crossed the Bulgarian-Yugoslav border and during the entire first 10-day period fought the German troops on the territory of Yugoslavia. As a result of the 10-day battles our army liberated considerable territory of Serbia and inflicted heavy losses on the enemy....

In addition to all this, in the matter of strengthening the political and moral state and raising the offensive spirit on the territory of Yugoslavia a large role was played by the presence of a strongly developed anti-fascist struggle in the country. From the very first days of the entry into Yugoslavia the men and commanders met units of the Yugoslav People's-Liberation Army and partisans.



From their stories and from the talks and reports conducted by the political officers, the men and commanders learned about the heroic struggle of the Yugoslav people.

All this instilled sincere respect for the Yugoslavs and served the cause of building up an offensive spirit. Here we should also note the role of the local population. The population of the villages and cities of Yugoslavia greeted the Red Army with the same enthusiasm and joy.

The warm greeting, gifts, and entertainment of the men and commanders on the part of the local population are also one of the factors which strengthens the political and moral state of the personnel.

Thus, it should be noted that under conditions of offensive battles in Yugoslavia the matter of strengthening the political and moral state of the personnel was furthered, in addition to all other factors, also by new circumstances, and namely--the meeting with partisans and soldiers of the Yugoslav National-Liberation Army as well as by the cordial meeting and the attitude of the local population.

Colonel Tsinev, chief of the 57th Army's  
Political Department

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ROLE OF POLITICAL WORK IN EASING NIGHT EXERCISE DIFFICULTIES

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 17, Sep 84 (signed to press 20 Aug 84) pp 48-52

[Article by Maj Yu. Galitskiy: "When Night Training Is Under Way"]

[Text] The tactical exercise with live firing which the regimental commander conducted with Major N. Vyprantsev's battalion ended. Its results exceeded even the boldest expectations. The battalion's tankmen demonstrated good tactical training, firing skill, and the ability to overcome great physical and psychological loads steadfastly. By the way, judge for yourself--more than 80 percent target hits, exceeding the most important tactical standards by almost 10 percent, not one combat vehicle bogged down in the swampy marshes (and there are more than enough of them on the terrain where the exercise was conducted) or lagging behind. Company commanders Captains V. Yevstaf'yev and S. Matyushin and platoon leader Lieutenant V. Lebedev, who skillfully commanded their subunits, became the true heroes of the day or, more precisely, of the night, because the most important and difficult stage of the exercise was precisely the night attack with live firing using authorized rounds. Also distinguishing themselves were tank commanders, gunners, and mechanics-drivers Sergeant V. Yokubauskas, Junior Sergeant A. Shavkunov, Privates K. Samadov and T. Karimov, and many other men who hit targets with the first rounds and drove the combat vehicles as if they were driving them during the day rather than at night.

Such are only the general results of this difficult exercise. But now I should like to talk about something else.

A little less than a year ago, a similar exercise was conducted in the unit on which problems in the attack of the defending "enemy" at night were also worked out. Then we also expected high results, but our hopes were not justified: individual subunits received low grades.

Immediately after the exercise a session of the party committee took place to which battalion commanders, their political deputies, and secretaries of the party organizations were invited. The goal of the talk was to determine the reasons for failures and ways for the further rise in the effectiveness of party-political work on night lessons. Many opinions were expressed, but after the discussion of each of them they succeeded in disclosing the main thing which prevented the subunits which participated in the exercise from demonstrating high results.

In particular, the discussion concerned the necessity to see, first of all, that night lessons are truly night lessons. The fact is that formerly night lessons in the battalions frequently took place in the evening twilight. Clearly, this is not the same thing--to learn to shoot, drive combat vehicles, and attack or defend in the dark evening hours and, as they say, in the dead of night. For, as is known, in the latter case the psychological loads increase significantly, the men tire more rapidly, they become drowsy, and their attention is blunted. As the exercise showed, many of them were not ready for just such loads and for operations under such conditions.

Valid reproaches were expressed at a session of the party committee and addressed to some communist officers, especially of the company and platoon echelon, who do not possess sufficient methodological skills and are not able to attain the high effectiveness of night lessons.

The exercise also showed that the tankers, in particular the mechanic-drivers and gunners, do not have firm skills in working with night vision instruments.

Substantiated reproaches were also directed toward the political officers. In organizing party-political work on night lessons, they did not always consider their specific nature, it happened that they were excessively carried away by mass measures to the detriment of the individual instilling of qualities necessary for night combat in the men, and did not always ensure the continuity of their influence on the consciousness and feelings of people.

The first thing from which they started in the regiment was the establishment of the closest contact between the political officers and the commanders and staff officers who had adopted organizational measures to eliminate the shortcomings. Working in parallel with them and helping them, by joint efforts they eliminated gaps in the men's night training, instilled in them psychological stability and the ability not to become lost even in the most difficult situation, and they mobilized them for the attainment of high results on lessons.

As a rule, night lessons in the regiment began to be conducted precisely at night. This immediately posed a number of substantial problems for political officers and party activists. How to see that the feeling of fatigue which is inevitable on night firings, driving, and drills does not overpower the natural desire of the men to accomplish the training combat mission in the best manner? What should be done to stimulate in each of them the striving to master the skills of operations under night conditions? What forms and methods of party-political work is it more expedient to use on night lessons?

First of all, they saw that the political officers and party activists delved into night training with knowledge of the matter and understood the entire process of the forthcoming lesson clearly even prior to going out to the field. Only in this case can they correctly determine which measures should be conducted with which category of servicemen and even at what time, and which aspects should receive special attention. Simple acquaintance with the plans for night lessons and with methodological elaborations is clearly insufficient here. This is why the following procedure was introduced: when the commander of the battalion which is to accomplish exercises in firing and driving under night conditions

travels out to the moving target gunnery range or tank driving grounds in order to prepare the target situation, check the condition of the obstacles, and to "tie" the tactical background to them as required by the appropriate documents, the political deputy or the secretary of the party buro rides with him. Here, on the ground of the future night exercise, they delve more deeply into the questions which the tankmen will work out and into the procedure for night training and, in a close connection with the missions, they plan and then conduct party-political work.

This is also how it was during the night firing with authorized rounds in the battalion commanded by Major V. Cherskiy. The political officer, Captain A. Kozlov, rode out on such a unique reconnaissance together with the battalion commander. While it was still daylight, on the moving target gunnery range they thoroughly analyzed the tactical situation against the background of which the night firings were to take place, became acquainted with the variations in showing the targets, and thought out ways to inform the men and companies firing on different directions concerning the results of their neighbors. All this helped him to become oriented in the situation freely during the lesson itself and, this means, to organize his work more objectively.

The advantage of such an approach was obvious. The first run had hardly been concluded when the voice of Captain Kozlov, amplified by a powerful apparatus, sounded over the moving target gunnery range. It put on the air an edition of the radio newspaper devoted to gunner Private V. Kazitsyn who had destroyed all the targets and received the first excellent grade in the subunit. In which regard the political officer did not simply inform the tankmen about their comrade's success but made a detailed analysis of the gunner's actions and generalized his experience.

Greater concern for the continuity of party-political work on night lessons began to be manifested. Formerly, cases of this type occurred in some subunits. During the period of preparation for lessons the political officer and party and Komsomol activists worked at full strength: they conduct talks, organize firing quizzes, and set up meetings for the exchange of experiences. But then the subunit went out to the moving target gunnery range or tank driving grounds, and all their activity was reduced to the timely publication of the news bulletin, filling in the columns of the competition screen, and informing the tankmen of the reasons for the successes of some and the failure of others. It goes without saying that all this is very important, but really, can one limit himself to such forms of work alone? Of course not. There are breaks on any lesson. It is hardly expedient to give them up completely to "smoke breaks" during which some strive to take a nap in a secluded corner or simply relax. Clearly, if people are left to their own devices, this does not further the maintenance of high enthusiasm in working out combat training missions and socialist competition. This is the very time for the political officer and communists to buck them up, force them to forget about fatigue, mobilize themselves and accomplish the exercise in a quality manner, and acquire as much knowledge and skills as possible.

I want to emphasize again: any lesson, and a night lesson in particular, should be stressed in the broadest meaning of this word. And such stress is attained by ways including the continuity of party-political work and its constant, effective influence on the mind, consciousness and feelings of the men.

In order to achieve continuity of party influence on people, for example on that firing which was discussed above, a field agitation post was set up. Here the tankmen could listen to the latest news during breaks and read the latest papers, and the activists could conduct talks. In this way it turned out that the agitation post became a unique center of contact and exchange of opinions. They hastened here to share their successes with their comrades, to find support among friends in case of failure, and simply to talk. And it is to the credit of the political officers and activists of the battalion that they used the situation which had been created correctly--they directed the conversation to the needed channel unobtrusively and tactfully, maintained a free and easy atmosphere in the agitation post, and tried to rouse the interest of each of the tankmen with useful information.

Socialist competition is the strongest means for mobilizing the soldiers and sergeants for the attainment of the highest results in night training. Unfortunately, some party and Komsomol activists limited their role to the collection of information on the grades obtained and making them available to the personnel. This, of course, is insufficient. Today activists led by subunit political officers actively help commanders and draw the men to the competition under the slogan, "At night according to daytime standards!" Working in the crews, platoons, and companies, they disclose how the leaders operate during the accomplishment of one or another standard or exercise and they ignite a spirit of competition and healthy rivalry among the tankmen.

It is also difficult for the commander to sum up intermediate results effectively during an intense night lesson and, moreover, to generalize someone's experience and explain to subordinates the reason for errors committed. But, in return, all this is within the capability of the activists who, receiving the needed information from the commander or political officer, can bring it to the attention of each soldier and sergeant.

I also want to speak about the large role of visual agitation. The erroneous opinion existed in some of the regiment's subunits that allegedly its influence on the men is weakened at night. There can be no agreeing with this.

Again I cannot fail to recall night firings in Major Cherskiy's battalion. Here, at the visual agitation, is the competition screen above which the slogan, "At night--according to daytime standards," was clearly distinguished and at operation news sheets, printed news flashes, and other materials it was always busy. The tankmen, both those who had accomplished the firing exercise as well as who were awaiting their turn, discussed the results of the competition which were displayed on illuminated plotting boards, the experience of the leaders, and the results of those who fired below their capabilities in a lively manner. The reason for such popularity of the visual agitation is simple; in the battalion they lean skillfully on the activists and with their help they evaluate the results of the various stages of night lessons efficiently and objectively and delve deeply into the experience of the best.

Nor did the political officers and all communists of the unit remain aloof from such a mainline direction of work as concern for raising the officers' methodological skill. Soirees for the exchange of experience in the organization and conduct of night lessons conducted on the initiative of the party organizations

became traditional. Thus, during the last two months alone the best methodologists, Major V. Cherskiy and N. Vyprantsev, appeared before the young officers. In addition, at sessions of party buros and at party meetings the communists regularly hear communications and reports of party members concerning how they are raising their methodological skill. In which regard, for the conversation to be objective and the analysis profound, on the eve of the buro session one of the communists, as a rule an experienced commander, is given an assignment by the secretary--to visit a comrade who is to give a report on a night lesson in a subunit and to analyze how methodologically competently he trains his subordinates. This permits an objective evaluation of the communist's attitude toward training and excludes the possibility of coloring the truth--the actual state of affairs is already well known.

I should especially tell about party-political support of lessons with the regiment's officers. Today shortcomings in the organization of night lessons are encountered much more rarely than formerly, although it cannot be said that here in the regiment everything is satisfactory. Thus, at one of the lessons it was disclosed that some officers, in particular Senior Lieutenant M. Nikonov and Lieutenant A. Golovko, had not yet fully mastered the art of firm leadership of subordinates in the course of a training battle and the flexible, continuous control of subunits. But you see, questions of leadership and the control of subordinates in night battle are acquiring special significance. Here the commander's error can reduce to naught even the most strained efforts of the entire troop collective.

The regimental commander and the staff officers are working in an intensified manner on eliminating these shortcomings. Nor do the political officers weaken attention to raising the methodological skill of subunit commanders and to the generation, in them, of flexible tactical thinking and the skills of continuous and competent control of subunits in the course of battle. These questions continue to be at the center of attention of the party committee and party organizations of the battalions.

Based on leading experience, in the regiment today they are teaching political officers and party and Komsomol activists to conduct all or almost all mass measures in the preparatory period and to stress individual work on the exercises themselves. In which regard, it is necessary to pay the most serious attention to the distribution of the activists. For in the dynamics of a night training battle we, the organizational political officers, cannot embrace all the men with our attention. There simply are neither time nor capabilities for this. And the tankmen must operate on the field of the training battle with that reserve of spiritual strength and with that attitude which were created prior to the start of the attack or the repelling of the "enemy's" attack. And so that energy, that combat enthusiasm, is not extinguished in the dynamics of combat operations, the activists should inspire the people along with the commanders and political officers.

For example, on a night tactical exercise the deputy battalion commander for political affairs, Captain I. Romanov, the secretary of the battalion party organization, Captain I. Sergeyev, and the secretary of the Komsomol buro, Warrant Officer [praporshchik] N. Pozdeyev, so distributed the forces of the members of party and Komsomol buros, agitators, and Komsomol group organizers

that the influence of the communists and Komsomols on the men of each tank crew was continuous and effective. By word and deed, the activists inspired their comrades for the attainment of the highest results and supported them at the difficult moments of the night attack.

Of course, the successes attained in the organization of night lessons inspire us. But this in no way means that unresolved problems and unused reserves do not remain in the regiment. The tactical training and methodological skill of individual officers should be improved even more persistently. All the more since novices recently came to the unit. It is also the task of party political work to pull up these and several other weak sectors. There is still much work to be done. It must be considered in the organization of party-political work which is directed toward raising the quality of night training.

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NEED FOR IMPROVED PARTY WORK IN COMBAT TRAINING

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 17, Sep 84 (signed to press 20 Aug 84) pp 53-55

[Article by Col I. Yegorov: "Action Follows the Word"]

[Text] Party election meetings--an exacting review of what has been done and achieved--are approaching. In preparing for them, we automatically turn to preceding reports and elections. On them the communists conducted an interesting talk on how to improve the organizational and ideological-indoctrinational work of party organizations and election organs, increase their activity, initiative, and combat vitality, and intensify party influence on all aspects of the life of unit and ship collectives. Many constructive suggestions directed toward raising combat readiness and strengthening military discipline as well as critical remarks were expressed, and practical decisions were adopted. The authors of the reports which are published reflect on how completely they are being implemented, how the party organizations achieve the accomplishment of what has been planned with the forms and methods inherent in them, what works well here, and what does not and why.

A tactical exercise in the Nth surface-to-air missile regiment took place in a situation as close as possible to the conditions of actual combat. The "enemy," using intensive jamming and the lowest possible altitudes and maneuver, tried to break through to the objective. The men had to work for a long time in individual equipment for protection against weapons of mass destruction. They restored the combat readiness of equipment and weapons many times. In the difficult situation of the exercises the missilemen demonstrated high combat training and the ability to combat effectively the "enemy's" means of air attack--such was the conclusion of the senior commander.

In analyzing how success was achieved and why, at the same time, all reserves could not be brought into action, the secretary of the regimental party committee recalls a party election meeting. The communists discussed in an ardent and self-critical manner the activity of the party committee and their own work on improving combat training and the strengthening of military discipline, and they introduced specific suggestions--how to improve the training and indoctrination process and improve organization in everything.



Then CPSU member Lieutenant Colonel V. Ivanov subjected to sharp criticism the party organization of the subunit where Captain A. Astrakhantsev is secretary of the party buro. This troop collective did not accomplish the socialist obligations which had been assumed and did not attain the goals which had been planned. What are the reasons for such a state of affairs? Ivanov named them: the blunting of a sense of responsibility for success in individual comrades, the insufficient demandingness of the party buro, and the poor organizational work of the communists. What was observed in the subunit at times? Some lessons on special, technical, and tactical training took place at a low organizational and methodological level and drills of combat crews, it happened, were conducted in a simplified situation. It would appear that this should have caused alarm and concern among the party activists first of all. However, they did not attach serious significance to the fact that shortcomings had been permitted in the training of the men--they said that the omissions which are being discussed do not spoil the overall picture. In the party organization the communists were not held strictly accountable to the party for the quality accomplishment of training plans. The party buro was not very interested in the problems connected with the professional training of the young officers although there were many of them in the subunit and not all of them had mastered the art of training and indoctrinating the personnel in sufficient measure. How could the professional skill of the officers be raised? What can be undertaken for this purpose by the subunit party organization and the unit party committee?

Other comrades also spoke of the urgent question at the election meeting. They did not simply criticize the communists who had omissions in their work, but they also spoke of how to eliminate shortcomings. For example, they proposed listening to those officer-communists who had weakened their self-demandingness and were not very concerned about raising their methodological skill. The participants in the meeting also proposed generalizing and disseminating Captain P. Borisov's experience in training and indoctrination.

The interesting talk at the party meeting also determined the nature of the decision to a great extent--it was practical and specific. But, as is known, word should be followed by deed and decision by execution; only then can we count on success. Therefore, the members of the party committee took under control everything which had been approved and adopted by the communists. And they devoted special attention to the questions connected with raising the professional skill of the officers.

At the beginning of the training year it was learned that lessons in special training are taking place at a low methodological level in a number of subunits. It was evident that not all comrades had drawn the proper conclusions from the criticism which was heard at the election meeting. This pertained, in particular, to a battery commander and CPSU member officer N. Demchenko. He did not properly monitor the platoon leaders' preparations for the lessons and he himself relied on an old store of knowledge. Nor did the officer devote sufficient attention to the sergeants and he was not interested in how they service the equipment and conduct prescribed maintenance. And you see, the level of special training of all crew members depends in considerable measure on the state of training of commanders at this level and on how they master knowledge, study the equipment, and transmit their experience to subordinates.

Consulting with the commander and political officer, the members of the party committee came to the conclusion that it is expedient to hear the report of communist N. Demchenko on how he accomplishes party and service obligations. An exacting and, at the same time, benevolent talk at the session did the communist good. He changed his attitude toward the matter and began to display greater demandingness toward himself and his subordinates and to organize lessons and drills better.

The party committee and subunit party buros are also doing much to improve military-technical propaganda and the activity of technical study groups and military-technical knowledge sections of the agitation and propaganda group. For example, they devoted special attention to the creation of methodological aids. A number of communists led by Major V. Stolbov were charged with developing the aids which would help conducting lessons and drills in special training more effectively. Such aids were made and they played their role in improving the training of the missilemen. On the initiative of party activists, technical quizzes and meetings with the best specialists were conducted regularly in the unit's subunits. They furthered the growth of the people's combat skill in the most direct manner and, in the final analysis, the attainment of success in the course of the tactical exercise.

Other suggestions of the communists which were expressed at the election meeting also served the party committee as a guide to action. Thus, the comrades who spoke spoke of instances of formalism which were committed in the course of organizing socialist competition.

Formalism in competition. How can it be eradicated? It was necessary to give a skilled answer to this question and adopt effective measures. And so members of the party committee visited lessons in the subunits and combat crews and the summing of the results of the obligations' accomplishment, and they talked with many specialists. As a result, the basic reasons for the insufficiently clear organization of competition were disclosed. And here is what they concluded. Some servicemen assumed vague obligations and at times publicity and comparability of results attained by the people were absent. In addition, some officers had poor skills in the procedure for summing up the results of competition by tasks and standards.

The conclusions of the party committee members became a subject for discussion in the subunit party organizations. At their sessions, the party buros planned measures to ensure the vanguard role of the communists in competition. CPSU members officers V. Pevzner and N. Ostapenko, who are members of the unit methodological council, together with the commander worked out recommendations for subunit officers, political officers, and party activists, the purpose of which was to further the improvement of practice in summing up the results in the accomplishment of socialist obligations in the competition.

In the unit's party organization, they constantly keep in mind that a check of execution is the most important and effective means for the accomplishment of the orders and critical remarks of the communists.

Diverse forms for monitoring the accomplishment of what has been planned are used. In one case, party activists restrict themselves to a talk with a

communist who informs them how he is accomplishing his assignment. In another case the state of affairs is checked directly on the spot and necessary assistance is rendered to those who need it. In a third case, at a session of the party committee or party buro they hear a communication or report of a party member on how he is working.

The hearing of the communists' communications and reports must be preceded by a study of matters on a specific sector. Not so long ago, for example, the report of the subunit party buro secretary, Captain A. Astrakhantsev, was discussed at a session of the party committee--how the buro influences the improvement in the methodological training of the officers and raising the quality of the lessons. And prior to this, on the assignment of the party committee CPSU members Major N. Ostapenko and Captain P. Borisov talked with Astrakhantsev and other activists and analyzed just what had been done by the party buro and the party organization as a whole after the election meeting and whether they are using fully the forms and methods of party influence on the training and service of the subunit's men and whether they are concerned about combat and political training.

Of course, the party activists of the unit and all communists still have much work to do. This was also discussed at a recent session of the party committee where the course of the realization of critical remarks and suggestions expressed at the election meeting were discussed.

The regiment's personnel assumed the obligation to complete the training year with a high grade. And the communists are mobilizing the people for the attainment of this goal. Their active organizational work is the guarantee of success in combat training.

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OFFICER TRAINING IN TANK REGIMENT CRITICIZED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 17, Sep 84 (signed to press 20 Aug 84) pp 56-57

[Article by Col A. Kosenko: "And Again They Wrote Down: 'Improve....'"]

[Text] On a check lesson the men of the tank regiment where one of the members of the party committee is Guards Lieutenant Colonel S. Khortov demonstrated low results in gunnery training and the driving of combat vehicles. Gaps were also discovered in the tankmen's tactical training.

We spoke of this with the regiment's party activists and tried to understand the reasons for the unfavorable state of affairs. The communist-leaders acknowledged the mistakes which had been committed. However, some of them explained the blunders by "objective" reasons. They say that many experienced specialists and masters of military affairs have been released to the reserve and they had not succeeded in pulling the young servicemen up to their level of training. The opinion was also expressed as follows: they say that demands on tactical training were raised. Unquestionably, the requirements on the training of the troops are growing with each passing year. And this should constantly be considered.

Uneasiness was also caused by the fact that individual officer-communists of the regiment did not properly delve into the true reasons for some drop in combat training. They often gave assurances: we are applying every effort for the unit to reach the forward positions in socialist competition. The striving is praiseworthy in general. Well, and how much is it substantiated? The tankmen completed the past training year with results which could hardly satisfy them. Some crews proved to be uncoordinated and unprepared for highly maneuverable operations to include operations under night conditions. There also were other shortcomings in the men's combat training, in particular in gunnery training. Clearly, they were discussed at the regiment's party election meeting. The communists drew a fully specific conclusion: the party committee and party buro of the subunits were not very concerned about increasing the responsibility of party members and candidate members for the state of affairs in the unit and the creation, in the collective, of an environment of devotion to principle and intolerance toward shortcomings, complacency, and indifference. This conclusion also found reflection in the meeting's resolution.

Several months passed. Just what changed during this time in the work style of the party committee and of all communists and is effective party influence on the accomplishment of combat training tasks ensured? Let us take, for example, the tankmen's gunnery training. It is one of the most important indicators of the men's combat training. Many communists spoke of how to improve it at the election meeting. Is there a shift for the better here?

"We constantly discuss questions of improving gunnery training," says the secretary of the party committee.

It goes without saying that much is said about improving the gunnery training of the personnel in the regiment both at party meetings and at service conferences. However, for the present the matter is not moving further than conversations. Facts show this.

In the company commanded by communist Guards Senior Lieutenant A. Zhukov several shooters received low grades for firing. The company commander himself was among the "failures."

Is this failure by chance? As an analysis of the state of affairs showed, no. For faults in the men's combat training were noted even earlier in this subunit. It happened that the company arrives at the range and it is immediately disclosed that some of the platoon leaders are not ready for gunnery lessons and the weapons are not ready for firing.

Or the following fact, A platoon leader, Guards Lieutenant S. Alabergenov, is conducting tank gunnery drill. The soldiers and sergeants are accomplishing the standards, in which regard they are committing the very same mistakes. However, the officer does not interfere in the course of the lesson and does not point out the errors of his subordinates. And the company commander, CPSU member Guards Senior Lieutenant Ye. Kibler, having noticed the lieutenant's methodological errors, does not correct him. Such an attitude of the people toward the matter and the accomplishment of their official duties cannot be called anything but indifference. Such instances were also found in several other subunits of the unit. Unfortunately, communists also proved to be among the guilty.

Just how did the party committee and party organizations of the subunits react to the deviation of the officer-communists from the requirements of the regulations, manuals, and other guidance documents? Were they alarmed by the fact that in individual party members and candidates a sense of responsibility for the state of affairs in the subunits was blunted or they resigned themselves to shortcomings? Let us say directly, they were not alarmed.

The interests of combat readiness require that each commander be a specialist of high qualifications and that he carry his subordinates along toward the peaks of military skill by personal example. And what can be encountered in a number of subunits? Some officer-communists are satisfied for a long time with a 3rd-class rating and do not try to raise their rating qualifications. And how can they fail to turn to one of the points of the party election meeting here in this organization: "To be concerned about improving the professional training of the officers and the equipping of them with advanced methods for training

subordinates." But just why is concern not truly manifested for the present on the part of the party committee?

At the election meeting it was decided to generalize the experience of the commander of one of the leading companies, CPSU member Guards Senior Lieutenant V. Barashnin. The tankmen of this subunit are known for their high level of training, and they fire especially well. It would appear that the party activists should have applied every effort so that what is new, advanced, and born by practice becomes common property and is adopted by everyone. However, the meeting's decision, one can say, remained a good desire. Organizational work did not follow it. But even here justification was found among members of the party committee: there is still much time ahead and we will succeed in achieving what has been planned.

What else would I like to discuss? In the regiment they often recall the times when the communists were the first to accomplish the exercises on firings and lessons on driving combat vehicles. They destroyed the targets with the first rounds at maximum range and drove the tanks skillfully. Their example carried all the men along for the struggle for high indices. But now not all party members and candidates can boast about excellent results in combat training. And the matter stands like this first of all because the comrades do not feel the strict demand either on the part of the party committee or on the part of the subunit party buros.

A party meeting recently took place at which questions connected with ensuring the vanguard role of party members and candidates in the struggle for the high gunnery training of the tankmen were discussed. It was again written down in the decision: "Improve organizational and indoctrinational work directed toward raising the level of the men's field training. All communists are to be examples in the accomplishment of their official duty...." But won't it turn out that this decision will also remain on paper? It is believed that on the eve of the new election meeting the party activists have something to reflect on.

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MAINTAINING STANDARDS IN PARTY ADMISSIONS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 17, Sep 84 (signed to press 20 Aug 84) pp 58-59

[Article by Cadet N. Rybolovlev: "From the Third Pass"]

[Text] I am not writing this letter to influence the decision of our primary party organization. It was adopted and, as became known, was approved by the party commission with the political department.

But however things may have been there, it is believed that the story of the acceptance of my fellow serviceman, Cadet Ye. Skomorokhov, as a CPSU candidate member deserves being related. Related if even not to be left alone with my doubts and not to ignore an acute question which disturbs many communists. This is what I have in mind.

Recently, we accepted Cadet Ye. Skomorokhov as a CPSU candidate member. What can I say about him? He studies diligently. He is actively engaged in sports. On recent competitions he won the title of school boxing champion. Of course, this cannot fail to please all of us. But something else annoys us. Cadet Yevgeniy Skomorokhov is not distinguished by discipline. He can be late in returning from leave, uses alcoholic drinks, is rude to his comrades, and starts arguments with his seniors. Commanders and the cadet collective tried to influence his behavior. Skomorokhov gave promises not to deviate from the requirements of the regulations. But time passed, and disruption again followed. This happened more than once. And here is the third course. Yevgeniy understood perfectly that if he does not become a CPSU candidate member now, he will not be a party member by graduation. And this has fundamental significance for a future political officer. Skomorokhov decided to submit an application for acceptance as a CPSU candidate member in a primary party organization. He turned for recommendations to communists officers A. Chernov and N. Vorokuta and to the Kom-somol organization. He soon collected all the necessary documents. A substantial shortcoming was indicated in the recommendations along with favorable qualities--instances of violation of military discipline.

And here is a meeting of the primary party organization. They read Skomorokhov's application and published the recommendations. The communists began to discuss the application. First to speak was Senior Lieutenant S. Orel--leader of the platoon in which Cadet Ye. Skomorokhov serves, and he spoke against accepting

Skomorokhov as a CPSU candidate member. The reasons? Unworthy behavior. Other communists spoke. The majority of them supported the recommendation of Senior Lieutenant S. Orel. They began to vote. The cadet did not receive two thirds of the votes as is required in such cases. He was refused acceptance as a CPSU candidate member.

No one was surprised by this decision. The party does not force its ranks; it strictly selects the people in them, accepting the best of the best. They were soon surprised at something else when they read the announcement about convening a meeting again with the same question: acceptance of Skomorokhov as a CPSU candidate member. They were surprised, but they did not change their opinion at the meeting. This time, too, they voted against Skomorokhov's joining the party.

It would seem that it is already time, considering the matter decided, not to return to it any more. But this precisely did not happen here. We see the company commander, Captain V. Didenko, the secretary of the party organization, Warrant Officer [praporshchik] A. Kurtev, and even the platoon leader, Senior Lieutenant S. Orel, who earlier voted against acceptance, talk first with one communist and then with another. The meaning of the talks is reduced to one thing--is it necessary to approach Skomorokhov so strictly? They say, we will accept him as a candidate--look, he is having second thoughts, he will turn over a new leaf. When I inquired as to why they are so persistently "pressuring" the communists in such an important matter as acceptance in the party without taking their opinion into consideration, I heard: there is a recommendation, they say--see that no more than three Komsomols remain in the company. I don't know whether this is so. But here on the third (in a week) meeting by count which now took place already during the period of intense preparations for the troop probationary period, Cadet Ye. Skomorokhov was accepted as a CPSU candidate member. In which regard, this time everything was decided by one vote which ensured a two-thirds vote.

Unfortunately, the fact which we are discussing is not the only one in our company. For example, the application of one other cadet for acceptance in the party was considered twice. He did not collect the votes at once either.

Of course, I am writing about what occurred in the party organization of our subunit. However, here I realize that even individual cases of violation of the party's requirements concerning replenishing its ranks cannot be tolerated. I remember that we spoke of this pointedly and based on principle at a party election meeting. We communists know that the CPSU Central Committee considers it impermissible when the requirements of the Party Regulations are violated in individual primary party organizations when accepting applicants in the party and that the political, professional, and moral qualities of those joining the ranks of the CPSU are not always thoroughly checked. The Central Committee points out that the matter should be so organized that actually the best of the best are selected for the party and the possibility of accepting unworthy persons in its ranks is excluded.

Of course, the subunit political officer should be a communist. This requirement is dictated first of all by that measure of responsibility which lies on his shoulders, by his special status, and by that special role which he is called upon to play in the troop collective. But we ask ourselves: can an immature



communist become a good political officer and skillful indoctrinator? Hardly. Then why commit an error consciously so that someone must correct it later?

In the training process we have often said that the doors of the party open only to the worthy of the worthy, to those who will be able to carry with honor the lofty title of member of the Leninist party. But how can we combine with this what we observe at times in our own party collective? You also ponder this again because tomorrow's political officer must organize party-political work and must answer in detail for that component part of it which is characterized by the struggle for purity of the party ranks. And in such a case, will it be able to be, as they say, equal to the requirements which are being imposed on it?

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PRESS ACTIVITIES OF PEOPLE'S 'CONTROL' ORGANS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 17, Sep 84 (signed to press 20 Aug 84) pp 90-92

[Article by Lt Col A. Shesternev, senior instructor of the Press Department, Main Political Directorate, Soviet Army and Navy: "Organs of People's Control--in Action"]

[Text] An important role is allotted to the organs of people's control in the accomplishment of the historic decisions of the 26th Congress of the Communist Party and the subsequent plenums of its Central Committee which are directed toward the further buildup of our motherland's economic and defensive might and a rise in the well-being of the workers.

"The party and the state...intensified the struggle against such disgraceful phenomena as squandering state resources, eyewash and the abuse of official position, embezzlement and graft," stressed Comrade K. U. Chernenko when appearing before the electors. "This is not a temporary campaign. It is a line which will be conducted constantly and absolutely. There is no condescension here and there will be none. No one should nourish any illusions on this account. Therefore even higher responsibility and demandingness of leaders, constant attention of the party organizations and labor collectives and of all Soviet people, and the effective work of the organs of people's control are needed...."

The military press is devoting special attention to the activity of the organs of people's control in the Armed Forces. In analyzing the work experience of committees, groups, and posts and informing the public about the results of their activity, district, group, and fleet newspapers propagandize an important form for the development of the social activity of Soviet servicemen and instill in the readers a sense of personal responsibility for the assigned matter. At the same time, such publications serve as an effective means for the indoctrination and training of public watchmen.

For example, the newspaper of the Order of Lenin Moscow Air Defense District, NA BOYEVOM POSTU [At Battle Station], skillfully combining diverse genres, periodically shows the work of the people's controllers in checking the storage, care, and operation of military equipment and armaments and the material, commercial-domestic, medical, and other types of support of the men. The work of the watchmen which is directed toward instilling an economical and careful attitude toward the people's property and toward the suppression of mismanagement

wastefulness, and cases of the embezzlement of socialist property do not remain without the newspaper's attention, either.

As a rule, these materials are published on special type pages, "The People's Control Leaf." Let us take one such page. It opens with the problem article, "Who Will Teach the Controllers?" In analyzing the activity of the people's control group led by Senior Warrant Officer [praporshchik] N. Khudobin, the author notes that it helped to save considerable material resources, but the results attained could have been considerably higher if the watchmen had delved deeper into the status of economic work and had relied more confidently and more often on the requirements of the guidance documents. Next the author presents an instructive example.

The members of the people's control group conducted a raid in the course of which many violations were discovered in the motor pool, repair shop, and other facilities. However, they just could not disclose their true reasons. It turned out that no one in the unit was engaged in training the watchmen. During the year, no experienced specialists, administrators, or lawyers appeared before them even once. Even the study of the instructions and orders pertaining to the activity of the people's control organs was not conducted here.

Such newspaper articles confirm the truly party approach to the solution of important tasks and further an increase in the effectiveness and quality of the work by groups and posts--the most massive element of people's control in the Armed Forces.

Material of a consultative nature, "What Can the Group Do?" was published on this same page under the heading, "The Lecture Bureau of the People's Watchman." It discloses the system of the organs of people's control in the Soviet Armed Forces and the procedure for their creation, work, and accountability. The author deals in greater detail with the activity of the people's control group and explains what the long-range plan should contain and how one should maintain a journal--the basic document which reflects all the work of the group, helps to implement systematic monitoring of the implementation of suggestions and recommendations, and serves as the basis for the preparation of reporting documents. The author's recommendations are clear, expedient, and rational.

The editors proceeded correctly in that soon after the election campaign in the organs of people's control they devoted special attention to the training of the public watchmen. Recommendations and explanations were constantly published on thematic pages under the headings, "On Your Request," "Into the Activist's Notebook," and "The Lecture Bureau of the People's Controller." Then, considering that the watchmen had already acquired certain knowledge and experience, the editors introduced a new, more capacious and pithy heading--"The Watchmen's Work Style," under which they began to publish materials which analyze the activity of the people's controllers.

On the page being reviewed room was found for photographs, two announcements, and the publication, "Serviceman, Remember!" which contains specific figures and facts which direct the reader toward a careful attitude toward material and technical resources. A report on measures adopted in accordance with critical

reports was published under the heading, "After the Newspaper Article." By the way, it should be said that the report has a specific, businesslike nature.

The topical satire, "Duck with a Trailer," can be called adornment of the page. Skillfully using facts with good effect, its authors mercilessly ridicule bribe-taking and expose the true face of the swindler who was engaged in the misappropriation of produce intended for the soldiers' mess. The satirical arrows of the topical satire were sharply honed and sent to the target accurately.

Among the newspaper's successes we can include the topical satires published on other type pages: "Sinless Profits," "Fakirs," and "Schemers." Unfortunately, this combat genre which enjoys great popularity among the readers has recently disappeared completely from the pages of "The People's Control Leaf." This cannot be called anything but a retreat from positions which have been won. There is something for the editorial board of the newspaper NA BOYEVOM POSTU to ponder here.

A specific system in dealing with the activity of the people's control organs also formed in the newspaper of the Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District, LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA [Leninist Banner]. A special page, "Under the Control of the Army Public," is also published here. Each of them has an ordinal number. Evidently, this disciplines the editors: for example, if only three editions of "The People's Control Leaf" were published during the first half year (?), they are published monthly in LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA.

Naturally, the pages "Under the Control of the Army Public" have much in common with the "People's Control Leaf" but, at the same time, they have their pluses and minuses. Let us examine one of them. Placed on a prominent spot of the special-purpose page is a talk between the newspaper's correspondent and the chairman of the people's control committee of the district's construction directorate, Lieutenant Colonel R. Shipilov, where he explains the procedure for accepting housing and cultural-domestic facilities for operation and advises the army watchmen to display greater persistence and initiative and require of the members of state commissions, customers, and contractors that they observe the procedure for the conduct of all types of work strictly.

It should be noted that the editors of LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA give the floor to members of the district's people's control committee more often than other newspapers. On one of the pages the following heading even appeared: "In the People's Control Committee of the Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District," under which the results of a combined raid to check the condition of accounts and the output and completeness of making available to all personnel categories all the food and clothing and equipment supply authorized by the standards were published in the material, "Authorized by the Standard...." But unfortunately, you do not feel satisfaction having read the material. It is constructed on the statement of negative facts disclosed by the public watchmen. And really, does the reader of such articles expect this? For comparison, one automatically wants to turn to the materials of PRAVDA under the heading, "In the USSR Committee of People's Control." A discussion of negative phenomena usually takes place in them, too, but from a different point of view: measures adopted by the committee for the most rapid elimination of shortcomings are reported. There just is none of this in the article "Authorized by the Standard...."

One must only regret that the editors did not utilize the opportunity offered them to show clearly and convincingly the effectiveness of checks of the organs of people's control.

It is with interest that one reads on the page being reviewed the sketch by Warrant Officer F. Polyakov, "Guarding Property," under the heading, "About Those Who Are Going in Front." It is with warmth and sincere confidence that the author tells about his brother soldier and public watchman, Warrant Officer A. Alaverdyan.

Sketches about watchmen are also encountered on other pages, "Under Control of the Army Public." In comparing them, you are convinced that "Guarding Property" is one of the most successful. It shows the watchman in action and in many others he is presented to the readers primarily as an official and not a people's controller, and all his activity is reduced basically to the performance of official duties.

The agitated letter of Major V. Zverev, "They Elected and Forgot," does not leave the reader indifferent. It discusses the fact that the new composition of the people's control group headed by Captain V. Avtondalov is inactive and that no one is leading it or imposing the necessary requirements on it. The letter saw the light under the heading, "An Acute Signal," and, naturally, required a response concerning measures adopted. But the corresponding article could not be found in subsequent editions of the page. Unfortunately, this is far from a single instance. Answers are encountered which do not bear on the questions raised. There is graphic confirmation of this in the newspaper NA BOYEVOM POSTU--the "follow-up" to the rejoinder, "The Heavy Load of Trifles," in which the poor work of the watchmen was discussed. The editors displayed a certain persistence in the struggle for the elimination of shortcomings disclosed in the topical satire, "Fakirs." They returned to it three times and in spite of everything a detailed answer on measures adopted was obtained. It appeared that order had been introduced. But when, several months later, I had the occasion to visit this unit and become acquainted with the activity of the people's controllers, it was learned that no noticeable improvement had occurred.

In LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA several editions of the page "Under Control of the Army Public" have already been published on strictly determined subjects: Number 205, for example, was devoted to problems in saving electric power, Number 206--water, and Number 207--to problems in improving the training-material base. This has its positive aspects. But the question arises: if the newspaper discussed the saving of electric power in March, in how many months will it be able to return to these problems again? Are they really all solved by this page?

And one more remark: the LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA pages are losing their combat vitality from edition to edition, and such contemplation is manifested in them more and more graphically. Reports on raids especially sin in this regard. Here is one of them published in March--"Stricter Demand--Fewer Losses." You read it and your heart melts from tender emotion: how well everything is.! And suddenly: "...The raid disclosed something else, and namely--shortcomings in indoctrinational work among the personnel." What is there to say: strict demand!

The April edition published material of the raid brigade, "Because Without Water...." In its key, it repeats the preceding material. Only in the last paragraph is it noted that among the neighbors where the Komsomol activists Sergeants V. Litvin and Yu. Gamma serve not all the faucets were in good working order, the water babbled out of them in trickles, and the "man on duty paid no attention to the babbling." The watchmen found such a deficiency after all and, as they say, even nodded at the guilty ones.

So as not to repeat ourselves, we will not make a detailed analysis of the May edition under the headline, "The Training-Material Base--at the Level of the Day's Requirements." We will only say that having read it, the impression is created that allegedly all problems in improving the training-material base have been solved in the Transcaucasus Military District and there is nothing for the watchmen to do.

One conclusion suggests itself: devotion to principle should be instilled in the watchmen more purposefully. And this means that they should be even more self-demanding and note flaws in their own work. The overwhelming majority of the people's controllers, as a rule, are those who serve as examples both in service and in public life. But, let us say directly, for the present far from everyone is demonstrating combat vitality and initiative. Some make the remark that they dare not make a sensible suggestion. But on this sector of social work especially energetic, persistent, and principled people are needed because at times it is necessary to enter into conflict and "sharpen the angles." The conversation rarely turns to this on the pages of the publications being reviewed.

In analyzing the newspapers NA BOYEVOM POSTU, LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA, and others you come to the conclusion that problems concerning party leadership of the people's control organs are reflected very poorly in them. Virtually absent are statements of commanders concerning what conditions they are creating for the effective work of the watchmen and how they react to their critical remarks and recommendations. The official coworkers of the editors also sidestep these subjects. As we see, the journalists of two military newspapers have far from exhausted all possibilities and reserves in dealing with the activity of the people's controllers.

In the work "Great Initiative," V. I. Lenin wrote: "Our press is not concerned, or is almost not at all concerned about describing the best dining halls or nurseries, achieving the transformation of some of them into model ones by daily insistence, and advertizing them and describing in detail what savings in human labor, what conveniences for the consumers, what economy in food products, and what...improvement in sanitary conditions are attained with exemplary communist work and what can be attained and can be extended to all society and all the workers." The criterion of effectiveness indicated by Vladimir Il'ich remains the determining one for the press even today. Correctly molding public opinion, its task is to stimulate to action those people on whom the solution of the problem depends. Stimulation to action, mobilization of the men for an actual matter, the example of a press organ in activity and combat vitality--all this is that necessary bridge between word and deed which should be "built" by each district, group, and fleet newspaper, showing clearly and with inspiration the work of the organs of people's control in the Armed Forces.

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PARTY PRIORITIES EMPHASIZE RESPONSIBILITY OF OFFICERS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 18, Sep 84 (signed to press 4 Sep 84) pp 9-14

[Unattributed article: "An Exacting Review of Party Work"]

[Text] In line with the ending of the term set by the CPSU By-Laws for the powers of the elective leading bodies in the Army and Navy party organizations, reports and elections have been set. These will be held in the party organizations of military schools in September-October and in the party organizations of the units, ships, military institutions, enterprises and organizations, in October-November of the current year. The party committees elected in accord with the Instructions to the CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy for a period of 2-3 years, will not report this year. They will inform the communists about their activities at meetings of the subunit party organizations and party groups.

Reports and elections in the party organizations are a major event in their life, an exacting review of party work, an assessment of its effectiveness, a critical analysis of shortcomings and the determining of a precise program of activities for the future. A particular feature in the current report-election meetings is the fact that they are being held at a crucial stage in the life of the party and the state and all our people as the 11th Five-Year Plan is drawing to a close and preparations for the 27th CPSU Congress are beginning.

"For us, the communists, preparations for a congress," commented Comrade K. U. Chernenko, "is a period for reflection, for summing up what has been achieved and a period of actively reinforcing all the positive that we have achieved. This is also a time for drawing lessons from the mistakes made, of self-critical analysis of shortcomings and determining the ways to surmount them; most importantly for determining the ways to carry out new major tasks." This idea voiced at the April (1984) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee is of crucial significance for each party element and hence also for the Army and Navy party organizations.

The Army and Navy communists must thoroughly analyze the activities of the party organizations from the standpoint of the increased demands made upon them and found in the decisions of the February and April (1984) plenums of the party Central Committee, in the speeches of the General Secretary of the CPSU

Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade K. U. Chernenko, and in the Central Committee's conclusions on the main results of the reports and elections in the party held at the end of 1983 and the start of 1984. These ideas have helped to further activate internal party life, to strengthen all organizational and political work in the masses, to strengthen military discipline and to raise combat readiness of the troops and naval forces.

In firmly and steadfastly carrying out party policy in the Armed Forces and in unswervingly fulfilling the decisions of its 26th Congress, the Army and Navy party organizations have provided a further uniting of the personnel around the CPSU Leninist Central Committee. The men unanimously support the consistent and tested course of the party's domestic and foreign policy under the conditions of the unprecedentedly aggravated conflict between socialism and capitalism and the military danger which has been increased due to the fault of imperialism and has immeasurably increased the responsibility of the Armed Forces for the security of the Soviet state and the entire socialist commonwealth.

The work of the Army and Navy organizations more and more is marked by increased attention to the major questions of combat readiness, the standing of alert duty, the field, air and sea skills of the personnel, and to improving their moral-political and psychological preparedness considering the technical equipping and purpose of the units and ships. In carrying out the party decisions, the demands in the orders of the USSR minister of defense, the provisions of the previous report-election meetings and the proposals voiced by the communists, many party organizations in the troop collectives have been able to establish an atmosphere of authentic professionalism, creativity, initiative and exactingness. In the course of exercises, cruises by ships, aviation flights and in standing alert duty, the elective party bodies have endeavored to show themselves as authentic organizers of the masses and the initiators of the socialist competition to worthily celebrate the 40th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War. The party organizations have begun to be more concerned for the vanguard role of the communists in training and service.

For example, take the party organization of the unit where Maj M. Romanchuk is one of the party committee members. In actually being the core of the military collective, it during the entire report period has had a daily impact on all aspects of the personnel's life, training and service. The party committee members first of all themselves know well the combat training documents and the demands on the organizing of alert duty, they knowledgeably bring up before the command questions related to improving the quality of personnel instruction, they promptly disclose and fundamentally assess the shortcomings and place particularly high demands on the communists who determine the adopting of measures aimed at eliminating abnormal phenomena. During the summer training period, the party committee thoroughly analyzed the course of carrying out the decree of the previous report-election meeting as well as the proposals and critical comments of the communists and took over control over a number of problems which had not been completely successfully resolved, in particular, party work to ensure high-quality field firing. These questions were also discussed at party committee sessions and meetings of the subunit party organizations. The party committee showed greater attention to military-technical propaganda, it



began to be more profoundly interested in fulfilling the standards of combat service and the preparation of the communists to take exams for class rating and frequently heard at its sessions their statements and reports on the fulfillment of prescribed duties. Strict demands, concern and attention told favorably on the deeds of the communists and all the personnel. All the field firings were carried out excellently by the regiment.

During the report period the party organizations have strengthened their influence on the development of the socialist competition which this year is being carried out under the motto "Be On Guard and Constantly Ready to Defend the Victories of Socialism!" The questions of organizing the competition at the exercises and in the course of training and cruises as well as seeking out unused reserves in fulfilling the accepted obligations are constantly at the center of attention of the party organizations. The competition has begun to be better organized for tasks and standards between the specialists, teams, crews and subunits for increasing class rating. Such experience, for example, has been gained in the party organization of the regiment where Capt S. Poretsov is one of the bureau members. Here, considering the proposals from the communists and the decisions of the last report-election meeting, great attention has been given to propagandizing advanced experience; speeches by the competition winners have been organized for all the men. It is largely due to the communists that the unit has struggled successfully for the title of outstanding. Some 89 percent of the communists have become masters of military affairs and specialists 1st and 2d class.

A good deal of experience in party work in carrying out the tasks of combat training has undoubtedly been acquired by other party organizations. Quite understandably this will be widely dealt with at the report-election meetings. At the same time, one cannot but help see something else. In a number of the party organizations there are substantial failings in the work of supporting the tasks of combat training. These shortcomings are explained primarily by the poor effectiveness of party work which does not everywhere consider the particular features of the combat training missions being carried out by the units and ships and by a lack of attention to the critical comments voiced previously by the communists. That this is the case is seen, for example, in the recent inspection of one of the Northern Fleet formations. Here the party organizations at times organized their work in isolation from the missions being carried out by the ships. The staff party organization where Capt 3d Rank A. Borshchevskiy is the party bureau secretary for example, did not properly carry out one-half of the proposals made by the communists at the previous report-election meeting. And these proposals dealt basically with the problems of increasing the effectiveness of the training process and improving ASW training. It was no accident that the previously existing oversights were not promptly eliminated.

At the report-election meetings, it is essential to carefully discuss how effective are the various specific forms and methods of party work in carrying out the tasks of combat and political training, to assess the initiative, activeness and principledness shown by the elective bodies and outline ways for further improving their work aimed at increasing the combat capability and readiness of the subunits, units and ships. It is essential to thoroughly examine

how the recommendations of the Sixth All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries are being carried out in the area of strengthening party influence on the training process and whether or not the party organizations have shown a demanding approach to ensuring the personal examples set by the communists in service and studies and to instances of weaknesses and oversimplification and a formal attitude to the organizing of the socialist competition and to the carrying out of adopted obligations.

The questions of ideological work will be at the center of attention of the report-election meetings. In carrying out the decisions of the June (1983) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the party organizations are working steadily so that this effort has an evermore effective, purposeful and offensive nature. The party committees and bureaus have shown more attention to the Marxist-Leninist and political training of the party members and candidate members and to their active involvement in ideological and political-indoctrinational work.

But, unfortunately, far from all the party collectives are fully aware that the chief criterion for the effectiveness of the efforts of the communists in this sphere is the increased political awareness, service activity of the men, their conviction and discipline as well as implacability for bourgeois ideology. For instance, the party bureau of the petrol boat "Gromkiy" where Sr Lt V. Arsent'yev is the secretary, as a consequence of insufficient attention to ideological work and to the political studies of the communists, was unable to effectively influence increased intensity of the training process and was not concerned about the more rational use of such forms of political work as colloquiums with the communists, hearing their statements and reports and the propagandizing of advanced experience. Understandably all of this could not help but tell on the results of combat training and the state of military discipline in a number of the ship's subunits.

In light of the demands of the June (1983) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the report-election meetings must thoroughly examine the set-up of ideological indoctrination, its role in uniting the military collectives, its influence on the growth of the political awareness of the men, their zealous fulfillment of their patriotic duty and on the successful carrying out of the tasks of combat readiness. It is important to analyze how the communists propagandize the party decisions and its domestic and foreign policy and what they are doing to further unite the multinational military and labor collectives. Considering the ideas of the CPSU Central Committee it is essential to put a special emphasis on further improving the work of the party organizations aimed at instilling in the youth a class self-awareness, high organization, collectivism, internationalist qualities and wholeheartedness in carrying out military duty and in the struggle for the ideals of communism.

At the present stage in the development of the Army and Navy the importance of discipline, organization and law and order has increased further. Where the party organizations, together with the commanders, the political bodies and staffs, conduct active and purposeful organizational and political-indoctrinational work aimed at carrying out the demands of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Minister of Defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, there the tasks of combat readiness are more successfully carried out. But, unfortunately, we still have units and ships where

party influence on the struggle for strong prescribed order has been weakened. One can feel the poor quality of the political indoctrination measures, their weak tie with the life of the personnel, and an underestimation of the importance of a differentiated, individual approach to the men, of constant concern for the personal example set by the communists and their indoctrinational work with the men in the subunits.

Considering the present demands on discipline, the meetings must thoroughly assess both the effectiveness of the elective bodies in strengthening this as well as the fulfillment of the prescribed regulations by the communists. In particular, they must examine whether everything is being done by the party members and candidate members who previously had been criticized at the meetings and sessions of the party bureaus and committees to increase their contribution to imposing strict prescribed order and whether they understand that it is essential not only to carry out the requirements of the regulations, orders and instructions in an exemplary manner but also to have an unflagging impact on the conduct of the servicemen, the maintaining of discipline and a healthy moral atmosphere in the troop collective of the subunit, unit and ship.

It is particularly important to analyze the experience and shortcomings in the work aimed at strengthening discipline among the officers, warrant officers ["praporshchik" and "michman"], sergeants and petty officers who to a decisive degree determine the state of order in the subunit, unit and ship as a whole. In this regard, increasing the pedagogical and professional training of this personnel has assumed particular importance and this must also be taken up in the course of the reports and elections.

The meetings must focus the party aktiv on more profoundly explaining to the personnel Soviet laws, the military oath and regulations. A principled discussion must be held on the need to respond acutely and quickly to instances of inefficiency, impoliteness, improper relationships, to instances of drunkenness, abuses of official position and violating of the standards of communist morality and morals.

The determining thing in the activities of the party organizations is the content of their inner life, the maturity of intraparty relations and the consistent observance of Leninist standards of party life. It must be pointed out that in the work of the party organizations there is more professionalism, organization and purposefulness, the principle of collectivism is more strictly observed and the organizing of party information has been improved. The party committees and bureaus are more concerned for strengthening the party organizations and groups in the subunits. At the same time, we still have not gotten rid of many shortcomings in intraparty life noted in the past. In certain party collectives as before they underestimate control and checks on execution and organizational work does not always follow a decision. There still are instances when individuals in their activity take over for the commanders and chiefs and the questions are viewed from command and administrative viewpoints.

All of this must be thoroughly analyzed at the meetings, bearing in mind that the main thing in party work is work with the men, the organizing of a check on execution and a unity of word and deed, decision and implementation. It is essential to look exactly at how the elective bodies are engaged in

indoctrinating the communists in practical work and in the process of carrying out party assignments. In the accountability reports it is important to thoroughly analyze the style of activities of the party committees and bureaus and their effectiveness.

The question of increasing the ranks of the CPSU must be discussed with particular care and exactingness, having focused basic attention on further raising the calling of a party member. It is not the number of persons admitted to the CPSU but rather the strength of their impact on increasing the militancy of the party organizations which is the main criterion for work in this area. It is essential to more exactly assess the objectivity of the communists in giving recommendations to more strictly approach the admitting to the party at meetings and to deal sharply even with individual instances of giving recommendations for the CPSU to persons who have in no way distinguished themselves; the same applies to a lack of attention shown to the candidate period.

It is also essential to profoundly analyze the practice of preparing and holding party meetings, the sessions of the party committees and party bureaus, the state of criticism and self-criticism, the attitude of the communists to this, and their involvement in carrying out the proposals and critical comments voiced at the meetings.

Each organization has its own particular activities. These must be more fully considered in the report-election meetings. As an example, let us take the party organizations of the staffs and headquarters bodies. Their attention in the meetings will be focused on the questions of improving the work style of the personnel and the organizational activities of the communists in the units and on the ships. In the party organizations of the military schools, in the forefront will be the questions of strengthening the effect on the educational and indoctrinational process, the quality of instruction, on strengthening its link with the life of the troops, and the problems of preparing the personnel to carry out the tasks of training and indoctrinating the personnel. The party organizations of the military enterprises and institutions also have their particular features. Here close attention must be given to analyzing the party work aimed at carrying out the construction plans and increasing labor productivity and the quality of the produced product.

A major area in the work of the party organizations is leadership over the Komsomol and trade union organizations as well as the activities of the people's control bodies. Improving the style and methods of this leadership and ensuring its concreteness and professionalism also merit proper discussion at the meetings.

At present, the questions of strengthening party leadership over the Komsomol have assumed particular pertinence.

Considering the demands of the decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the instructions of Comrade K. U. Chernenko given in his speech at the All-Army Conference of Komsomol Organization Secretaries, the political bodies and party organizations have outlined measures aimed at improving Komsomol leadership. It is essential to inform the communists about the implementation of these measures and to focus attention on further increasing the demands made on the party

members and candidate members working in the Komsomol, on developing and supporting the initiative of the Komsomol organizations aimed at improving the communist indoctrination of the youth, and strengthening the contribution of the Komsomol members to carrying out military and political training and the strengthening of military discipline.

The successful holding of each report-election meeting depends upon its careful preparation. From the experience of previous years, it is essential to involve in this important manner the largest possible number of communists, and more fully analyze all areas of party work, having paid particular attention to its content, forms, methods and effectiveness. Special attention must be given to preparing the accountability report which should be informative, business like, principled and self-critical. Only under this condition will it set the necessary tone for the meeting.

The political bodies must be concerned that each meeting be characterized by a creative and business-like situation which ensures the active participation of all the communists in discussing the major questions of party life. Due to the fact that party conferences will not be held during the current year, the political bodies must inform the party organizations on the carrying out of the decisions of previous conferences, on the activities of the party commissions and the fulfillment of assignments by the communists.

In the interest of ensuring unflagging leadership over the reports and elections, the political bodies, as before, will make it a practice of sending their workers to the meetings. And this requires early concern for the careful instructing of the representatives so that they can help the aktiv in resolving organizational questions and ensure the observance of intraparty democracy. As in previous years, the results of the first meetings must be generalized in order to consider both the positive and negative aspects in their preparation and holding and draw the necessary conclusions from this. In the political bodies it is advisable to hear statements by the secretaries of the party committees and party bureaus as well as by the deputy commanders for political affairs on the course of the reports and elections.

In the report-election meetings, the communists will choose the party group organizers, the secretaries and their deputies and the members of the party bureaus and committees. On the one hand, it is important that truly worthy communists, capable organizers who have the high regard of the collectives be elected to the party body. On the other, it is essential to be concerned with the prompt instructing of this aktiv since it, as practice shows, will be significantly replaced. The political bodies must not draw out this work until the end of all the report-election meetings. It must be done immediately after the meetings, having paid special attention to individual instructing.

It is equally important to effectively generalize and organize the fulfillment of the decisions adopted at the meetings as well as the proposals and comments from the party members and candidate members. The political bodies must show an attentive attitude to those comments which involve the activities of the superior levels and draw appropriate conclusions from these comments.

The report-election party meetings are an important time in the life of each party organization. The Army and Navy communists demonstrate at them their monolithic unity, their wholehearted dedication to the Communist Party, and their readiness with even greater tenacity to strengthen the combat might of the Armed Forces and to unstintingly carry out the missions of defending the peaceful, creative labor of the Soviet people.

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ARMY GEN GRIBKOV ON SACRED MISSION OF WARSAW PACT

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[Article by Army Gen A. Gribkov, chief of staff and the first deputy commander-in-chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact States: "The Noble Mission of the Warsaw Pact"]

[Text] Less than a year remains until the Soviet people, the peoples of the other socialist commonwealth countries and the men of their armies will solemnly celebrate the glorious jubilee of the 40th anniversary of the great victory. The defeat of Nazi Germany and militarist Japan where the Soviet Union made the decisive contribution, contributed to the success of the people's democratic revolutions in a number of European and Asian countries and to the formation of the world socialist system.

However, even during the first postwar years, the militaristic threat from the imperialist states grew stronger. In 1949, the aggressive NATO military bloc was formed and it was aimed against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. Under these conditions they were forced to adopt similar measures to strengthen their defenses. In 1955, the Warsaw Pact was established as a defensive military-political alliance of the socialist commonwealth countries.

The urgent need to defend the socialist victories against the joint efforts of imperialism led to a pooling of not only economic and political but also military might of the peace-loving socialist states. The words of V. I. Lenin were affirmed who in February 1920 had said: "...In confronting the enormous front of imperialist powers, we who are fighting against imperialism conceive of an alliance which requires a close military unity and any attempts to violate this unity will be viewed by us as a completely inadmissible phenomenon and as a betrayal of the interests of the struggle against international imperialism.... We say: there must be a unity of military forces and a deviation from this unity is unacceptable" (PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 40, pp 98-99).

In being guided by Lenin's ideas, the Warsaw Pact states for almost three decades now have carried high the banner of proletarian internationalism and have waged a stubborn struggle for peace and for preventing war and for establishing favorable conditions for the building of socialism and communism. Under the conditions of the greater activity of the reactionary imperialist forces,

the Warsaw Pact countries feel it necessary in the future to closely combine peace-loving foreign policy actions with a constant concern for further increasing their defense capability. The joint, collective activities to strengthen the military-political alliance are important. In April 1984, in presenting an award to the Polish Minister of National Defense, Gen of Arms F. Siwicki, Comrade K. U. Chernenko noted the permanent importance of collective efforts by the allied states to strengthen the Warsaw Pact which serves as a dependable shield in the struggle to prevent a nuclear war and for thwarting the attempts of the most reactionary imperialist circles to organize a "crusade" against socialism.

The military alliance of the fraternal countries is based on strong sociopolitical, economic, ideological and military-strategic grounds which guarantee its unity and stability.

The sociopolitical basis for the unity of the Warsaw Pact armies derives from the commonness of their state and social system and leadership by the communist and worker parties is a major sociopolitical factor in strengthening this unity.

The commonwealth of socialist nations, in being united by common fundamental interests and goals, is moving steadily forward, it is strengthening and gaining force, and is having an ever-growing impact on the course of world development. In carrying out the historic decisions of the congresses of the communist and worker parties, the fraternal countries have achieved major successes in all spheres of social life. Our common accomplishments demonstrate the great strength of communist ideals and further raise the prestige of the socialist commonwealth which sets an example for other peoples of ongoing socioeconomic progress, a new type of interstate relations, an authentically democratic society and the justness of the socialist way of life.

To a significant degree the rapid economic growth of the fraternal socialist countries has been aided by the efficient implementation of the comprehensive program for socialist economic integration and by the successful activities of CEMA which is based upon the Warsaw Pact member states. The economic summit meeting of the CEMA member nations held in Moscow was a major international event of recent months. This was a significant turning point in the life of the fraternal socialist countries and in strengthening their unity and cooperation on the path of carrying out major tasks in the interests of increasing economic and defense might and improving the prosperity of the people.

At present, the socialist commonwealth nations are a monolithic alliance with a dynamically developing economy which has provided over one-half of the increase in world industrial production. Its industrial might is greater than that of the United States and greater than all the Western European countries.

The ideological basis for the unity of the fraternal socialist countries is Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism and a belief in the great principles of the international solidarity of the working class and all toilers in the struggle against imperialism and for the victory of communism. The socialist nations are united by the common goal of building a new society and by the common task of defending revolutionary victories and national independence from the encroachments of the aggressive forces.



The successes of building a new society in the USSR and the other fraternal countries have further strengthened this alliance in all regards and to a significant degree have contributed to the further rise in the defense might of the socialist commonwealth.

The events which are occurring on the international scene indicate that ensuring the security of the fraternal peoples and preserving peace are linked to the existence of the Warsaw Pact. The history of mankind knows no other military alliance with such noble goals and tasks. This is its fundamental distinction from the military coalitions of the past and from all the current blocs of the capitalist states.

All the history of the defensive military-political organization of the socialist commonwealth countries is a history of the struggle to resolve disputed questions by talks and for eliminating a military confrontation. At the same time, the Warsaw Pact has been and remains a dependable shield of socialism and an important factor for peace. In the most alarming days for mankind, when the international horizon has darkened with storm clouds, the firm and reasonable position of this alliance has helped to halt the irrational militant imperialist circles and has opened up prospects for normalizing the situation.

A scientifically sound, foreign policy course of the fraternal socialist states is worked out jointly within the Warsaw Pact. The foreign policy activities of the USSR, our friends and allies are aimed at strengthening peace between peoples, at freeing mankind from the nuclear threat and ensuring favorable external conditions for peaceful construction in which the peoples of the Soviet Union and the other member states of the fraternal commonwealth are engaged. Foreign policy is coordinated on a class, Marxist-Leninist basis in the interests of the socialist commonwealth, the successful development of the world revolutionary movement and providing international security and in the general interests of combating the growing military threat from the aggressive circles of the United States and NATO.

The fraternal countries offer an alternative to the growing military threat and to the dangerous arms race which the most reactionary circles of imperialism, primarily the United States, are fostering. This alternative is a policy of strengthening peace and lessening international tension and of constructive collaboration. Many peace-loving foreign policy initiatives which have been made by the Warsaw Pact countries have served as the basis for resolutions of other international forums or have been reflected in a number of important bilateral international acts.

The problems of ensuring European security as a major condition of international peace have been and are constantly at the center of attention of the allied nations. The European continent has twice been the center of world wars initiated by imperialism and here at present is found the main military grouping of the aggressive NATO bloc; here hostile actions have been repeatedly carried out against the socialist states. A majority of the meetings of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee has been devoted to elaborating and concretizing a program for strengthening peace in Europe.

An important result of the coordinated foreign policy of the fraternal countries has been the concluding of treaties by the USSR, Poland, GDR and CSSR with West

Germany confirming the inviolability of the frontiers of the European states and reinforcing the major results of the liberation struggle of the European peoples during the years of World War II and postwar development.

The protracted struggle of the Warsaw Pact countries to establish a collective security system in Europe has also born a tangible practical result. The effective system of the collective defense of socialism has been a new, important factor in all international life and a dependable guarantee against the aggressive intrigues of imperialism. Never before has the coordinating of foreign policy activities among the Warsaw Pact states been so profound and effective as in recent years. Joint efforts have paralyzed the attempts of American imperialism to establish a diplomatic and economic blockade against Cuba. Socialism has been firmly established on the Island of Liberty and the international positions of Cuba have been strengthened. The attempts have failed of international reaction to wrench Poland from the fraternal family of the socialist commonwealth countries.

The Warsaw Pact states, in conducting a coordinated foreign policy course aimed at lessening international tension and at preventing the arms race, at the same time cannot help but consider the aggressiveness of imperialism, particularly American, which has grown sharply in recent years. The leaders of Washington are endeavoring at any price to disrupt the military-strategic equilibrium between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and which impedes their adventuristic actions. Programs have been rapidly carried out which are aimed at deploying qualitatively new strategic weapons systems, space weapons systems, the nuclear-missile "arming-up" of NATO and the building up of the groupings of U.S. Armed Forces in Europe, Asia, Central and South America. Laser and ray weapons are being developed, and conventional types of combat equipment are being improved. The offensive capabilities of the armies, air forces and navies are being increased at full speed.

U.S. military outlays have been increasing in an unprecedented manner. Under peacetime conditions, the growth rate of the military budget has been brought by the Reagan Administration up to an average of 17 percent a year. Over the last 3 years, the Pentagon has already received around 640 billion dollars, and 265.3 billion have been allocated for 1984 while over the next 5 years the military allocations will be 2 trillion dollars. It has taken the Pentagon almost the last 35 postwar years to spend this amount.

The present-day military-political situation is characterized by an increased military threat to the socialist commonwealth countries from the ultrareactionary imperialist forces of the United States and its NATO partners. The so-called "arming up" of NATO carried out by the American ruling circles has clearly unmasked the true goals of those who hope to resolve the historic dispute between the two social systems by using such an evil argument as thermonuclear weapons. This shows the antihuman, immoral, cynical essence of modern imperialism and its aggressive foreign policy.

The appearance of the American Pershings and cruise missiles on the European continent has become an accomplished fact. This is a direct threat to the security of the USSR and the entire socialist commonwealth, and is a step extremely inimical to the cause of peace and aimed against the whole world and

socialism. All of this shows that the current American administration at full speed is carrying out practical steps in the aim of upsetting the military-strategic equilibrium existing in Europe and the world and achieving military superiority over the USSR and its allies.

Simultaneously with increasing military preparations, the U.S. Administration has undertaken attempts to mobilize all the forces of international reaction, militarism and aggression to fight against detente and to unite them on an anti-Soviet, antisocialist basis. Washington is endeavoring at any price to make the other imperialist states, primarily the NATO partners, accomplices in its piratical actions as well as draw certain developing countries into its military adventures.

In the existing situation, the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries cannot allow themselves to be caught by surprise and be unprepared to decisively repel imperialist aggression. The USSR, in agreement with its allies, has been forced to take retaliatory measures which it warned of long ago. Among such retaliatory measures is the revising of the decision of the Soviet Union to impose an unilateral moratorium on the deployment of medium-range missiles in the European USSR. By agreement with the GDR and CSSR governments, we have deployed operational-tactical missiles of increased range on their territory.

Also amongst the mentioned retaliatory measures is the deploying of the appropriate Soviet equipment in ocean areas and seas which in their performance will be equal to that threat which the American missiles deployed in Europe represent for us and our allies. For any actions involving a change in the existing military-strategic balance, other measures will be adopted ensuring the security of the Soviet Union and all the socialist commonwealth countries.

Considering the existing situation in Europe, at a session of the Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers Committee held at the end of last year in the capital of Bulgaria, Sofia, the questions were examined of the practical activities of the Joint Armed Forces in the spirit of the Prague Political Declaration and the joint statement of the leading party and state figures of the seven socialist states, and the appropriate decisions were taken.

These measures must be viewed not as a threat to the nations of the NATO bloc, and primarily the United States, but as a necessity dictated by the vital interests of the security of the Warsaw Pact countries. They are aimed at restraining the overseas adventurers from attempting to make a nuclear attack with impunity in the hope of using it to achieve victory. "The security and defense capability of our countries," commented the USSR Minister of Defense, MSU D. F. Ustinov, "have been and will be on a level to teach any aggressor not to try its strength on us."

At the same time the steps initiated are aimed at preventing an outburst of a global nuclear conflict which would threaten all states and peoples without exception.

The retaliatory measures undertaken by the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies have been unanimously approved by our people and the workers of the other socialist commonwealth countries and have been greeted with support and understanding by all good-willed people abroad.

One of the most important areas in the activities of the Warsaw Pact is the further strengthening of the Joint Armed Forces and the combat alliance of the fraternal armies. Over many years, effective forms of collaboration have been worked out and these are aimed at the steady growth of combat readiness in each of the national armies and the strengthening of the combat alliance of the socialist nations as a whole. In recent years, the Warsaw Pact has become significantly stronger. Due to the collective efforts, the armed forces of the allied states are on a high level of combat readiness. They possess modern equipment, they are well trained and have high moral-political potential.

The Defense Ministers Committee has worked fruitfully on strengthening the defense might of the Warsaw Pact countries and their armed forces. Close military collaboration of the allied countries has also been carried out within the Joint Command, the Military Council, the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces and other military bodies of the Warsaw Pact. The work of the allied military bodies is carried out in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and fraternal friendship.

The allied armies give great importance to coordinating efforts on the questions of the organizational development of the troops and naval forces, to mutual aid in providing standardized weapons and military equipment and in the rapid mastery of the new types of weapons by the personnel, to exchanging experience in the organization and execution of operational and combat training and to working out and introducing into practice the most effective, unified methods for training and indoctrinating the personnel.

The Joint Command coordinates efforts in the area of military organizational development and the training of the Joint Armed Forces, equipping and increasing their combat capabilities. Within the Warsaw Pact, a unity of views has been achieved on the questions of the development of the armed services and branches of troops as well as the strengthening of their military-technical base. At meetings, consultations and conferences for the leadership of the allied armies, the training plans are discussed for the Joint Armed Forces as well as various joint measures related to improving the combat readiness of the troops and fleets. On this level of great importance were the official friendly visits held in 1984 to the Soviet Union by a GDR Military Delegation headed by the member of the Politburo of the SED Central Committee and GDR Minister of National Defense, Army Gen H. Hoffmann, the Polish Military Delegation headed by the Candidate Member of the Politburo of the PZPR Central Committee and Polish Minister of Defense, Gen of Arms F. Siwicki, as well as the working visit by the member of the MSZMP Central Committee and Hungarian Minister of Defense, Army Gen L. Czinege.

In the system of the Warsaw Pact military bodies, an exceptionally important role is played by the Staff of the Joint Armed Forces. It is the working body of the Defense Ministers Committee and the headquarters body of the commander-in-chief of the Joint Armed Forces. In their practical work the generals and officers of the staff pay chief attention to increasing the combat and mobilizational readiness of the Joint Armed Forces, to improving the operational and combat training of the troops and naval forces assigned to them, to working out long-range plans for the development of the fraternal armies and for coordinating military-technical policy, and to the all-round strengthening of the

combat alliance. The staff is the organizer of a majority of the joint measures conducted under the plans of the Joint Command. It not only studies the acquired experience and promising undertakings but also works out specific measures to propagandize and introduce them.

The Staff of the Joint Armed Forces is a unified, united and smoothly-operating organism which is a true example of socialist internationalism and fraternity in arms. Its activities are carried out in an atmosphere of complete mutual understanding and comradely mutual aid and high responsibility for each worker for the assigned job. The party organizations are the unifying elements of the staff and the other headquarters bodies of the Joint Armed Forces. Their work is permeated with a feeling of cooperation and a spirit of great international friendship.

In the combat cooperation of the allied armies, a special place is held by the joint troop and command-staff exercises conducted according to the plans of the Joint Command. The exercises are of great military-political importance. They demonstrate the growing defense might of the socialist states and mobilize the personnel of the allied armies to defend the revolutionary victories of our peoples. At the same time, the exercises enrich the military art of the socialist armies, they help to improve the operational training of the commanders and staffs and raise the combat skill of the troops, and they make it possible most effectively to work out the questions of organizing cooperation and troop control.

The joint exercises inevitably become a vivid demonstration of the constantly strengthening combat alliance of the fraternal armies, of international solidarity, military friendship and camaraderie. Joint activities, mutual aid and support under the difficult conditions of the exercises bring the men spiritually closer together, and strengthen a feeling of a helping hand and confidence in their brothers in arms. In the course of the exercises it has become traditional to hold friendly meetings for the representatives of the fraternal armies and local population and to exchange military delegations. The major exercises of the Joint Armed Forces like "Soyuz" [Union], "Shchit" [Shield] and "Bratstvo po oruzhiyu" [Fraternity in Arms] have become a school of military skill and a school of internationalism.

The groups of Soviet forces temporarily stationed on the territory of the GDR, Poland, CSSR and Hungary hold a special place in the development of ties with the personnel of the allied armies and population of these states. Broad collaboration along all lines, close friendship and fraternity permeate all aspects of these relationships. Close friendship has also been established among the personnel of the Baltic, Belorussian, Carpathian and Odessa Military Districts and the Black Sea and Baltic Fleets with the armies, fleets and population of the allied countries.

The strong ties between the political bodies, the party and youth organizations of the fraternal armies are an important means for strengthening the combat alliance. They make it possible to exchange experience in ideological work and the indoctrination of the personnel in a spirit of high revolutionary vigilance and socialist solidarity. This work is carried out on the basis of the decisions of the communist and worker parties of the Warsaw Pact countries,

considering the national features and traditions of each fraternal army. Collaboration among the socialist state armies is being broadened in the area of the international indoctrination of the personnel; their cooperation has been strengthened in organizing ideological work related to unmasking the reactionary essence of bourgeois ideology, false bourgeois propaganda and the aggressiveness of international imperialism. And this is understandable as the increased efforts by the class enemy to have a demoralizing impact on the men of the Joint Armed Forces obliges us to maintain high political vigilance, to promptly rebuff any attempts by ideological subversives and to offensively employ our ideological potential for countering enemy propaganda.

The men of the Joint Armed Forces are aware of their high responsibility for defending the revolutionary victories of the workers. They are always ready to carry out their sacred international duty of defending the socialist commonwealth and maintaining peace.

The socialist defensive military-political alliance established on the principles of proletarian internationalism is a firm guarantee for the security of the socialist commonwealth and for strengthening peace in Europe and throughout the world. Our alliance has a high and noble mission: to provide favorable conditions for the building of socialism and communism to which all progressive mankind links its hopes and aspirations. Our strength and invincibility lies in the unity and solidarity of our peoples and armies, in their unswerving loyalty to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism and in unswerving adherence to the glorious revolutionary, military and labor traditions.

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MILITARY SERVICE: INSTRUMENT FOR CREATION OF 'NEW MAN'

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 18, Sep 84 (signed to press 4 Sep 84) pp 22-30

[Article by Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, Docent, Capt 1st Rank  
A. Plekhov: "A School of Life, a School of Indoctrination"\*]

[Text] The most important demand of our party on the shaping of the new man is always to be able to see the main goals of the communist indoctrination of the Soviet people and to be able to achieve them in the course of carrying out diverse practical tasks of socioeconomic and cultural development and strengthening the defense capabilities of the nation. Under Army and Navy conditions, such an approach provides the political, military and moral indoctrination of the men and makes service a school of courage, labor, collectivism, organization and discipline.

The indoctrinational role of our Armed Forces has been brought about by their sociopolitical nature, by the high social significance of military service, by the technical equipping of it, by the comprehensive nature of party political work aimed at developing in the servicemen a scientific, Marxist-Leninist ideology, communist conviction and an activist position in life. The effect of the powerful shaping factors which our Armed Forces possess on the young men who at times are politically naive and do not have sufficient experience in life for labor skills turns them into politically and morally mature defenders of the fatherland and active members of a socialist society.

The complex and diverse tasks of improving developed socialism and securely defending socialist victories under the conditions of the increased military danger caused by imperialism as well as the exacerbation of the ideological struggle on the world scene increase the demands on indoctrinational work in the Army and Navy. This applies both to the officers who organize the training and indoctrinational process and constantly direct this as well as to their subordinates who must master military skills and become ideologically mature, steadfast and able defenders of the socialist fatherland. "The people rightly call our

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\* The article is recommended for use in the system of Marxist-Leninist officer training in studying the subject "The USSR Armed Forces--A School of Military Service, Military Skill, Moral Purity, Collectivism and Courage."

Army and Navy a school of courage, industry and high morality," emphasized the June (1983) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. "We should further increase in every possible way the indoctrinational role of the Soviet Armed Forces."

Indoctrination in the broad sense of the word presupposes a comprehensive impact on the individual in the aim of preparing him for an active part in production activity, military service and social life. In the Soviet family, school, on the job, in the Komsomol, trade union and other social organizations, young people are shaped as active builders of a communist society dedicated to the great cause of the Leninist party and to their socialist fatherland; they are indoctrinated in a spirit of patriotism and internationalism and a readiness to defend the historic victories of socialism.

In the political indoctrination of the Soviet youth, military service holds a special place. It occurs precisely at that age when the process of the development and reinforcing of a person's basic qualities and his civil and social development is particularly intense. The further development of the individual and, ultimately, a certain portion of the younger generation depends upon in what direction this process occurs.

Under socialist conditions service in the army prepares a military man spiritually and physically for the armed defense of the revolutionary victories of the workers. Here lies precisely its main purpose. At the same time, service indoctrinates a citizen, an aware and active builder of communism. Thus, the Armed Forces objectively are for the youth a school of life and a school of indoctrination. During their service the young people not only master military affairs but also develop in themselves the qualities which make it possible for them to carry out military duty in an exemplary manner and in the future take a worthy place in any sphere of society's life.

The Communist Party has given exceptional importance to the indoctrinational role of our Armed Forces. Even during the period of the founding of the Red Army, the 8th RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Congress in March 1919 urged that the army be made the center not only of military instruction but also general education and political indoctrination. "The Red Army not only trains the fighters of the Red Army but is also a school for socialism for millions of peasants and workers" was how the party viewed the indoctrinational role of our Army 10 years after its founding. And several decades later the CPSU at its 25th Congress pointed out that the young men arrive in the military family without having any schooling in life. But they return from the army as people who have undergone schooling in restraint and discipline and who have received technical and professional knowledge as well as political training. At present, in the ranks of the defenders of the motherland, as was emphasized at the 26th Party Congress, there now are the sons and grandsons of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War. They have not undergone the severe hardships which befell their fathers and grandfathers. But they are loyal to the heroic traditions of our army and our people. And any time that the interests of national security or the defense of peace require, when the victims of aggression must be helped, the Soviet soldier presents himself to the world as a selfless and courageous patriot, an internationalist ready to surmount any difficulties.



"We have not forgotten the traditions of our fathers, and their valor and honor live in us...", said Lt Aleksandr Stovba on the successive generations of the Soviet people. In carrying out his international duty in the land of Afghanistan, he showed the highest courage and valor. The motherland highly praised the feat of the young officer, having awarded him posthumously the Order of Lenin. The Komsomol member Sergey Kizhapkin, in risking his life, prevented the exploding of a fuel tank and eliminated the danger of a major fire.

One could mention many examples of courage and intrepidity shown in carrying out military duty in extreme conditions. But praise is merited not only by the soldiers who proved themselves in extraordinary circumstances but also by all those who serve conscientiously, who stand alert duty vigilantly, who steadily study and skillfully employ the combat equipment and has become an outstanding man and a class specialist, in a word, studies military affairs properly.

The indoctrinational role of the Soviet Armed Forces is determined by a number of objective factors. First of all by their sociopolitical nature and historical purpose. Our Armed Forces are a new, socialist type of military organization. They were founded by V. I. Lenin and our party to defend the interests of the workers and should, in Lenin's definition, "protect the victories of the revolution, our people's power...and the entire new democratic system against all enemies..." (PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 35, p 216).

A socialist army differs in a fundamental and major manner from the armies of the exploiting states which are antipopular in their class essence and political purpose. The ideologists of the West have endeavored to depict the bourgeois army as one of all the people supposedly serving the "entire nation" and defending national interests. V. I. Lenin termed such assertions as a vulgar, hypocritical and false doctrine as they are designed to conceal the desire of the monopolistic bourgeoisie to employ the armed forces as an obedient weapon for achieving reactionary, aggressive goals. The ruling circles carry out a sort of social filtering of the personnel in order to eliminate the "unreliables" and carry out large-scale ideological and psychological influencing of the servicemen. Crude anticommunism and anti-Sovietism are the basis of their spiritual anesthetizing. The ideological influencing is accompanied by political investigation, by fierce disciplinary suppression, by the monitoring of the attitudes of the servicemen and by punitive measures to eradicate any progressive views as well as by an extensive system of bribery for hired warriors who are ready to commit any crime for money.

In opposition to the imperialist army which is divorced from the workers and opposes them, the Armed Forces of the Soviet socialist state are an inseparable part of the people, they live the same life as them and have the same concerns and aspirations. They reflect the socioeconomic and spiritual accomplishments of developed socialism, the unity of interests of the classes and all social groups in our society, friendship of peoples, Soviet patriotism and proletarian, socialist internationalism.

The military might of the Army and Navy are completely directed at ensuring the defense of the creative labor of the people and the great socialist victories, as well as preserving peace; it serves as an important factor in the prevention of nuclear war. "On the world scene," commented Comrade K. U. Chernenko at the

All-Army Conference of Komsomol Organization Secretaries, "one encounters political forces to which good will is alien and which are deaf to the arguments of reason. Here the restraining might of our defense potential plays an irreplaceable role. At present, it is not only the guarantor for the creative labor of the Soviet people but also the guarantor of universal peace in the world." The elevated goals of military service inspire the Soviet youth dressed in the military greatcoats to new patriotic deeds.

An effective factor which determines the indoctrinational role of the Armed Forces is the development of our society toward complete social homogeneity and the establishing of a classless structure of society within the historical limits of mature socialism. In the integrating of all classes and social groups, a major role has been played by the social policy of the party and the state. In recent years, under the leadership of the CPSU, an enormous program has been carried out to increase the prosperity and cultural level of the Soviet people. Under conditions of developed socialism, everyday life, the culture and psychology of the various strata of society draw closer together. The unity of the fundamental interests, the joint work of the Soviet people and the development of socialist social relations, relations of comradely collaboration and mutual aid, objectively help to strengthen the spirit of collectivism and to form and develop in the members of society and the military such common sociopsychological traits as pride for the socialist system and a desire to carry out a feat for the sake of the motherland. All of this has a beneficial influence on the quality of the Army and Navy personnel.

The indoctrinating of high civil awareness in the military is aided by their active involvement in sociopolitical life. As full citizens of the Soviet nation, they have all the socioeconomic and political rights guaranteed by the USSR Constitution. Thousands of servicemen have been elected as deputies of the soviets and to the leading central and local party bodies.

The further strengthening of the unity of the army and the people is an important factor in the indoctrinational role of the Armed Forces. Under the conditions of mature socialism, this has acquired a new, deeper content. The carrying out by the Armed Forces of the missions entrusted to them to defend the creative labor of the people and the victories of socialism operates as an essential and important element in the nationwide cause of building communism. The fundamental unity of the army and people stems from the very nature of the socialist social system. The Soviet people have shown ever-growing concern for equipping the Army and Navy with modern weapons and combat equipment and for preparing the young people for military service. Worthy recruits are being received by the Army and Navy. Virtually all inductees have a higher and secondary (complete and incomplete) education.

The men of the Army and Navy take an active part in carrying out national economic tasks. The military construction workers have erected a good deal of housing as well as social and cultural-service buildings. The military are involved in building a number of mainlines, including the BAM [Baykal-Amur Mainline], in harvesting and in carrying out other national economic tasks.

The moral-political unity of the socialist society and the strengthening of the unity of the army and the people serve as a sound basis for the solidarity of

the command, political and rank-and-file personnel. Over 90 percent of the servicemen are communists and Komsomol members. All the Soviet military see each other as reliable combat comrades.

The increased indoctrinational role of military service is aided by the fact that the citizens of all the nations and nationalities of our country perform the sacred duty of defending the fatherland and the victories of socialism. The sons of all the Soviet peoples live, serve and carry out military duties side by side in the Army and Navy collectives. A spirit of internationalism permeates the entire way of life in our Armed Forces. The organizing of life in multinational military collectives and a system of military and political training and ideological work serve the cause of indoctrinating the servicemen in this area.

In the process of service, the spiritual world of the men is influenced not only by objective conditions but also by the subjective factor, that is, the diverse ideological and organizational activities of the military councils, commanders, political bodies and party and Komsomol organizations in shaping ideologically tempered and morally mature soldiers who have mastered the weapons and combat equipment. Certainly the indoctrinational process does not occur in isolation but rather in a close relation and interdependence with other types of activities. Hence, the factors which determine the indoctrinational role of the Armed Forces complement and determine one another. Moreover, the effectiveness of these factors depends completely upon their unity and coordination.

The basic way for increasing the effectiveness of communist indoctrination is a comprehensive approach which is being introduced evermore widely and deeply into indoctrinational practices. The Decree of the June (1983) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee pointed to the necessity of "constantly working for a unity of ideological-political, labor and moral indoctrination, better coordinating of the means of ideological influence and the efforts of social organizations, labor collectives, the family and the school and to encompass all social groups by an ideological influence."

A comprehensive approach is one of the underlying principles in theoretical thought and practical activity. It is found in the very view of Marxism-Leninism on society as a system organized in a certain manner where all elements are closely connected, interdependent and have their own subordination. For this reason it must be viewed as a method for a systematic analysis of the processes of real reality and as the fundamental basis for organizing ideological measures.

The heart of indoctrination for servicemen is their ideological tempering. Ideological-political work, in providing the ideological basis for shaping the communist conviction of the Soviet military, gives all the other indoctrinating factors the clarity of class positions, scientific soundness and methodological order. On the basis of analyzing the entire aggregate of conditions which determine the increased role of ideological work, the July Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee pointed to the necessity of a renewal, enrichment and actualization of the content of ideological indoctrination, its forms and methods as well as greater aggressiveness of our propaganda. Its decisions focus on

realism, justness and professionalism, the skillful demonstrating of the achievements of socialism and its advantages, freshness of thought and clarity of exposition.

In light of the plenum's instructions, the military personnel are carrying out diverse and complex tasks. At present, it is impossible to imagine any area of military activity outside the sphere of ideological and political indoctrination. Main attention is being paid to the questions of the ideological support for a further improvement of the Soviet Armed Forces and to increasing their combat might and constant readiness to decisively rebuff aggression wherever it might arise. In raising tasks in the area of increasing the spiritual forces of the Army and Navy, our party follows the conclusion of V. I. Lenin that in any war, victory is ultimately determined by the state of morale of those masses who shed their blood on the battlefield. Under conditions where weapons and combat equipment are becoming evermore complex, man as before remains the decisive force in a war as it is man who masters the weapons, who is able to utilize all their capabilities and who is ideologically and morally prepared to conduct combat operations in any situation.

The central area of ideological work in the Army and Navy is the shaping of a scientific, Marxist-Leninist ideology in the personnel. This serves as the basis of a person's position in life and his convictions. An ongoing study of Marxism-Leninism, the military theoretical heritage of V. I. Lenin, his life and activity as well as Communist Party policy is a powerful and constantly active means for developing communist ideological conviction in the youth as a fusion of knowledge, convictions and practical action. The party has posed the task of achieving a situation where each Soviet person has mastered scientific views on the development of society and is profoundly aware of his place in the general formation of the creators and defenders of the new order.

It is particularly important to increase the theoretical level of the military personnel who are the leaders and indoctrinators of subordinates. Having mastered Marxist-Leninist theory, an officer has an opportunity to clearly understand the objective patterns in defending the victories of socialism, military organizational development of the Armed Forces and the maintaining of them in constant combat readiness. A knowledge of theory makes it possible to correctly assess the range of relations in a military collective and direct their development with understanding in the required direction. Scientific knowledge of an ideological nature provides an opportunity to anticipate the future and to dependably determine the development trends in military affairs. The ability to think long-range is now becoming one of the indispensable conditions which ensure success in the activities of officer personnel.

A major task in ideological training is to develop high political awareness among the personnel. A clear understanding of Communist Party policy and a precise notion on the ways of carrying out its decisions provide the basis for the practical activities of a serviceman. An important role is played by the basic forms of political training for the personnel. The idea of political training, as was pointed out at the June (1983) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, is to make each person profoundly aware of party policy, to be able to employ the obtained knowledge in practice, to fully realize and carry out one's social duty.

In the system of political exercises for the rank-and-file and noncommissioned officers, they have begun to more fully consider the needs of a comprehensive solution to the problems of ideological-political, moral, military and legal indoctrination as well as the interests and needs of the students. A significant amount of time at them is devoted to the questions of increasing vigilance, maintaining constant combat readiness and strengthening military discipline.

The party is concerned that enemy ideology be resisted effectively by all means. The measures adopted in this area are aimed at establishing a unified system of counterpropaganda on a nationwide scale, starting from the labor and military collective. The main thing here is to clearly reveal the advantages of the Soviet, socialist way of life, to convincingly unmask the ulcers and failings of bourgeois society, the "values" publicized by it which are alien to the new system, a specific analysis of imperialist propaganda which is inimical to socialism, as well as the working out and coordinating of anticipatory counterpropaganda measures. The class enemy will go to any lengths, flaunting the generally accepted standards for relations between states, it has initiated "psychological warfare" against socialism and employs in this the basest and dirtiest means, brazen lies and slander. Under these conditions it is essential to have the highest vigilance and the most energetic rebuff of any intrigues from the ideological saboteurs.

To conduct an offensive ideological struggle means to see to it that the servicemen are clearly aware of the historic mission entrusted to them, that they have firmly assimilated the party's conclusions concerning the present balance of political and military forces on the world scene, and on this basis have worked out an attitude toward military danger as a harsh reality of our times. "It is essential to see to it that each soldier, and Komsomol member above all," pointed out the USSR Minister of Defense, MSU D. F. Ustinov at the All-Army Conference of Komsomol Organization Secretaries, "profoundly understand all the urgency of the present-day international situation and the demands of the party Central Committee and the Soviet government for the Armed Forces of always being ready to repel any intrigues of imperialism so that no accident could catch us unaware."

An important place in forming communist ideological conviction and high political awareness is held by indoctrinating the Soviet people and the men of the Army and Navy in the revolutionary, military and labor traditions as well as propagandizing the world historical victories of the Soviet people in building a new life and in defending the motherland. The recreation of the combat history of the units, ships and formations, active military sponsorship, participation of the men in hikes to the sites of revolutionary, combat and labor glory, meetings with war and labor heroes as well as many other forms of military-patriotic indoctrination have become universally widespread. The party and Armed Forces veterans take an active part in indoctrinating the youth.

At present, from party positions it is essential to thoroughly propagandize all that is noble and heroic that has been achieved by the Soviet people and the men of the Army and Navy under CPSU leadership. It is essential to more fully utilize the entire arsenal of ideological means for resolving the new problems of training the personnel, for developing in the men high moral-political and military qualities, a profound awareness of duty to the motherland and personal responsibility for its security.

Military service provides great opportunities for the patriotic and international indoctrination of the Soviet people. By all forms and methods of ideological work, the Army and Navy personnel develop a feeling of love for their fatherland, dedication to the party, to the socialist social and state system and pride for the accomplishments of our people who under the leadership of the CPSU march in the vanguard of mankind's social progress.

Soviet patriotism in its very essence is international. It is incompatible with national exclusiveness. The international nature of Soviet patriotism is manifested in an organic unity of loyalty of the Soviet people to their motherland and dedication to the socialist commonwealth as a whole and to the cause of class solidarity with the workers of all countries. Friendship of the Soviet peoples has been and remains one of the sources of the might of the socialist state and its Armed Forces. At present, they along with the Warsaw Pact armies are guarding the victories of the socialist commonwealth. Year by year the combat fraternity in arms born and forged in the battle against fascism grows stronger. We have the same aspirations, interests and goals. The combat friendship of the personnel of the fraternal armies is unbreakable. A defensive coalition of socialist states opposes the imperialist aggressive blocs. It is perfectly obvious that the strengthening of cooperation among the fraternal nations and indoctrinating friendship and combat camaraderie among the servicemen of the allied armies are a task of primary importance.

The spiritual make-up of the Army and Navy personnel is also improved as a result of moral indoctrination. This is based upon the principles and standards of communist morality and the observance of these under the conditions of military service assumes particular importance as this is related to carrying out the tasks of defending the fatherland and the victories of socialism. This important circumstance has predetermined the need to incorporate a number of moral standards in the military oath and regulations and to give them the force of law. Consequently, under the conditions of the Armed Forces the moral standards are more closely intertwined with legal standards. The observance of the demands of the military oath and regulations which control the life and activities of the military collectives is obligatory for each man of the USSR Armed Forces.

A particular feature of moral indoctrination is that this is based upon specific models of conduct which serve as an unique standard for the embodiment of moral standards in practice. The examples of the wholehearted service to the party by the revolutionaries of Lenin's Guard, the heroes of the struggle for the liberty and independence of the socialist fatherland and the labor pacesetters who have devoted and are devoting all their energy and knowledge to establishing high moral ideals have always served and will serve as a source of inspiration and emulation for the youth.

The CPSU gives great importance to the personal example set by the leaders, that is, the commanders and political workers and all officers. From how a leader observes the moral standards, how demanding he is on himself and how honest he is in his attitude toward superiors and juniors and in everyday life, people judge not only his personal merits but also the truthfulness of the moral values in our society. By all their moral make-up and by their conduct in

service and everyday life the officers must embody the high standards of communist morality.

Among the important areas of ideological work in the Armed Forces is legal indoctrination. This assumes the developing in the personnel of a legal awareness, a correct attitude toward the legislation existing in our country, as well as precise notions of the rights and duties of a soldier and the justness of one or another action by a serviceman. Legal indoctrination is characterized by the purposeful activities of the commanders, political bodies, party and Komsomol organizations and military judge advocates in propagandizing the USSR Constitution, Soviet legislation, the military oath and regulations.

The strength of the indoctrinational effect of Soviet laws established on the basis of the USSR Constitution is that they express the will of the people, and officially reinforce the legal principles and standards which are based on communist morality. Consequently, legal indoctrination must give the men both a clear understanding of Soviet legislation as well as develop in them a profoundly moral attitude toward observing the requirements of our laws. The carrying out of the legal standards actively helps to increase the combat capability of the subunits, units and ships as well as strengthen aware military discipline.

In developing the high qualities of a defender of the motherland a major role is played by military indoctrination. This is the purposeful and coordinated activities of the commanders, political bodies and party and Komsomol organizations to develop those moral-combat qualities which are determined by the specific features of troop activities and by the nature of armed combat under present-day conditions as well as by the purpose and missions of the Soviet Armed Forces. In all its content military indoctrination should help to strengthen one-man command, prescribed order, organization and discipline.

One powerful means of indoctrinating the men is Soviet military discipline which is one of the forms of socialist state discipline. Soviet military discipline expresses the social relations of comradely cooperation and mutual aid among workers free from exploitation. The relationships of commanders and rank-and-file, superiors and subordinates, seniors and juniors are developed in us on a basis of a unity of class interests and on the commonness of political convictions and moral principles among the servicemen who are representatives of the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry and the Soviet intelligentsia.

The questions of strengthening military discipline and indoctrinating the personnel in a spirit of the strictest observance of its requirements have always comprised one of the most important tasks in the activities of our commanders, political bodies, party and Komsomol organizations. This is natural because high, aware discipline is the prime basis of the combat capability of our Armed Forces and their brilliant victories over our enemies.

Military service itself has an enormous impact on the spiritual development of the men. Under the conditions of socialism, this is rightly viewed as a specific variety of socially useful labor. Its particular features are determined primarily by constitutional provisions, as our nation's Basic Law defines military service as an honorable duty of the Soviet citizens and the defense of the socialist fatherland as their sacred duty. The high social importance of

military service in a socialist army determines its great indoctrinational opportunities. In troop exercises, during the combat launches of missiles, flights and on alert duty, during the period of cruises by submarines and surface vessels in the world's ocean, the Soviet military have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to withstand high moral and physical stresses, to skillfully utilize the weapons and military equipment. They have also gained skills in mobilizing their forces to achieve victory over the enemy.

The indoctrinational role of military service is fully apparent when this service is scientifically organized, supported in moral-political, material and organizational terms, when the socialist competition actually encompasses all spheres of military activity, while advanced experience not in words but in deed is introduced into military and political training practices. In carrying out the mission of increasing the indoctrinational role of military service, special emphasis must be put on improving its organization and on carrying out the requirements of the regulations, instructions, orders and directives.

Great indoctrinational opportunities of Army and Navy service are also to be found in the military collective. The collective shapes and improves such moral-political and combat qualities as a readiness to unstintingly defend one's motherland, courage, tenacity, discipline, endurance, friendship and military camaraderie. The uniting of the military collectives and particularly involving the young men who have just been called up for military service in active life, are a difficult task. Here it is important to develop in them a spirit of collectivism and comradeship, and a moral atmosphere in the subunit which would help to shape up the new men, successfully carry out the combat training tasks as well as strengthen discipline and organization.

A close-knit Army or Navy collective gradually hones the relationships of the men, it gives them a certain focus as established by the regulations while constant contact with one another develops friendship and camaraderie. The closeness of the commanders and political workers as well as all the officers to the soldiers and sailors makes it possible to know the needs, merits and shortcomings of subordinates. Only by studying the men, their individual features and inclinations, by developing vital ties with them and in relying on their trust and support is it possible to achieve success in indoctrinating dependable defenders of the motherland.

Increased effectiveness of this work is inconceivable without raising the political activeness of the communist officers and their practical involvement in the ideological conditioning and military development of the men. The Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Party Leadership of the Komsomol and Increasing Its Role in the Communist Indoctrination of the Youth" provides specific recommendations for this. For strengthening the effectiveness of ideological and political work and primarily heroic-patriotic indoctrination, it is important to widely use the preparations for the 40th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War.

To make full and skilled use of the indoctrinational factors which the commanders, political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations possess means to bring about a rise in the combat readiness of a subunit, unit or ship. This, today, is the demand placed on the personnel. It is quite apparent that its



consistent implementation will serve to further raise the indoctrinational role of the Soviet Armed Forces.

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PREPARING PARTY REPORTING-ELECTORAL MEETINGS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 18, Sep 84 (signed to press 4 Sep 84) p 86

[Unattributed consulting material: "Preparation of a Party Report-Election Meeting"]

[Text] How are preparations carried out? Who is involved in this? These questions have been asked in their letters by the CPSU members, Officers G. Yakovlev and A. Pavlovskiy.

Preparations for a party report-election meeting start ahead of time and include primarily the elaboration of the accountability report and the draft decision. In the course of preparing for the meeting, many questions of an organizational sort are also resolved. It is particularly important to choose a convenient time for the meeting, considering the maximum involvement of the communists in it. It is advisable to announce ahead of time when and where it will be held and together with the command provide for the possible relieving of those comrades who on that day will be on duty or carrying out some assignment.

The preparatory work must be organized in such a manner that it contributes to the development of activeness and initiative among the party members and candidate members, to a stronger feeling among them of responsibility for the state of affairs in the party collective and to the creation of a situation of exactingness in the party organization. This is achieved primarily by the fact that a broad range of the party aktiv is involved in the preparations for the forthcoming report-election meeting. Many party organizations have established a practice whereby not only the secretaries and members of the elective body participate in working out the accountability report but also other activists (the commander, the political worker, officers from the staff and services, experienced specialists and leaders in training).

The communists are given assignments such as: to check how the decisions of the last report-election meeting have been carried out, how the party members and candidate members have handled the assignments, what has been done to realize the proposals and critical comments voiced by the communists at the meetings, and so forth.

Here it is wise to mention the following. In large party organizations often groups of communists are organized to generalize the materials for the report and to work out proposals on the draft decree. This makes it possible to enrich the accountability report with interesting examples, facts and conclusions as well as to work out specific recommendations aimed at improving affairs in the military collective.

Each communist is obliged to prepare as well as possible for the report-election meeting, to think through his comments on the question concerning him, to voice his own viewpoint and make proposals. The active involvement of the party members and candidate members in preparing and holding the party meetings should help to improve internal party work, to increase its effectiveness and pertinence and to strengthen party influence on all aspects of life in the military collectives.

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PREPARING PARTY COMMITTEE ACCOUNTABILITY REPORTS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 18, Sep 84 (signed to press 4 Sep 84) p 87

[Unattributed consulting material: "The Accountability Report of a Party Committee (Party Bureau)"]

[Text] What should the accountability report be and should it be discussed and approved at a session of the party committee (party bureau), ask the journal's readers, Comrades Ye. Senin, O. Makhno and others.

The accountability report is the final document on the work done by the elective party body and by the party organization secretary over the report period. Understandably it should analyze what has been done, and study the experience gained by the secretary and the party committee (party bureau). It should provide an assessment of how the elective body has worked, how the communists elected to its membership carried out their duties as well as define the further tasks.

There is no standard model of an accountability report. As a rule, in it basic attention is given to showing the activities of the party organization, primarily the party committee (party bureau) as a body of collective leadership and to analyzing how they have been able to carry out the decisions of the party and government, the requirements of the CPSU Program and By-Laws, the Instructions to the CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy, the orders and directives of the USSR minister of defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, the recommendations of the Sixth All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries as well as the decisions of the party conferences and meetings. The main thing is that the report profoundly analyze the effectiveness, content, forms and methods of party work aimed at carrying out the plans for military and political training and the socialist obligations and the strengthening of military discipline; it should critically assess what has been achieved.

In the report it is essential to thoroughly review the questions of ideological indoctrination of the party organization in light of the demands of the 26th Party Congress and the June (1983) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, that is, how the communists are studying Marxist-Leninist theory and party policy and are participating in the political and moral indoctrination of the men.

The problems of internal party work must be thoroughly taken up. It is essential to analyze how the party committee (party bureau) directs the work of the subunit party organizations and has been able to increase the vanguard role of each party member. It must review the practice of holding party meetings, the use of the forms and methods of work with the communists, the state of criticism and self-criticism and the checking on the execution of adopted decisions. It is essential to bring out what attention the party committee (party bureau) gives to the questions of strengthening leadership over the Komsomol organization, to carrying out the instructions of Comrade K. U. Chernenko contained in his speech at the All-Army Conference of Komsomol Organization Secretaries, as well as to the carrying out of the decree of the CPSU Central Committee.

It is very important that the report take up an objective and thorough assessment of the contribution of each communist to the deeds of the party collective, that shortcomings be mentioned and their causes disclosed.

When the accountability report is ready, it must, as is demanded by the Instructions of the CPSU Central Committee on Conducting Elections for the Leading Party Bodies, be discussed at a session of the party committee (party bureau). This must be done not on the eve of the meeting but ahead of time. A collective discussion of the accountability report provides an opportunity for the members of the elective body to arrive at a uniform viewpoint on one or another problem raised in the report and to incorporate in it the necessary corrections and additions.

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REVIEW: YEPISHEV 1984 VOLUME ON PARTY-POLITICAL WORK

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 18, Sep 84 (signed to press 4 Sep 84) pp 89-92

[Review by Col Gen A. Lizichev of the book "Aktual'nyye voprosy partiynopoliticheskoy raboty v armii i flote" (Urgent Questions of Party-Political Work in the Army and Navy) by A. A. Yepishev, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1984, 223 pages, price 1 ruble, 30 kopecks]

[Text] The present-day international situation is characterized by an increased danger of war which is being prepared against the USSR and the socialist commonwealth countries by the aggressive imperialist forces and primarily the reactionary American circles. They are continuing to deploy nuclear missiles in Western Europe, they are carrying out constantly new programs for nuclear and conventional weapons and are beginning to militarize space and initiate wide-scale work in developing antimissile defense systems.

The unrestrained arms race and the treachery of the forces of reaction and militarism have obliged the Soviet people to show unflagging vigilance. "The present-day situation," emphasized Comrade K. U. Chernenko at the April (1984) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "demands from us constant and all-round efforts to ensure national security and strongly defend the peaceful labor of the Soviet people."

The Communist Party, in being constantly concerned for the strengthening of national defense and for the development of combat improvement of the Armed Forces, has employed various methods and means for resolving the fundamental problems of Soviet military organizational development. Here one of the most important places has been allocated by the party to party-political work which encompasses all aspects of Army and Navy life and activity. The urgent questions of this work and the scope of it are brought out in a book by the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, Army Gen A. A. Yepishev.

A characteristic feature of this monograph is the comprehensive treatment of the problems of party-political work. It discloses the leading and guiding role of the CPSU in military organizational development and generalizes the historical experience of the organizing and strengthening of the political bodies and party organizations in the Soviet Armed Forces. It also examines the major

questions of organizational, ideological and mass-political work in the Army and Navy in light of the party's present-day demands.

On the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory, the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, the subsequent plenums of the party Central Committee, other party documents on military organizational development as well as present-day military-theoretical views, the author of the work profoundly and thoroughly analyzes the urgent questions of party-political work in our Armed Forces and points out the ways to resolve them. Among these questions is the strengthening of party influence on all aspects of Army and Navy life, including: ensuring high vigilance and combat readiness of the units and ships, further strengthening military discipline, organization and order and the uniting of the troop collectives.

Party-political work in the Army and Navy is completely subordinate to indoctrinating the personnel in a spirit of wholehearted dedication to the party, people and to the socialist motherland as well as a readiness for decisive actions to repel any aggression. This is carried out with the constant attention of the party to military organizational development and to the questions of further improving the work of the political bodies and party organizations. As is pointed out in the book, the activities of the CPSU in military organizational development encompassed a broad range of problems such as: elaborating the theoretical bases of Soviet military organizational development, including military doctrine, a range of measures related to the technical equipping of the Army and Navy, training, the placement and rational utilization of military personnel, the carrying out of party-political work, the development of the initial principles for organizing the combat training of the troops and naval forces and improving the system for preparing reserves.

A major area in CPSU military policy is the development and strengthening of the material, sociopolitical and spiritual bases for the defense capability of the Soviet state and the military might of the Armed Forces. Strict observance of the principles of party leadership over the Armed Forces is the guarantee for successfully carrying out the complex range of questions related to CPSU military policy.

The book thoroughly analyzes these principles. They are examined in detail and in various aspects. In a condensed, systematized version the principles of party leadership are the following: a unity of political and military leadership; scientificness; centralism; collectivism; the delimiting of the functions of the party and military bodies; the greatest possible development of the activeness and creative initiative of the masses; activeness, continuousness and purposefulness of party-political work. These fundamental, scientifically sound provisions are constantly carried out by the party, state and military bodies.

A special section of the monograph examines the increase in the leading role of the party in military organizational development. This has been brought about, first of all, by the more complex tasks related to organizing the effective defense of the socialist fatherland during the age of nuclear and other types of modern weapons against possible imperialist aggression, as well as by the resolving of an ever-broader range of problems related to the sociopolitical,

military-technical and ideological development of society and influencing the organizational development and preparation of the Army and Navy.

The Communist Party exercises its ever-increasing leadership over the Soviet Armed Forces through the political bodies. Together with the party organizations and in close unity with the commanders, they work steadily on carrying out the policy of the Leninist party and its Central Committee in the area of improving the Armed Forces and increasing combat readiness. Due to their daily activities, the party has an organizing and directing influence on all aspects of the instruction and indoctrination of the Army and Navy personnel, on the life and routine of the troops and on the carrying out of combat missions in wartime. For this reason, it is quite logical that, having viewed the leadership of the Communist Party over the Armed Forces in the first part of the book as the prime basis of Soviet military organizational development, the author in the second chapter shows in detail and completely how V. I. Lenin and the party have improved the structure of the political bodies and the party-political apparatus to conform to the tasks and organization of the new-type army and altered their forms considering the demands of the specific historical situation.

As is correctly emphasized in the monograph, under present-day conditions, in line with the general greater complexity of the tasks for the Army and Navy, the role and importance of the political bodies have increased even more. By all their work the political bodies must strengthen the combat might of the Soviet Army and Navy, they must more closely rally the personnel around the Communist Party and Soviet government, strengthen vigilance and indoctrinate the men in a spirit of ideological conviction, loyalty to their people, dedication to the principles of socialist internationalism, and a constant readiness for armed defense of the socialist motherland and the great cause of communism.

In thoroughly analyzing the areas of the daily and diverse activities of the political bodies, the author has drawn on specific experience and gives recommendations to improve the activities. The successful carrying out of the tasks entrusted to the political bodies depends primarily upon an improvement in their work style. Here it is important, the author stresses, "that paper work not replace the main thing, that is, organizational and indoctrinational work in the masses, but rather help and contribute to this. An eye on the deeds and not on noisy words is what the party urges."

The main thing in the activities of the political bodies, the book points out, is a creative approach to the job. A feeling for the new and useful initiative in their work will always contribute to success. Here it is important to stay away from far-fetched forms of work. "We need a rational approach to the question based upon a scientific analysis of reality, an affirmation of what has been engendered by the needs of life and meets the increased demands of the party as well as a decisive discarding of the obsolete and out of date."

In the third chapter the author provides a definition of party-political work as the scientifically based system of political, ideological and organizational activities of the CPSU aimed at increasing the combat readiness of the troops and naval forces as well as developing in the men a scientific ideology and high moral-political, combat and psychological qualities.



In the chapter, particular attention has been paid to examining the work of the Army and Navy primary party organizations, one of the leading elements in party leadership of the Armed Forces. In being the combat detachment of the CPSU, they work in the very midst of the masses of servicemen, they act as the political nucleus of the military collectives and by all their work contribute actively to carrying out party policy in the area of strengthening national defense capability and raising the combat potential of the Armed Forces. At present, the primary party organization of a unit or ship headed by a committee is a close-knit party collective which possesses all opportunities for carrying out diverse work.

The author has focused attention on an indispensable condition in increasing the activeness and militancy of the party organizations, namely a high level of intraparty work and this depends largely upon correctly resolving such problems as the growth of the party ranks, the ideological tempering of the young communists, a just assessment of the activities of each member and candidate member and the consistent observance of intraparty democracy and party discipline. In analyzing these questions, Army Gen A. A. Yepishev takes up in detail the role of the party organization secretary in carrying out these tasks.

To be the leader of a party collective, the book points out, is a great honor and at the same time a responsible obligation. A person elected by the communists values their trust, he constantly maintains and strengthens ties with them and shows initiative. The strength of the challenge of a party leader lies in his authority and in the unity of word and deed. Here it is essential to consider that true leaders of the masses are not born. They grow up and are tempered in practical work. For this reason, the author, proceeding from Lenin's instructions "do not endeavor to do 'everything' by 'yourself,' in overdoing it and not succeeding, in setting to work on 20 projects and not completing a single one, but rather check the work of scores and hundreds of assistants and organize a check on their work from below...." (PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 43, p 242), gives a number of recommendations on how one must instruct the party organization leaders carefully, attentively and considerately.

The effective activities of the primary party organizations depends largely upon contact with the commanders and their deputies for political affairs. Although generally the work goes on smoothly and closely, however not all commanders and political workers rely effectively on the party organizations and direct their activities. In this regard, the book points out that to rely on the party organization means to develop its activeness and initiative, to assist in carrying out all measures, to constantly seek advice from the party secretaries and party committee and bureau members and other activists, to consider proposals from the communists in one's work, to respond effectively to critical comments and to take measures to eliminate shortcomings.

In turn, to direct the activities of a party organization means primarily to take a personal part in its work, to promptly inform the communists of the pending tasks as well as of the achievements and oversights in military and political training and discipline, and together with the secretary of the party committee or bureau, to achieve purposefulness in the work of the party organization and a close tie between it and the life of the subunits. Concern must

be shown for the example set by the communists and conditions created for them to show activity and initiative.

In the Soviet Armed Forces there is no area where the Komsomol members do not work, devoting their energy, knowledge and enthusiasm to the common cause. The Army and Navy Komsomol organizations have an active impact on all the youth and make a major contribution to the training and indoctrination of the men. The guarantee for the successful activities of the Komsomol organizations lies in party leadership. Party leadership, as was pointed out in the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Party Leadership Over the Komsomol and Increasing Its Role in the Communist Indoctrination of the Youth," is the primary condition and major guarantee for the revolutionary succession of generations in a socialist society and the pledge for the ideological loyalty, militancy and creative activity of the Komsomol.

This time-tested Leninist tradition and standard of party life is widely discussed in the book. Party leadership over the Komsomol embodies the wisdom and concern, the support and exactingness which are shown by the communists, in establishing and organizing their reserve. Practice confirms that where Komsomol questions are constantly at the center of attention of the party organizations, the youth develop a profound inner need and desire to be the assistants of the party members, to equal them and keep pace with them.

The very informative speech of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade K. U. Chernenko, at the All-Army Conference of Komsomol Organization Secretaries, is a militant program for the work of the military councils, commanders, political bodies, party and Komsomol organizations in further raising the combat readiness of the Army and Navy and for the communist indoctrination of the Komsomol members and all personnel.

Proceeding from the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, and from the fully elaborated plan for ideological activities of long-term importance as proposed at the June (1983) Plenum of the Party Central Committee, the fourth chapter of the book thoroughly examines the questions of the theory and practice of ideological work in the Army and Navy and its increased role and effectiveness.

The plenum decisions have provided a powerful impetus to improve the ideological-indoctrination, mass-political work in all its areas. "The main thing," pointed out Comrade K. U. Chernenko, "is to shift the center of ideological efforts into the labor collective, into the primary party organization. We must completely rid ourselves of the still existing inertia when all the activities are at times kept within the ideological organizations and are replaced by the drawing up of lengthy papers and hours-long sessions." The party demands that professionalism, organization, clear control and check on execution and the ability to achieve effective results be inseparable traits of ideological practices.

In light of the decisions of the June (1983) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the military personnel are confronted with diverse and complex tasks. No area of military activity, the author points out, can now be conceived of outside of the sphere of ideological and political indoctrination. On the basis of analyzing the entire aggregate of factors which have caused the increased

role of ideological work in all areas of military organizational development, the book reviews the areas in which this is carried out in the Army and Navy. Central to them is the shaping of a scientific, Marxist-Leninist ideology in the servicemen.

Precisely a scientific ideology makes the military personnel and all the soldiers conscientious political fighters who are capable of understanding independently the objective patterns in defending the victories of the socialist revolution, the ways for improving the Soviet Armed Forces and maintaining them in constant combat readiness. The formation of a communist ideology occurs more successfully the higher the level of the basic forms of political studies and communist indoctrination of the men. In this context the book examines the ways for improving the Marxist-Leninist training of the officers, generals and admirals, the political studies of the warrant officers ["praporshchik" and "michman"] as well as the political exercises for the soldiers, sailors, sergeants and petty officers. The author emphasizes that "work must be carried out more tenaciously in explaining and demonstrating the real accomplishments of Marxist-Leninist thought of recent times as well as the ideas and conclusions contained in the works and speeches of the leaders of the Communist Party and the Soviet state." Here the idea of improving developed socialism should lie at the basis of not only the theoretical but also all the propaganda and indoctrinational work. Whatever form of study covers all the categories of the personnel, their knowledge should become more profound and systematic and should be fully apparent in concrete deeds.

The chief content in the activities of the military personnel in the troops and fleets, as was pointed out by the USSR Minister of Defense, MSU D. F. Ustinov, at a reception in the Kremlin honoring the military academy graduates, is the maintaining of high combat readiness of the units and ships. The concluding, fifth chapter of the book is devoted to the role and place of party-political work in carrying out this key problem. The combat readiness of the units and ships embodies an entire range of questions of a military-technical and moral-psychological sort. The effective security of the Soviet state and the creative labor of our people depend completely upon a solution to these problems. The high-quality mastery of the weapons and combat equipment, field, sea and air skills, increasing the ideological tempering and moral-political and psychological preparedness of the men as well as the strengthening of discipline and organization--each of these components of combat readiness has been properly taken up on the book's pages.

The author pays particular attention to party-political work being carried out in the interests of carrying out military discipline. At present, the Armed Forces must have discipline, vigilance brought, in the expression of V. I. Lenin, up to the highest limits. As the book emphasizes, the solely responsible commander plays the decisive role in indoctrinating disciplined and efficient soldiers. Life shows that where the commanders and the political bodies carry out not isolated, not "all-hands" measures but rather carry out an entire system of well-conceived measures such as strengthening the lagging units and subunits with personnel providing them with help in organizing service and indoctrinational work, arming the commanders and political workers with advanced experience, correctly combining measures of persuasion and coercion and the strengthening of one-man leadership--here the state of discipline is continuously improved.

Confronted with the growing military threat deriving from the imperialist circles, the Soviet people have been forced to improve the defenses of the socialist fatherland. At the present stage, the party has posed evermore responsible and difficult tasks for our Armed Forces.

The book by Army Gen A. A. Yepishev which thoroughly and profoundly elaborates a number of urgent questions in party-political work in the Army and Navy will be a valuable aid in the activities of the military councils, the commanders, the political bodies and the party and Komsomol activists and aimed at further increasing the combat readiness, combat skills, and at developing in the men high moral-political and psychological qualities and a desire by specific deeds to confirm their loyalty to their patriotic and international duty.

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ROLE OF BROADCAST MEDIA IN MILITARY-PATRIOTIC UPBRINGING

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[Article by K. Kotlukov, chief specialist of USSR Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting] Main Administration for Local Television and Radio Broadcasting: "Reference Point for the Search: Military-Patriotic Theme in Local Television and Radio Broadcasting"]

[Text] It is difficult to imagine our daily life without radio and television, which have entered every home and every family and become our good company and good advisers. They are given an important role along with other means of mass information and propaganda, particularly in the military-patriotic indoctrination of young people and Army and Navy personnel. This work acquires special significance in connection with preparations for celebrating the 40th anniversary of our victory in the Great Patriotic War. In a speech at the All-Services Conference of Komsomol Organization Secretaries, Comrade K. U. Chernenko said: "In heading for the banner jubilee of the 40th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War we must unfold the work of military-patriotic indoctrination more widely. We must instill in young people with even greater persistence a feeling of love for the Motherland, hatred for her enemies, high political and class vigilance and constant readiness for an exploit. We must conduct this work so that it has as little idle talk as possible and as much imagination and innovative search as possible, without which work with young people is generally inconceivable."

The CPSU Central Committee Decree "40th Anniversary of the Soviet People's Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" defines specific tasks for mass information and propaganda media. These tasks are intended for detailed and well-reasoned coverage of preparations for and celebration of the jubilee of the Great Victory and for a vivid, convincing demonstration of its world-historic importance.

At the present time the focus of attention of television and radio committee boards and party organizations is on matters of efficiency, information saturation, current nature of content, and effectiveness of programs for the 40th anniversary of the victory. This was the subject of an interesting conversation on the board of USSR Gosteleradio, where a detailed analysis was made of the work of the Belorussian Television and Radio in the military-patriotic

indoctrination of young people. These problems also became a subject of discussion at the All-Union Seminar-Conference held by USSR Gosteleradio together with the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, the DOSAAF Central Committee, the USSR Civil Defense staff and the political directorate of the Border Guard Troops. The seminar took place in Minsk and Brest. Its participants examined questions of military-patriotic indoctrination as a complex, and drew up recommendations for improving the quality of television and radio broadcasts, their reasoned nature, ideological content, persuasiveness and, consequently, their effectiveness.

It was noted in part that substantial changes for the better had occurred of late in organizing broadcasts on military-patriotic subjects, in their preparation, and in their ideological and artistic content. The propaganda of revolutionary, combat and labor traditions of the party, the people and the Armed Forces is being carried on on a larger scale. Many new series and rubrics have appeared in the structure of television and radio programs in connection with preparations for the 40th anniversary of the victory. The Communist Party's managing and directing role, heroic achievements of the Soviet people, and courage of Army and Navy personnel in Great Patriotic War battles was revealed vividly and convincingly in them by word and visual sequence.

Many editorial collectives have joined actively in the All-Union Contest under the motto "The fathers' exploits are the sons' heritage" conducted by the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, the board of the Union of Journalists, and the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee. The series of television broadcasts entitled "A Rescued World Remembers" and "This was with the Country, This was with Us" achieved great popularity in the Volgograd Studio. Creative groups used diverse genres in presenting material, movies, photo topics and synchronous interviews to reveal the historic importance of the Soviet people's exploit in the Battle of Stalingrad through the destinies of citizens. Viewers especially remember the broadcast "Children of Stalingrad." It was shown twice over Central Television.

Broadcasts on patriotic affairs of party, war and labor veterans are standing out more and more clearly as an independent direction. For example, two years ago Estonian Television opened a special series entitled "Veterans." More than 20 sketches were sent over the air which revealed the lives of remarkable patriots. There was a warm tale about war veteran E. Nagel'man. He received his baptism of fire at age 16 and at 18 he became a private first class. His father and older brother died in the war. As the best sniper in his regiment, he struck down the fascists accurately. After the war he became a militia worker and gave much effort and energy to protect law and order in the capital of Soviet Estonia. Sketches about Col (Ret) Kh. Lessel and other war veterans also were memorable.

The "Evening with War Veterans" organized by the Estonian Television in the club of the Vinni Model Sovkhoz-Tekhnikum was interesting and meaningful. People who had gone down the stern roads of war, young sovkhoz workers and schoolchildren gathered here. The first secretary of the party's

Rakvereskiy Raykom, the rayon military commissar and the chairman of the rayon war veterans' council spoke to those assembled. Recollections of courage and valor and words about readiness for defense of the Motherland were heard at the meeting, and favorite patriotic songs were sung.

One of the sessions of the "Future Soldier" club of Leningrad Television left an ineradicable mark on the young people and all viewers. It was attended by 40 Heroes of the Soviet Union who now are foremost personnel in industrial enterprises of the city-hero's Moskovskiy Rayon. Their stories about friends and comrades and about their own lives are living proof of the mass courage and heroism of our people and their valorous sons and daughters.

It must be said that materials about the Great Patriotic War require special responsibility in working on them, validity, and competency of the author, editor and the entire creative group. Broadcast commentators who personally experienced frontline life enjoy great respect. Their tales remain a long while in the young people's memory and contain an inexhaustible charge of enormous inspirational and mobilizing force.

In turning to our Great Victory over the black forces of fascism and exposing aggressive plans of ruling U.S. circles and their partners in the NATO bloc, the blue screen and radio broadcasting permit Soviet citizens to gain a deeper realization of their own responsibility for preserving peace, for implementing the grandiose plans for building communism, and for strengthening the Motherland's economic and defense might.

Time passes and a new generation joins the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces to replace the veterans. The new generation is faced with extremely important and responsible missions of assuring reliable protection of our great Motherland and the cause of socialism and peace. This is why, in telling about the heroic past, radio and television journalists are called upon to focus attention on showing the life, routine and leisure of personnel of today's Army and Navy and of the Border Guard Troops and Internal Security Forces, and on preparing young people for service in the Armed Forces' ranks.

That is just what many editorial collectives do. There are more and more examples where broadcasts for military personnel about preparation of young people for service in the Army become traditional and are conducted not occasionally, but strictly by plan. Mention can be made of the television program series "Soldier Glory" (Ukraine), "Guarding Southern Borders" (Georgia), "Green Shoulderboards" (Kirghizia), "Countrymen" (Leningrad), "Red Star" (Vladivostok) and "The Oath" (Sverdlovsk); the radio programs "Soldier of the Soviet Army" (Belorussia), "Baltic Sentries" (Lithuania), "The Soviet Soldier" (Latvia and Turkmenia), "The Soldier's Hour" (Khabarovsk) and many others.

In reports, correspondence, sketches and outlines from ranges, tank training areas and various kinds of exercises, television and radio journalists attempt to pass on the inspiration of strenuous military work by privates, NCO's, warrant officers and officers and to reveal the experience of socialist competition in units and subunits by a variety of creative and technical techniques.

The television and radio mailbag indicates that programs devoted to noteworthy holidays--Soviet Army and Navy Day, Victory Day, and days of tankmen, missilemen and artillerymen, navymen, pilots and Border Guard personnel--leave a perceptible imprint on the hearts of Soviet citizens. People greet with special warmth the television and radio appearances by Army and Navy leaders. Officers and rank-and-file military personnel now are being invited more often to take part in broadcasts.

The television and radio successes unquestionably are gratifying but, as practical experience shows (and this was noted at the All-Union Seminar-Conference), there still are many substantial omissions in organizing a radio broadcast and preparing television broadcasts on military-patriotic subjects. At times the authors lack depth in their approach to coverage of a selected theme and there is a lack of a well-argued nature, vividness and persuasiveness in broadcasts. The life of the modern Armed Forces and the actual status of young people's preparation for service in their ranks are not yet always interpreted thoroughly. Omissions in this area by journalists of Azerbaijani Television and Radio are apparent. Having analyzed their work self-critically, they stated that materials on the routine of units and subunits often bear a random nature and few broadcasts are prepared about military educational institutions and about the work of DOSAAF clubs and organizations. Local broadcasts on military-patriotic subjects lack a journalistic nature, novelty, or variety of genre. This occurs because republic television and radio committee workers have weakened their ties with military units and subunits and make no attempt to delve into the essence of missions being accomplished by the units and subunits or to delve into the soldier's spiritual world.

Just what has to be done to ensure that there is more creativity and innovative exploration in broadcasts on military-patriotic topics and to ensure that every performance over television and radio attracts and persuades the audience by the depth of penetration into life, by the principle and acuteness of thought, and by the vivid nature of word and style? There are many ways to do this. I would like to dwell only on a few of the most essential directions in the work.

Above all, long-range and current planning of programs on military-patriotic subjects need further improvement, especially those for the Army and Navy audience. It would appear that here we should proceed from the assumption that under conditions of the intensifying military danger and the threat of nuclear war on the part of imperialism, the Soviet serviceman's responsibility for the fate of his country and for the destiny of the planet's peoples is higher than ever before. Therefore television and radio are called upon to reveal the aggressive essence of imperialism and intrigues by aggressive U.S. and NATO circles in a well-reasoned manner and to thoroughly show the enormous mission assigned to the Soviet serviceman as a defender of peace and progress and as one capable of countering the forces of reaction and, if necessary, of giving a resolute rebuff.



This requires enormous responsibility of creative cadres for preparing material on the Army and Navy and on predraft preparation of the youth and it demands the competent display of this material by the television and radio media. Broadcasts on military-patriotic subjects must be distinguished by a competent display of that by which the Army and Navy youth lives and by a deep penetration into the process of work by commanders, political organs and party and Komsomol organizations to develop the servicemen's love for the socialist Motherland, high vigilance and hatred toward enemies of socialism. Unfortunately some local television and radio broadcasting series and programs go wrong in the superficial view of phenomena of reality and at times the important factor is overshadowed to suit external effects, i.e., the daily military labor of the person in a military uniform, labor with a high purpose.

Today there is no need to show that in planning and preparing broadcasts from among the troops, television and radio journalists cannot get by without the comprehensive assistance of commanders, staffs, political bodies, and the party and Komsomol organizations. Such assistance must be permanent, qualified, concerned and effective.

The experience of Chita Television and Radio merits attention in this regard. The oblast television and radio committee together with political directorates of the Transbaikal Military District and Transbaikal Border Guard District developed measures aimed at raising the ideological and artistic level of programs on military-patriotic and counterpropaganda subjects. Their implementation permitted elevating the personal responsibility of television and radio workers and of political bodies for the quality and effectiveness of broadcasts for military personnel. Public editorial boards for preparing the broadcasts "Soldier of the Transbaikal," "We Serve in the Transbaikal," "In an Enlisted Men's Club," "The Muses Serve with Us" and others have been strengthened by competent persons here. The boards now are headed by experienced officers. Journalists of the district newspaper NA BOYEVOM POSTU have been included in the editorial boards. The joint programs entitled "With the Oath in the Heart" and "Combat Glory," prepared together with television and radio committees of oblasts and autonomous republics included within the borders of district unit locations, were the product of creative quests of the Chita personnel.

Since we have touched on questions of planning, it seems to me there is a need to think about coordination of central and local broadcasting programs on the military-patriotic theme. There are frequent instances where broadcasts of republic (oblast) television and radio come on at the very same time as central programs. Isn't there an oversaturation of the broadcasting day in this instance with specialized broadcasts? Do we take into account here that on any day, including Saturday and Sunday, the soldier has a strictly defined budget of free time? Under these conditions is he capable of viewing or listening to a local broadcast prepared especially for him and about him?

It stands to reason that this question is not a simple one and it requires a more detailed study. Commanders and political bodies must suggest how best to do it and when to place a local broadcast into the program with consideration for central broadcasting.

An improvement in broadcasting on the military-patriotic theme above all has to follow the line of an improvement in program content and quality and a diversity in the forms and genres by which material is presented.

In broadcasts from units and subunits today journalists often are carried away with showing equipment. Of course, this too is important but the Soviet soldier, defender of Lenin's great Motherland, always must be in the foreground. The soldier's inner world, his schooling, and his high combat and moral-psychological qualities deserve very careful attention and persuasive demonstration.

More attention should be given to creating memorable broadcasts about friendship, troop comradeship, brotherhood in arms, mutual exactingness and concern for people.

The broadcasts for young people and servicemen should show the indoctrinational role of the Armed Forces more persuasively and constantly emphasize that the Soviet Army is a school of maturation, a school for indoctrinating genuine socialist internationalism not in words but in action. Those who have gone through the Army school and have tempered themselves ideologically and physically can tell best about this.

The number of television and radio broadcasts about military educational institutions has increased of late. Such materials are prepared in studios of the Ukraine, Belorussia, Moldavia, Lithuania, Latvia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenia and others. This is a very important direction and it must be constantly expanded. Proper steps were taken in Novosibirsk, where the local studio held a festival of programs jointly with the Red Banner Siberian Military District political directorate under the motto "Officer is a heroic profession." In addition to Novosibirsk, television studios of Barnaul, Kemerovo, Krasnoyarsk, Omsk, Tomsk and Tyumen took part in the festival. The programs offered told the viewer about military schools, about the young people who must put on the military uniform tomorrow, and about the qualities which distinguish the Soviet officer.

The course of the festival was widely covered in the local press, radio and television. The best broadcasts were presented with diplomas of the district political directorate and the Novosibirsk Television and Radio Committee and prizes from various organizations. Festival results were summed up at a conference held in the Novosibirsk Higher Military-Political Combined-Arms School imeni 60th Anniversary of the Great October.

In revealing the image of the Soviet officer one obviously should not forget his combat companion, his wife. But for now we have few broadcasts locally which would show the officers' families in an interesting way.

In short, there are many problems for television and radio in covering the military-patriotic subject in light of present-day party demands for indoctrinating ideologically mature, capable defenders of the socialist Motherland. This was also a subject of discussion at the All-Union Seminar-Conference. In

determining ways to improve the quality of work by local television and radio committees, its participants in particular made the proposal that the Army and Navy press be called upon to be more active in publishing materials critiquing broadcasts which have been aired. The question also was posed about the need for a systematic conduct of seminar-conferences of television and radio workers jointly with representatives of Army and Navy political bodies and the military press.

One of the chief tasks of radio and television is to further increase the ideological-artistic level and effectiveness of programs for military personnel and the youth.

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MAJ GEN PAYUSOV ON ATHEISTIC UPBRINGING

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 19, Oct 84 (signed to press 17 Sep 84) pp 54-59

[Article by Maj Gen K. Payusov, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor: "Atheistic Indoctrination in the Military Collective"]

[Text] Young replacements come into military collectives twice a year. What features characterize them? Above all it is a dedication to communist ideals and the high level of education, culture and technical competency. Almost all draftees have a secondary or secondary technical education and the overwhelming majority of them are Komsomol members. The draftees carry in themselves all those best qualities which are typical of Soviet young people who are actively participating in work for the welfare of the socialist Motherland.

At the same time young people are encountered among the new recruits, albeit rarely, who are held captive by religious prejudices for one reason or another. As a rule, they are reticent and passive. Although their conduct does not bear an antisocial nature outwardly, the religious narcotic hinders them in thoroughly perceiving the importance of those missions which the people assign to their armed defenders, it hides the collective's interests from them and it impoverishes them spiritually. In such cases it is very important to help the believer opportunely, skillfully and tactfully free himself of religious fetters and accustom him to mastery of a scientific outlook.

Guided by demands of the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, unit and subunit commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol organizations are making ever more productive use of different forms of the propaganda of scientific atheism. Lectures, briefings, antireligious question-and-answer nights, thematic showings of movies, exhibits of atheistic literature, readers' conferences, and tours to museums and planetariums have become widespread. Experienced propagandists of atheism make extensive use of the method of contrasting the ideals of a citizen in the society of developed socialism with the illusory ideals of religion and they convince servicemen of the scientific insolvency of the clergymen's dogmas.

A retreat from religion is the result of long reflections and doubts. One cannot place hopes on the instantaneous effect of antireligious propaganda or expect that the believer will immediately become an atheist. Dropping a spark of doubt as to the truth of religious dogmas in a believer's soul through painstaking work and the force of knowledge and argument, forcing a person to think and read actively, and at the same time giving him access to participation in the collective's political and cultural life and inspiring him by common actions and concerns represent that far from easy path toward attaining the desired goal.

At times one can hear the statement that some mass activities of an antireligious nature in the Army and Navy are held "emptily" since believers try to avoid attending them. It is possible that this is how it is in places, but that is where people engaged in indoctrinational work are unable to inspire colleagues, arrange an interesting lecture or memorable question-and-answer night, or prepare the personnel for them, above all those for whom these activities are intended. In other words, formalism, conventionalism and indifference at times ruin the best plans.

Of course, atheistic indoctrination is a unique process. Effect is not always achieved here by mass forms of work, and at times one can overdo it by trying to persuade the majority of nonbelievers of something for which there is no need to persuade them. Experience shows that individual work contributes most to development of a scientific outlook in a certain category of people. The importance and necessity of this form of influence on servicemen's hearts and minds are determined by the fact that first of all believers are encountered more and more rarely among servicemen; secondly, the reasons for each specific person's religiousness are strictly personal; and thirdly, individual work at times is the only possible way to approach believers, especially sectarians.

In addition, it is far from every person who has access to religion who will dare ask the propagandist a question of interest to him let alone express his opinion or enter an argument in view of everyone at a mass atheistic activity. It isn't always possible at an antireligious lecture, talk, question-and-answer night or readers' conference to find out what troubles each of the attendees and so it is more difficult to choose the most effective means of influencing a specific listener's innermost feelings and ideas.

The primary condition which assures success of individual atheistic work is a good knowledge of people and consideration of their professional and general educational level, national features of life, customs and mores, nature and depth of religious convictions, sentiments and feelings, and specific nature of the professed religion. It is difficult to expect the desired results without this and without consideration of the believers' religious denomination and the character and features of activity of the religious organizations and preachers at the young people's call-up places, and at times even in the subunit and unit locations. Only a comprehensive knowledge of the conditions of a believer's upbringing and life and of his inclinations and interests permits finding the correct path of struggle against vestiges of the past.

The incident with Pvt Aleksey Koval'chuk, told to me recently by his former commander, Officer B. Artamonov, is typical in this respect. Koval'chuk was born and grew up in a village in Ternopol Oblast. His father left his wife with three young children. Crushed by grief, the woman fell under the influence of sectarians and brought up her children in a religious spirit. No one in the home read books or newspapers or listened to the radio. The children did not join either a Young Pioneer organization or the Komsomol. On seeing off her son into the Army the mother strictly instructed him to "keep the faith within you."

From his first days in the unit Pvt Koval'chuk kept aloof, made friends with no one and gave the impression of a reserved, unsociable person. He was diligent in service but displayed no effort or interest in studying military affairs. He usually answered questions monosyllabically: "Yes," "No." He didn't listen to the radio, he didn't go up to the television set and he tried to avoid attending club activities under various pretexts.

Such behavior by Koval'chuk of course did not escape his colleagues' attention. "It has to be that he is pining for a sweetheart," cracked some. This "version" seemingly was confirmed... Away from comrades, especially after retreat, Koval'chuk would move his lips as if talking with someone.

An incident helped understand everything. Once during reveille a pocket prayer book fell out from under the soldier's pillow. A neighbor picked up the little book. "It seems Koval'chuk is a sanctimonious person!" remarked one of his colleagues loudly with a laugh.

As prescribed, the incident was reported to platoon commander Lt B. Artamonov. That same day a convenient instance to talk with the soldier in private presented itself to the officer.

"Are you bored? Why didn't you go to the movies together with everyone else?" he asked Koval'chuk, who was sitting alone in the barracks.

"Further from people and closer to God!" Koval'chuk uttered by heart. Admitting that he had been expecting a summons "through channels" since morning, he immediately declared to the commander: "Demand an accounting for service, but don't touch God!"

There was no frank conversation that time. Artamonov realized that it would be difficult to wrest the soldier from religious fetters. Together with the subunit political worker, he assembled the Komsomol activists and explained to them that the comrades' mockery of Koval'chuk was not to their honor. He and the political worker advised surrounding the soldier with attention and concern, drawing him into mass cultural work and not leaving him alone during free time. The commander himself often chatted with the soldier on various topics and approved his every successful step. To fill in his own atheistic knowledge Artamonov studied appropriate literature and the experience of work with believers.

The soldier's outlook did not change all at once, but Koval'chuk gradually became more and more sociable, he stopped avoiding attendance at movies and amateur concerts, he began to take part in talks at political classes and he became accustomed to reading newspapers and books. He even began to have a different outward appearance--his gaze became direct and open, and his face became more affable and smiling. After a year of service Koval'chuk's entry into the Komsomol was an indubitable victory for the collective in the struggle for their comrade.

Unfortunately, examples of another sort also can be encountered which attest to a lack of desire to "mess" with believers, to the absence of a feeling of responsibility in certain appointed persons and party and Komsomol workers, and to an inability to fight against religious vestiges. Lt I. Koshel' recently told about one such instance in the newspaper FRUNZEVETS. "Today people in the subunit get rid of believers relatively easily. How? On learning that a soldier who has arrived in the unit is connected with some kind of sect, they immediately send him to the construction troops. That was the fate of privates P. Sayenko, D. Budzhuga, I. Kutsak..." "What is this?" asks the officer in conclusion.

The answer to this question would appear to be clear. The indifference and formalism of those who are duty-bound to indoctrinate ideologically and morally are of no benefit to the collective and contradict our communist morality--the morality of a society where a person is a friend, comrade and brother to another person.

An attentive, sensitive attitude toward a young soldier who must be helped to see the light is what is lacking at times in some commanders and political workers who try to dissociate themselves from a difficult but necessary matter.

On entering a military collective some believers appear to reject their belief or at least its external attributes: crosses worn next to the skin and the performance of religious ceremonies. Satisfied with this, the indoctrinators lose sight of such servicemen and cease to perform the necessary work with them. And some erroneously believe that one or two months in the subunit are enough for a believer to decisively reject his delusions.

The atmosphere of a Soviet military collective unquestionably has a very effective influence on a young person's psychology. Understanding that he must not draw attention to himself with his piety, a believer tries to conceal the external manifestations of religiousness, but this does not at all mean that he is breaking off with religious prejudices and superstitions which were instilled in him from childhood. In his heart he remains the very same "gen-uflector" and this cannot help but influence his attitude toward service, toward comrades and toward those ideals which make up the Soviet soldier's spiritual strength. In that case a return to religion after the soldier is released to the reserve seems very likely. This unquestionably dishonors the military collective which in essence was indifferent to a believer.

The indoctrinator's ability to find the proper approach to a person in every individual case, to win him over, and to display tact which does not allow an insult to religious feelings is very important here. Any uncertain step by the propagandist puts the person being indoctrinated on guard and may alienate him and prejudice him. The clumsy imposition of one's views on a believer and the desire to make him an atheist immediately can at times push him to categorical statements: "I believe and will believe!"

Irreconcilability toward religion which is incompatible with the ideology and morality of the active fighter for a new, communist society must be combined with a sensitive, attentive attitude toward believers. Leninist principles of atheistic indoctrination preclude the use of techniques contradicting our humanistic, legal and ethical norms in work with them. The propagandist needs special delicacy when religious ceremonies which believers revere are touched on during contacts with believers. In this case even slight irony let alone a joke or coarseness is inadmissible. Prominent atheist A. V. Lunacharskiy wrote in this regard: "When mockery is turned against deeply and touchingly revered holy things of the naive heart, it wounds it..."

It stands to reason that legal influence also is justified along with persuasion in indoctrinational work with believers. It is the duty of commanders and supervisors to see that believers unconditionally and precisely fulfill the demands of the military oath, regulations and military duty. But here it is very important not to exceed and not to distort the "letter of the law," and to show concern for preserving the deluded soldier's sense of his own dignity.

Some officers do not wish to "mess" with a believer, they give him all kinds of indulgences in service or they transfer him to administrative subunits. On encountering indulgences, some soldiers and sailors write letters to their comrades who are serving conscientiously in units and aboard ships and in the letters express satisfaction that thanks to the "kindness" of their supervisors they received an opportunity to serve "without sinning before God and without breaking his commandments." In an attempt to persuade a young believer, Pvt I. Zalevskiy, of the need to perform military duty honestly, people in one of the units contrived to turn for "help" to his "spiritual mentor"(!). The authors of the letter tried "out of humane motives" to prevent "an instance of a person's punishment" and they asked the ecclesiastical pastor to influence the soldier with his "stately authority" and explain to him the need to strictly follow Soviet laws.

A sense of measure, knowledge, and methodological armament are what the indoctrinators lack in such instances, just as they lack these qualities when they call a believer in for a talk and exert influence on him by the method of "pressure." Such techniques clearly will not provide the proper result and only place the believer on guard, force him to be more secretive and reinforce his prejudice toward social interests.

It is common knowledge that K. Marx did not share the meaning of the old Jesuit saying that a good end justifies bad means. Moreover, in communist ideology there is no shortage of persuasive, scientific arguments substantiating the need to defend the socialist homeland.



In the stage of becoming familiar with a believer and gaining his trust, a propagandist obviously should not bare his end goal to the subject of indoctrination all at once. It is well if the first contacts in the ideological sense are more or less neutral. It is important here that their subjects and the questions discussed are of interest and close to a soldier. The scientific-ideological charge of the talks must be strengthened gradually as the believer's prejudice toward the propagandist's work is removed. Experience indicates that it is best to begin the discussion with some mundane matter, generally known fact, or newspaper article and if possible imperceptibly shift it into the necessary channel. An unconstrained comradely talk or a heart-to-heart discussion with a believer best permits an understanding of the nature of his religious convictions and feelings and the planning of proper ways to overcome them.

Individual atheistic work with religious privates and seamen unquestionably is not limited merely to talk. It is also useful to include in the matter such effective ideological means as newspapers, journals, radio, television, fiction, popular science and, in time, as the subject of indoctrination changes his mind and develops a need for independent interpretation of the world, special atheistic literature as well.

The most important task of the indoctrinator is to persuade the believer of the contradictory nature of religious views on problems of war and peace. It is possible here to show in historical examples the arbitrary nature of interpretation of church dogmas to suit the political interests of exploiters, and to explain convincingly that religious prejudices and superstitions have a negative effect on the perception and fulfillment of military duty and dull vigilance toward intrigues by enemies of the socialist Motherland. The person thus can be led to an understanding of the reactionary nature of religion and he can be made an adherent of a scientific ideology.

Individual work with believers proceeds more successfully if the atheistic, antireligious influence on them is accomplished together with ideological-political, moral and legal indoctrination. In this case the propagandist can successfully overcome the believer's delusions in understanding questions of war and peace and persuasively reveal the peaceloving character and noble, humane goals of the CPSU's Leninist foreign policy and initiatives advanced by our party's 26th congress and by a number of subsequent plenums of its Central Committee.

In showing the social insolvency and harm of ideas existing in certain categories of believers about the "sinfulness of opposing evil by the sword," it should be emphasized that the struggle for firm peace on earth is integrally combined in Communist Party and Soviet state policy with a firm and resolute rebuff to the aggressive aspirations of imperialism, and the fundamental difference of the socialist Army from armies of bourgeois states must be explained.

The task of forming a Marxist-Leninist ideology--the foundation of communist indoctrination of the individual--was named at the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum as one of the most important tasks facing fighters on the

ideological front. This is what makes Soviet citizens conscientious political fighters capable of independently evaluating social phenomena and seeing the relationship of current tasks with our end goals.

Experience confirms that success accompanies those propagandists of atheism who are well prepared, who are able to find an approach to people, and who knowledgeably expose the antiscientific nature of the religious ideology. It stands to reason that all this is acquired in the process of mastering the experience of the best propagandists of atheism and in the course of systematic independent work. Officers receive much benefit from roundtable meetings with scientists and local party and Komsomol workers where there is talk about new "trends" in the religious world and methods of exposing them.

Army and Navy collectives have great reserves for a further improvement in the atheistic indoctrination of Soviet servicemen and for more effective use of the mass media, tested forms and methods of scientific-atheistic propaganda and an individual approach to a person. Experience indicates that the results of atheistic work are higher where there is party management of this important work and where there is constant concern shown so that it is not conducted on a crash basis, but systematically, and so that its content is current and its forms meet modern demands.

The religious soldier is a rare phenomenon. Such a person may not even show up in a collective. But this does not mean that there is no longer a need here for atheistic propaganda. The shaping of a Marxist-Leninist ideology presumes mastery of scientific knowledge of the material world which refutes any religious views and myths about a divine creation of nature and society. Young people must be indoctrinated comprehensively in a spirit of communist ideology and morality, they must be helped to develop an active position in life and they must be taught the ability to defend atheistic views, no matter when this is necessary in life.

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1985 TRAINING SERIES: EIGHT-HOUR COURSE OUTLINED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 19, Oct 84 (signed to press 17 Sep 84) pp 70-76

[Article by Col P. Konyukhov, candidate of historical sciences, docent: "For Political Study Group Instructors: Reliable Guardian of Peaceful, Creative Labor";\* passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] From the editors. With this issue the journal KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL begins the publication of articles to assist political study group instructors based on 1985 training plans. According to established tradition, these articles will be published approximately 1½ months before the corresponding topic is studied. It is planned to accompany them where possible with various diagrams, selections of reference material and figures, and other data.

The journal's editorial staff requests everyone using these materials to express their opinions about them as well as their desires and suggestions, which will be considered in preparing the next articles.

Classes under this topic are intended to assist students in gaining a deeper understanding of imperialism's aggressive nature, reasons for the aggravation of the world military-political situation, and Soviet Armed Forces' missions stemming therefrom for further strengthening the country's defensive capability, maintaining high combat readiness of units and ships, perfecting military proficiency, and performing operational readiness, shipboard, and watch duties in an exemplary manner.

It is recommended that the class be conducted by the narrative and discussion method. Six hours are allocated for studying the topic, and it is best to distribute this time as follows: two hours for narrative, two hours for independent preparation and two hours for discussion.

\*Material for political studies on the topic "The USSR Armed Forces are a reliable guardian over the Soviet people's peaceful, creative labor and the bulwark of peace and socialism."

The following issues must be covered IN THE NARRATIVE: 1. Imperialism is a constant source of military danger. 2. The Soviet Armed Forces are a powerful factor for deterring imperialism's aggressive aspirations. 3. It is the sacred duty of Soviet military personnel to be in constant combat readiness, to perfect military proficiency and to strengthen discipline.

Students should be reminded IN A BRIEF INTRODUCTION that the Soviet Armed Forces have been reliably protecting the creative labor of Soviet citizens building communism for the seventh decade now. The USSR consistently implements a Leninist peaceloving foreign policy course aimed at eliminating the threat of war, deepening detente and curbing the arms race.

The Communist Party and Soviet government realistically assess the processes occurring in international life. While defending the cause of peace they are forced to keep their attention constantly focused on assuring the reliable security of our Motherland and countries of the socialist community. Building a communist society, struggling for peace, strengthening the Armed Forces' combat might and being in readiness to offer a crushing rebuff to any aggressor represent the foundation of the Soviet state's foreign and domestic policy as bequeathed by the great Lenin.

In the report at the April 1984 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, Comrade K. U. Chernenko emphasized: "The present situation demands our constant, comprehensive efforts to assure national security and reliable protection of Soviet citizens' peaceful labor." This thought reaffirms that the Communist Party and Soviet government will continue to show steadfast concern for strengthening the defense might of the country and our valorous Armed Forces and will do everything necessary to see that the Soviet Army and Navy's armament, technical outfitting and combat might are at the most up-to-date level.

#### 1. IMPERIALISM IS A CONSTANT SOURCE OF MILITARY DANGER

In speaking of imperialism's basic features, V. I. Lenin repeatedly emphasized that while in its fundamental economic features imperialism is distinguished by the least love of peace and freedom and the greatest development of a military clique everywhere, politically imperialism generally is a desire for violence and reaction (see "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], Vol 37, p 248; Vol 27, p 388). One of imperialism's most important characteristics--its aggressive essence--is reflected in concentrated form in this conclusion by Lenin.

The unevenness of countries' development under imperialism led leading capitalist states to the struggle for world domination. This, in Lenin's words, reflects the content of imperialism's politics, "the continuation of which is an imperialist war" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," Vol 30, p 85). Under imperialism the struggle for world domination acquired the stable character intrinsically inherent to it. For this reason imperialism has been, is, and will be a constant source of military danger.

Imperialism has undergone certain changes as a source of military danger. Up until October 1917 it held undivided sway throughout the world. The actions by aggressive circles of imperialist states were aimed at a redivision of an already distributed world. After the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution international imperialism tried to stifle the world's first state of the working people and put down the revolutionary movement in its countries. Nothing came of this reactionary adventure: the Soviet state defended its achievements in the years of civil war and military intervention and won out in a most difficult clash against Hitlerite fascism unprecedented in scope.

The CPSU Central Committee Decree "40th Anniversary of the Soviet People's Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" notes that the defeat of German fascism and then of Japanese militarism had a most profound effect on the entire course of world development. Favorable conditions were established for working masses to struggle for their social and national liberation. The positions of progressive, democratic, peace-loving forces were strengthened and the influence of communist and working parties rose. The world socialist system appeared and has been developing successfully. There was an acceleration in the process of disintegration of imperialism's colonial system, ending in its collapse.

All this led to the fact that the sphere of imperialist domination in the world narrowed and internal contradictions within and rivalry among countries of capital became aggravated. But the nature of imperialism remains the same; it is not changing and cannot change. "Adventurism and a readiness to gamble mankind's vital interests for the sake of one's narrow, selfish goals are what shows up especially nakedly in the politics of the most aggressive circles of imperialism," emphasized the CPSU Central Committee Accountability Report to the 26th party congress. The deepening of capitalism's general crisis and the aggravation of its contradictions thus intensify even more imperialism's adventurism and the military danger for world nations stemming therefrom.

U.S. imperialism announced its claims to "world domination" in the postwar period. In an attempt to strengthen its political and military-strategic positions and possessing a temporary monopoly on nuclear weapons, the United States took the path of blackmail and threats toward the Soviet Union and began to conduct politics "from a position of strength." At the time when the Soviet people were occupied with restoring the war-ravaged national economy, U.S. and British ruling circles had begun to prepare the most monstrous and insidious plans against the USSR. Back in 1948 Churchill proposed beginning an atomic war against us and in 1949 the United States even developed a war plan against the Soviet Union at the direction of then President H. Truman codenamed Dropshot, which recently came to light. According to this sinister plan, 300 atomic bombs and 20,000 tons of "conventional" bombs were to be dropped on the USSR, and the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community were to be destroyed.

Even at the present time, cloaked in the notorious myth of the "Soviet military threat," aggressive U.S. circles and their NATO allies are conducting a

course toward further aggravation of the international situation, a change in the approximate parity in military-strategic forces in the world arena in their own favor, and achievement of military superiority over countries of the socialist community.

International tension grew especially sharply and military danger intensified with the arrival of the Reagan administration to power.

The present U.S. administration's plans and calculations ominous for world peoples are reflected in a new military strategy developed at Reagan's initiative and called the "strategy of direct confrontation." According to a statement by U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger, its chief task is to achieve "complete and indisputable" military superiority and restore "the United States' leading role in the world." The United States is counting primarily on preparing and delivering a "preemptive" nuclear strike against the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community.

Having assumed the role of world gendarme, the United States is unceremoniously interfering in the internal affairs of sovereign, independent states. The United States is implanting reactionary dictatorial regimes everywhere in Central and South America, Asia and Africa without regard for the people's will and it is creating tension and centers of aggression and conflicts.

Here is only a brief chronicle of imperialism's crimes against peoples in the postwar period:

1946-1949. A grouping of U.S. and British Marines numbering over 5,000 persons was landed in Greece with the support of naval forces and aircraft. The interventionists participated in putting down a democratic revolution and establishing a monarchical system in the country.

1947. The American Marines were thrown into Paraguay to put down a rebellious people and establish a "democratic system." A military dictatorship was set up in the country with the help of American bayonets.

1948-1953. A 90,000-man grouping of U.S. Armed Forces assisted the reactionary government of the Philippines in putting down an armed uprising of workers in this country.

1950-1953. The aggressive war in Korea. American troop actions were distinguished by special brutality, the "scorched earth" tactic was employed, and there was extensive use of napalm and bacteriological and chemical weapons.

1954. The armed invasion of Guatemala by CIA-trained mercenaries supported by American aircraft. The democratic government was overthrown and a regime of military dictatorship was established.

1958. The U.S. Marines and ground forces were landed in Lebanon and they took part in putting down mass demonstrations by the Lebanese people.

1961. The attempt at armed invasion of Cuba by American mercenaries for the purpose of overthrowing its revolutionary government. Over 1,500 cutthroats trained and armed in the United States, 80 aircraft and 35 warships participated in the aggression.

1964. The bloody reprisal by American troops against the peaceful populace of the Panama Canal zone who were demanding the elimination of American military bases on Panamanian territory, removal of troops and restoration of sovereignty.

1964-1973. U.S. aggression in Vietnam. Mass strikes by strategic aviation and ship bombardment of peaceful targets were employed. The war of annihilation was waged using chemical weapons, napalm and other barbaric kinds of weapons.

During these same years there was U.S. aggression against Laos to support the reactionary government in the struggle against the Pathet Lao liberation front.

1965. The armed intervention against the Dominican Republic. The demonstration by masses of people was drowned in blood.

1970-1975. U.S. troops took part in putting down the struggle by peoples of Cambodia against the reactionary puppet regime.

1971-1973. There were counterrevolutionary overthrows in Bolivia, Chile and El Salvador, democratic governments were overthrown and fascist regimes brought to power with the direct participation of the U.S. CIA.

1982. Under the pretext of "establishing peace in the Near East" 800 U.S. Marines were landed in Lebanon. Later the grouping of American forces was brought to 2,000 persons and more than 30 U.S. warships were drawn up to the Lebanese coast. Lebanon's population was subjected to bombardment from American ships and to air strikes. At the present time American imperialism also is giving every possible assistance to Israel, which is carrying out real plunder on Lebanese soil.

1983. The U.S. armed intervention against Grenada, overthrow of the democratic government and establishment of a puppet regime.

All these facts eloquently indicate the savage essence of imperialism, and American imperialism above all, and its crude intervention in the affairs of sovereign states. And now the United States continues to prepare new acts of intervention. It openly set the goal of putting down the liberation movement in countries of Latin America. An undeclared war is being waged against patriotic forces in El Salvador and new provocations are being prepared against Cuba.

Preparations for aggression against Nicaragua are being accelerated. A fundamental "work" titled "Estimate of Resources and Losses in an Invasion of

Nicaragua" which appeared recently in the United States can be called nothing other than an outrageous provocation. It pedantically calculates the number of personnel and amount of equipment necessary for defeating the Sandinista People's Army and the subsequent occupation of Nicaragua. It is noted in part that this will take 61,000 Marines and landing personnel, 216 warplanes and 730 helicopters, tanks and APC's.

The U.S. president proclaimed a "crusade" against communism, pursuing the delirious goal of destroying socialism as a sociopolitical system. Military preparations are being conducted at ever-increasing tempos for this purpose. An extensive program has been adopted and is being carried out intended for making new weapon systems operational in the near future, primarily those of strategic offensive forces. These are the MX and Midgetman intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear-powered strategic submarines with the Trident missiles, the strategic B-1B and Stealth strategic bombers, and air-, sea- and land-based long-range cruise missiles.

The intensified development of space means of warfare also is a component part of American military preparations. This actually means that it is planned to unfold yet another new direction of the arms race--preparation for war in space.

The course of the present U.S. administration is very dangerous. The Pentagon has begun stationing new first-strike American missiles in a number of West European countries. In an attempt to lull the vigilance of peoples worried by the danger of war, U.S. ruling circles are declaring that the stationing of medium-range missiles allegedly will assure Europe's security. Such a statement is nothing more than outright deception.

In reality this deployment led to an increase in nuclear threat on the European continent. Not only military tension, but political tension also increased, since actions by leaders of the United States and those NATO countries which agreed to accept the Pershing and cruise missiles on their territory led to a breakdown in talks which had the purpose of limiting and substantially reducing nuclear arms.

It should be noted on the first question in conclusion that the policy of the United States and other NATO countries is deeply hostile to the interests of peace and international cooperation. The Pentagon's crafty schemes, directed against life itself on the planet, are causing indignation and anger in peoples of all continents.

## 2. THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES ARE A POWERFUL FACTOR FOR DETERRING IMPERIALISM'S AGGRESSIVE ASPIRATIONS

Lenin's behests about observing supreme vigilance and high combat readiness acquire special urgency under conditions where military danger has grown through imperialism's fault. "We must accompany our steps to peace," emphasized our party's creator, "with the straining of all our military readiness..." ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," Vol 40, p 248). This Leninist



precept is being strictly fulfilled thanks to the CPSU's constant concern and the Soviet people's efforts.

Proceeding from a profound and realistic analysis of the international situation and considering the status and prospects for development of military affairs, the Communist Party is constantly carrying out the planned development of our Armed Forces. Special attention is being given to those forces and resources which provide for the Army and Navy's combat might to the greatest extent.

This thought can be confirmed in the following historical example. It is generally known that on 6 and 9 August 1945 American imperialism committed a very grave crime against mankind by subjecting the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to atomic bombs. U.S. leaders wished to frighten the Soviet Union thereby. "The Russians soon will be put in their place," declared U.S. President H. Truman with aplomb, "and then the United States will assume direction of the world movement along the path over which it must be taken." They were setting hopes on the fact that our country, weakened by war, would be able to manufacture an atomic bomb no sooner than in 15-20 years.

But the imperialists miscalculated. As early as 1947 the Soviet government declared that the secret of the atomic bomb no longer existed. The first test of an atomic bomb was conducted in the USSR in August 1949, and then the production of atomic weapons and their delivery means began. Nuclear missile weapons began to influence the organizational development of the Army and Navy in a determining manner. In December 1959 the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers adopted a resolution establishing the Strategic Missile Forces and the establishment of this new branch of our Armed Forces was announced at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in January 1960.

But calculations to achieve military superiority over the USSR and thus free their hands for conducting a global policy of diktat and piracy continue to give the militant forces of imperialism no rest. These forces see the chief obstacle in the path to restoring imperialism's lost international positions to be in the person of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community.

Soviet citizens know well what incalculable disasters the aggressors' actions can bring. They have not forgotten the stern years of the Great Patriotic War. For this reason the Communist Party and all our people are showing steadfast concern for strengthening national defense. They are doing everything to see that the Soviet Armed Forces have everything necessary for reliable protection of socialism's achievements and peace on earth. "So long as military and political tension exists," emphasizes Comrade K. U. Chernenko, "so long as nuclear missile danger from the United States and NATO states hovers over our country, we must keep our powder dry and be constantly on guard to see that the correlation of forces does not change in favor of imperialism and that we do not turn out to be weaker."

Thanks to efforts of the party and all the people, the Soviet Armed Forces and their combat might and combat effectiveness now meet modern demands. The combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces is at a high level. Let no one doubt that the Soviet people's peaceful labor is reliably protected.

It was emphasized at the 26th party congress that the combat potential of the Soviet Armed Forces is a firm alloy of high technical outfitting, military proficiency and indomitable morale. The class instructor must tell the students in more detail about each of these component parts of combat potential.

In speaking of high technical outfitting it must be noted that this is above all the quantity and quality of weapons and combat equipment which determine the fire, attack and maneuver capabilities of our Armed Forces. Lenin emphasized that the very best army and people most dedicated to the cause of revolution can be annihilated by the enemy immediately if they are not sufficiently armed. Considering this, the Communist Party is steadfastly concerned with seeing that our Armed Forces develop in step with contemporary scientific-technical progress.

In the present situation when imperialism's aggressive preparations have stepped up sharply and calculations toward achieving military-technical superiority over the USSR are showing up more and more clearly in U.S. strategic plans, we are forced to maintain the technical outfitting of our Armed Forces at a level precluding attainment of such superiority over them. "The present-day level of production, science and technology in our country," notes USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, "permits the development of any kind of weapons and outfitting the Army and Navy with them in the necessary amount should this be necessary in response to imperialism's military challenge."

The personnel's military proficiency is another important component of the Soviet Armed Forces' combat potential. Military proficiency is the high professional and special preparedness of every serviceman and of military subunits to accomplish combat missions and fulfill obligations of performing military duty. The degree of proficiency is determined by the personnel's knowledge and practical skills.

Soviet servicemen persistently implement Lenin's behest to learn military affairs in a genuine manner. They are learning and are skillfully using combat equipment and they are constantly perfecting their combat proficiency. But demands on combat and political training are growing and each individual serviceman's reserves for improving proficiency still are far from exhausted. Therefore the students must be attuned to the fact that they must achieve the maximum possible high level of combat proficiency even today since there will be no opportunity to finish learning in the course of combat actions in case the imperialists unleash a war. It is important to hit the enemy at long ranges, with the first round or launch, and to make full use of the combat qualities of weapons and military equipment. Because of the collective nature of modern weapons, it is also necessary to have cohesiveness in actions and combat teamwork of subunits, mutual assistance and interchangeability among members of combat teams, and confidence in one's proficiency.

The personnel's indomitable morale holds a special place in the Soviet Armed Forces' combat potential. Lenin emphasized the importance of morale for winning victory. He noted that "in any war victory is determined in the final account by the state of morale of those masses who are spilling their blood on the battlefield" ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," Vol 41, p 121). Guided by Lenin's precepts, the CPSU conducts extensive work for the communist indoctrination of Soviet citizens and for instilling in servicemen, along with high ideological-political conditioning, stable moral-combat qualities such as courage, valor, boldness, staunchness, and readiness to conduct decisive, intense combat actions in a difficult situation, at any time of day or year, and under all climatic conditions.

In a speech at the All-Services Conference of Komsomol Organization Secretaries, Comrade K. U. Chernenko emphasized: "Our Army today is strong, as it always has been, not only in contemporary equipment and good training, but also in its ideological charge and high moral-political spirit."

It must be noted that the importance of troop morale is rising under present-day conditions. This is determined above all by the nature of modern combat, distinguished by a previously unprecedented intensity, decisiveness and mobility. To withstand its ordeals and win victory will require high moral-political and psychological staunchness and the high combat activeness of servicemen.

In completing presentation of material on the second question one should emphasize that the Soviet Armed Forces, which are utterly dedicated to their people, the party and the cause of communism, reliably protect the revolutionary achievements of workers, the security of nations and peace on earth in a common formation of fraternal armies.

### 3. BEING IN CONSTANT COMBAT READINESS, PERFECTING MILITARY PROFICIENCY AND STRENGTHENING DISCIPLINE IS THE SACRED DUTY OF SOVIET SERVICEMEN

Lenin's behests about the need for vigilance, constant combat readiness and firm military discipline in the Army and Navy were perceived by all generations of Soviet servicemen as a significant and mandatory matter. This is shown by numerous examples from the history of the Soviet Armed Forces' development and the Army and Navy's present combat training. Here are a few of them.

This happened in January 1944. A subunit was assigned the mission of taking an enemy strongpoint. It was a stone's throw to the fascist trenches, but a furious hail of lead pressed the fighting men to the cold ground. Mikhail Serov was the first to rise at a critical moment. An enemy burst stitched through the hero just before the barbed-wire entanglement. Gathering his last forces, he threw himself on the barbed wire and shouted with a final effort: "Forward, over me!" Serov did everything possible and impossible for his comrades' combat success.

WO [Praporshchik] V. Sidorenko did not have to place his chest up against bullets. Nevertheless the situation which developed in one of the tank subunits of the Moscow Military District during a recent tactical exercise required his readiness for an exploit. It so happened that one of the attacking combat vehicles fell into a quagmire. Its crew got its bearings quickly, put on breathing apparatus and waited for help. Help came. WO Sidorenko dove twice into the icy water. He managed to penetrate to the tank and attach a steel cable... The people and equipment were saved.

It is advisable for the class instructor to tell about personnel of his own unit, ship or subunit who are fulfilling military duty faultlessly and are an example of vigilance, discipline and execution.

Constant, high combat readiness assumes that every Soviet soldier always is ready to conduct combat actions under conditions of the employment of any means of warfare and to perform any combat mission; that he handles equipment and weapons expertly and keeps them in constant readiness for use; that he improves his own combat and political training constantly; and that he strictly follows military regulations and is a disciplined, diligent serviceman. A comprehensive increase in combat readiness is inseparable from the personnel's high moral-political and combat qualities. As military affairs become more complicated there is a constant increase in the scope of operational training missions, a change in the nature of military labor and a growth in moral-psychological and physical stresses. All this places high demands on every serviceman.

High combat readiness builds up from day to day through a steady improvement in combat and political training. Technical training is the initial step of a serviceman's ascent to combat proficiency. Preparing for skillful, resolute combat actions and for defeating the enemy under all conditions of a war's outbreak means quality mastery of modern weapons and combat equipment and full use of all features and capabilities contained in them. The movement which has now unfolded in the Army and Navy under the motto "A high level of mastery for modern equipment" very accurately reflects the essence of this demand.

The movement for an increase in class ratings and mastery of related specialties and the servicemen's struggle for full interchangeability are of great importance. It is common knowledge that specialists with high ratings make much more effective use of combat capabilities of weapons and equipment. They rarely allow breakdowns, they fix malfunctions faster and they have not only a broader technical outlook, but a broader tactical outlook as well. For this reason the struggle for a high class rating is an element of the struggle for high combat readiness.

Mastery of equipment also presumes without fail an improvement in the methods of its use and mastery and development of modern tactics. Every Army and Navy serviceman must take an active part in a constant search for more effective combat techniques which help attain victory not by numbers but by ability.

Exercises, flight operations and sea deployments rightly are called the highest form of unit and ship training for conducting combat actions and a check of readiness for combat. Conditions are created here which approximate combat to the maximum and require of the troops an exceptional exertion of efforts and full use of the capabilities of equipment and weapons. The combat, physical and moral-psychological qualities needed by a serviceman are gained and firmly secured in exercises. In recent years Soviet servicemen have undergone a check for military maturity more than once. As the experience of many exercises and maneuvers shows, our troops are capable of performing the most diverse and difficult combat missions.

The time factor is of special importance in maintaining constant, high combat readiness. While in past wars deficiencies in the personnel's training were successfully remedied to a certain extent in the course of the war itself and in pauses between actions and battles, there will be no such opportunities in modern combat because of its dynamism, transient nature, and practical continuity. Therefore all Armed Forces personnel must learn to handle all kinds of combat equipment and weapons expertly under peacetime conditions and be able to use them with maximum effectiveness. Targets have to be hit with the first burst, first volley, or first missile launch, since there will no longer be time to repeat or correct something.

In other words, it is important for the propagandist to stress that the concept of combat readiness has acquired a new coloration at the present time. The approach time of modern missiles has been reduced to a minimum and aircraft long ago bettered the speed of sound and became all-weather. To counter all this it takes expertise developed to a state of automatism and personnel training to ensure that not one second is lost and there is not one superfluous movement in combat.

The party links successes in perfecting developed socialism with a further improvement in efficiency and order and with a strengthening of discipline. General party and state guidelines on this matter also are governing in the area of military organizational development. Firm military discipline has been, is and remains the most important component of troop combat readiness and of the strength and invincibility of our valorous Armed Forces.

Questions of a further strengthening of military discipline continue to be given great emphasis at all levels and in all elements of the military body in recent years. A very important task in this area is to actually support all the personnel's life and activities in conformity with demands of the oath and regulations. The regulation and the order are a law which must be followed strictly and unquestioningly by everyone without exception.

In speaking of the personnel's combat schooling one should stress in particular the importance of a high state of physical training. Physical conditioning, sport and combat readiness are inseparable. Any exercise or problem, let alone actual combat, is a strict test of soldiers' endurance. Physical culture and sport contribute to harmonious development, condition the personnel, under peacetime conditions help successfully accomplish operational training

missions and, under wartime conditions, help the personnel act boldly and resolutely and staunchly endure the hardships of marches and combat life.

Socialist competition is an important means in attaining high goals in combat training. In the present training year it is taking place in the Army and Navy under the motto "Be on guard, in constant readiness to defend socialism's achievements!"

As noted by USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, the principle tested by life of teaching troops what is necessary in war must become the immutable law of Army and Navy training. All training of Army and Navy forces must be conducted with consideration of the probable enemy's capabilities and the characteristics of modern combat, and this must be done primarily in the field, in the air and at sea.

It is important to emphasize that in fulfillment of this requirement combat training must be made to approximate to the maximum the actual conditions which might occur in modern combat, there must be a comprehensive struggle against indulgences and oversimplification, and there must be total fulfillment of the combat training plans which have been outlined.

One should note in conclusion that, true to Lenin's behests, the party of communists considers defense of the socialist homeland, strengthening of the defensive capabilities of the Land of Soviets, and maintaining the Soviet Armed Forces' combat might at the proper level as its sacred duty, as a matter for all the Soviet people, and as a most important function of the socialist state. This is also stated in the USSR Constitution (Basic Law): "The duty of the USSR Armed Forces to the people is to reliably protect the socialist homeland and be in constant combat readiness guaranteeing an immediate rebuff to any aggressor."

In close collaboration with fraternal armies of Warsaw Pact member states, the USSR Armed Forces are carrying out their historic mission worthily. Soviet citizens can be sure that their peaceful labor and socialism's great achievements are reliably protected. In his speech at a Kremlin reception in honor of military academy graduates on 27 June 1984 USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov declared: "Today the Soviet Armed Forces represent a powerful combat monolith. Army and Navy personnel are closely united about the Communist Party and are utterly dedicated to the Motherland. They are performing their duty to the people and to the homeland with honor and dignity."

DURING THE DISCUSSION with the students it is advisable to go over the following questions: 1. Where does the aggressive essence of modern imperialism manifest itself? 2. What changes have occurred in the technical rearming and further improvement of the USSR Armed Forces? 3. What demands does modern combat place on the soldier and sailor? 4. What does it mean to be in constant combat readiness under present-day conditions? 5. What are the military personnel's basic missions under conditions of the aggravated international situation?

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CSO: 1801/82

TRADE SERVICES OFFICERS REPRIMANDED FOLLOWING ARTICLE

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 19, Oct 84 (signed to press 17 Sep 84) p 96

[Article: "In the Wake of Journal Articles"]

[Text] "A Conflict Could Have Been Avoided" was the title of an article by Lt Col V. Perov published in KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No 13 for 1984. It discussed the fact that party member-managers of one of the military enterprises were delving poorly into subordinates' requirements and needs, they weren't relying on the party organization in resolving particular problems, and they weren't considering the collective's opinion. This didn't have the best effect on people's mutual relationships or on establishing a healthy moral atmosphere in the military enterprise.

As Maj Gen A. Taskayev and Maj Gen O. Kichayev announced, the facts cited in the article had been confirmed. It was discussed in the party organization of the directorate to which the military enterprise is subordinate. It was noted that directorate party members had to increase the effectiveness of indoctrinational work in subordinate units and enterprises, direct efforts toward perfecting the managers' work style, and achieve uniformity of organizational and ideological work. In conformity with demands of the 1984 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, when evaluating the work of commanders and supervisors they should give attention not only to the fulfillment of planning indicators, but also to actual efforts aimed at improving the working and living conditions of servicemen, workers and employees.

The article "A Conflict Could Have Been Avoided" was discussed at meetings of the party, trade union and Komsomol organizations and in the women's council of the military enterprise. Specific steps were planned to improve the moral climate in the collective.

Col V. Yakovlev, chief of the military enterprise, was given a reprimand and Chief Engineer Lt Col G. Grinevich and Maj Z. Sharipov, assistant chief of the military enterprise for logistical support, were given a severe reprimand for omissions in indoctrinational work and for crude violations of finance and labor legislation by order of the directorate chief.



Col V. Yakovlev and Maj O. Yushkevich, deputy chief of the military enterprise for political affairs, were given a hearing in the directorate. It was recommended that they improve the effectiveness of individual indoctrinational work and the culture of mutual relations with subordinates.

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'SHIELD-84' TRAINING EXERCISES PROFILED

Assault River Crossing

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Sep 84 p 1

[Article by Col V. Moroz and Lt Col A. Polyakov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondents: "The Battalions Force the Laba"]

[Text] The sides continued their active operations in the exercise yesterday. The "Easterners" developed the offensive by employing a tactical airborne landing operation and forcing a water barrier. The "Westerners" offered stiff resistance.

A river is an advantageous natural line for setting up a strong defense. Crossing one has always been a difficult task for the troops, one which requires great tactical skill of the commanders, boldness and flawless handling of the equipment from the personnel, and precise interaction among the subunits of the various branches of troops.

That section of the Laba where the crossing was to be made is wide and deep. The "Western" subunits had fortified themselves on the opposite bank.

The "Easterners" were conducting intensive reconnaissance. Aircraft and reconnaissance groups were conducting reconnaissance beyond the river. Fighters were clearing the skies above the water barrier. A struggle was underway for air supremacy. Fighter-bombers were striking at strongpoints and control centers on the other bank, and engineer reconnaissance of the water barrier was underway. The bottom of the Laba at that spot was rocky, sandy and rough.

Pontoon subunits of the "Easterners" were preparing for combat work on the approaches to the river, in areas convenient for camouflage. Forward battalions from motorized rifle regiments of the Czechoslovak People's Army and the National People's Army of the GDR tested the equipment over and over.

A powerful artillery strike and missile attacks by combat helicopters against targets on the opposite bank presaged the beginning of the assault crossing. "Eastern" batteries were preparing a site across the river with accurate fire for the landing of the tactical airborne group. The airborne group contained a motorized rifle subunit of the Soviet Army. The "snatch" group was led by

Officer A. Lashkin. After capturing the landing site, the motorized riflemen set up its defense. They were assisted from the flanks by defensive fire from an "Eastern" battery. Aircraft covered the "snatch" group from the air.

Transport helicopters delivered heavy equipment to the site. The bridgehead across the Laba was being enlarged by the minute. Advance battalions of the Czechoslovak People's Army and the National People's Army of the GDR reached the river. Infantry combat vehicles of the battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel (V. Renisha) sliced the water simultaneously on the right flank. That battalion had won first place in the competition in the Max Rocher regiment. Infantry combat vehicles of the battalion commanded by Captain L. Heinz, member of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, were ripping up the smooth surface of the water on the left flank.

The crossing took place along a broad front. Wave after wave of the combat vehicles crossed the river, climbed up the steep bank and rushed to the assistance of the airborne landing personnel, who were disrupting the operations of the "Westerners." Antiaircraft pieces and vehicles carrying antitank guided missiles systems crossed the Laba. The artillery crossed on tracked self-propelled ferrys.

The tank subunits crossed the river on the bottom. One after another, the powerful squat vehicles disappeared beneath the water, and only milky, white billows from the engines and air-intake pipes cutting through the waves like submarine periscopes gave away their movement. The crossing reminded one of a smoothly functioning plant conveyor. Good physical fitness and psychological conditioning were demanded of the crews. One could not help recalling that the first attempts to send armored vehicles across a river on the bottom were made by Soviet tankmen 30 years ago. Our tank units also employed this method during the Great Patriotic War. On the Desna, among others. Every tank subunit of the fraternal armies was now accustomed to bottom-crossings.

The scene of the crossing was especially impressive from a helicopter. It seemed as though two powerful waves--water and metal--came together and parted, each in its own direction.

The "Easterners" began to set up bridge crossings. One of them was a dummy crossing. Tank mock-ups moved over the dummy bridge. Tactical aircraft of the "Westerners" struck at the dummy crossing, destroyed the "bridge" and set the "equipment" on fire. A dynamic air battle flared up above the river. Aircraft of the Czechoslovak squadron commanded by Major F. Novak, military pilot 1st class, were hitting targets detected on the other bank.

Pontoon subunits attached to the battalions demonstrated skill in handling the equipment. The vehicles dropped the bridge elements into the river. The elements were linked together in a line at their own bank. A few minutes later boats were laying out the steel bed, linking the banks. The bridge was securely moored with anchors.

The company commanded by Lieutenant J. Galanda, which affirmed its "vzornoy"--that is, exemplary--title this year, completed the crossing far more rapidly than the norm.

The pontoneers of the GDR's National People's Army performed their missions with the same sort of confidence. The equipment began moving over the bridges simultaneously. The check points and the traffic control service kept the crossing going at the most rapid pace possible. The reserve bridge set up by means of truck bridgelayers could be used at any time.

The "Eastern" aircraft and tanks brought up to fire with direct laying before the crossing began and artillery batteries, which had ranged in on the "enemy" strongpoints, reliably covered the crossing area, interacting from concealed fire positions.

The river tested both the equipment and the personnel. The remarkable combat qualities of the equipment with which the subunits of the fraternal armies were outfitted and the flawless training of the teams and crews were demonstrated in the crossing, as they had been in an offensive battle the day before. Floating armor--this is what one might call the equipment in the battalions which rapidly overcame the large water barrier.

The training battle died down. The banks emptied, tugs and barges began moving over the peaceful, laboring Laba again....

#### Mountain Tank Battle

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 14 Sep 84 p 1

[Article by Col V. Moroz and Lt Col A. Polyakov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondents: "In a Unified Thrust"]

[Text] One of the central events in the exercise yesterday was a tank battle in the mountains. Tankmen of the Bulgarian People's Army, the Soviet Army and the Czechoslovak People's Army interacted in it.

In inclement weather, when the sun does not break through the clouds, the mountains appear harsh and gloomy. The steep slopes, which retain their moisture even in dry times, swell up completely and become difficult to cross. A tank sometimes slides down the rocky footing, along with a layer of soggy earth.

Autumn gave the tankmen of the fraternal armies warm and sunny days for the first exercises. Rain then poured down on the mountains. The sun then reappeared. The tankmen were not operating under the best of conditions, as they say, however. Great skill and good psychological conditioning were required for operating the vehicles.

Fightingmen in the regiment commanded by Major D. Stoyanov were the first to enter the battle. The Bulgarian tankmen were supported by Czechoslovak airmen. Airmen in the flight commanded by Major M. Cip obtained valuable reconnaissance information. Aircraft and artillery carried out strikes against the "Westerners" positions. "Enemy" air raids were successfully repelled by antiaircraft subunits of the Czechoslovak People's Army.

Tankmen in the battalion commanded by Captain O. Filipov, a recent graduate of the Military Academy of Armored Troops, felt right at home in the mountains.

The companies commanded by Captain I. Golev and Senior Lieutenant K. Georgiyev performed well in the training battle. Their tanks crossed over dizzying slopes.

Tankment of the Bulgarian People's Army captured an advantageous position and created a good situation for the commitment to battle of the second echelon---subunits of the Soviet Army and the Czechoslovak People's Army.

When second echelons are committed to battle, a great deal depends upon the correct assessment of the situation, the commander's competence and mutual understanding in all elements of the battle formation. This task was accomplished with great skill in the exercise.

Subunit crews of the tank regiment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Kovalenko performed smoothly and precisely. This unit has some remarkable combat traditions. During the Great Patriotic War the regiment traveled thousands of kilometers over frontline roads and completed its combat journey in the Baltic area.

Everyone in the regiment has heard of Senior Lieutenant Khutoryaskiy, Hero of the Soviet Union. The tank company which he commanded destroyed four fascist mortar batteries and smashed up trains near the settlement of Novaya zhizn in Gomel Oblast. When the commander's tank was knocked out of action, the officer did not abandon the vehicle. He and his crew continued to destroy the enemy with fire and tracks. Army General K.K. Rokossovskiy, front commander, wrote in the tankman's award document: "Worthy of the title Hero of the Soviet Union." Senior Lieutenant Anatoliy Khutoryanskiy's name is heard during each evening roll call at the regiment's field camp, inspiring the tankmen to continue the glorious traditions. The very best are awarded memorial certificates with a picture of the hero, who is listed for eternity on the roster of one of the companies.

In the regiment's history great importance will be attached to its participation in the exercise by the fraternal armies. The heirs to the frontline fighters confidently performed the difficult missions. The men under Major V. Lutsenko, who has been awarded the medal "For Combat Merit," demonstrated good tactical and technical training in all the phases. The unit's best battalion came close with its performance in the exercise to achieving its cherished goal of earning the title of excellent subunit just before the 40th anniversary of the Soviet people's Victory in the Great Patriotic War.

Senior Lieutenant N. Platonov, company commander, secretary of the battalion party organization and specialist 1st class, increased his reputation as a skillful organizer. Lieutenant S. Pilipenko, deputy company commander for technical affairs, passed the test in the field with honor by servicing the tanks irreproachably under camp conditions.

The crews of Senior Sergeant I. Zakhidnyy, a participant in the traditional Tankmen's Day meeting in the Komsomol Central Committee, and Junior Sergeant A. Yaremchuk operated with skill and initiative on the mountain routes.

"The outcome of the battle is determined by many factors, of course," Major A. Kozhevnikov, deputy regimental commander for political affairs, said. "We never have any doubts about the main factor, the Soviet soldier's moral stamina and spiritual strength. I see in my men everything for which the front line

fighters gained fame. I see the same irrepressible thrust, the same readiness to accomplish what would appear to be impossible for the sake of victory, the same love for their remarkable equipment, capable of miracles in skilled hands...."

The mountain battle was a serious test for personnel of the Sokolov-Belotserkovskiy Tank Regiment imeni Hero of the Soviet Union Captain Otakar Yarosh. Major M. Korman's men had also not operated under such difficult conditions before. The outstanding tank regiment of the Czechoslovak People's Army, which inherited the traditions and the glory of tankmen in the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps, passed the test with excellence.

The "Shield-84" exercise, the performance of the joint combat training mission and the joint attack brought the Soviet and Czechoslovak tankmen even more strongly together. The friendship between the personnel in the regiments is deeply rooted. The comrades in arms have no secrets from each other. There is a constant exchange of know-how at all levels. Subunits of the Czechoslovak regiment have trained more than once at the Soviet regiment's training facilities under common training plans and programs. Upon returning to their own unit, Lieutenants (I. Yeriye) and V. ospe and Senior Lieutenant Z. S. generously shared with their comrades what they had acquired and told them about the nature of methodological innovations employed by their Soviet friends. Our companies, which merged temporarily with the Regiment imeni Hero of the Soviet Union Captain Otakar Yarosh. It is therefore not surprising that there is much similarity in the combat traits of the fraternal regiments, that their interaction in the difficult training battle was irreproachable.

The echo of the final shots have not yet died away in the mountain forests, when the monitor at the command post had been turned on in order to take another look at the combat events recorded on video tape. A detailed and in-depth analysis of the operations carried out by the troops and the experience of the "Shield-84" exercise will be made available to all the armies of the Warsaw Pact nations and will serve the cause of further enhancing the combat readiness of the units and formations and of reliably defending the creative labor of the fraternal peoples.

11499

CSO: 1801/15

EDITORIAL NOTES IMPORTANCE OF GUARD DUTY, CITES SHORTCOMINGS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Oct 84 p 1

[Editorial: "Perform Guard Duty Vigilantly"]

[Text] Among the missions being accomplished daily by our Armed Forces, an important place is allotted to guard duty. Its significance is determined by the Garrison and Guard Duty Regulations of the Soviet Armed Forces. The performance of guard duty, it is stressed in them, is the accomplishment of a combat mission and requires of the personnel high vigilance, inflexible resolve, and initiative. These words from the regulation sound especially timely today when the aggressive imperialist forces, having declared a "crusade" against socialism, are undertaking measures of economic, military, ideological, and psychological pressure and various types of subversive actions which are hostile to us. Under the conditions which have been created it is especially important for the Soviet servicemen to display unremitting vigilance and be in constant combat readiness.

An indispensable condition for the maintenance of high combat readiness is guard duty which is organized in an exemplary manner. In accomplishing the combat mission of protecting and defending battle standards and military and state facilities, the guard personnel are required to display clarity and organization as well as constant high vigilance.

Success in the accomplishment of a combat mission as part of the guards is ensured to a great extent by constant and firm leadership of guard duty and attention to it on the part of responsible officials: chiefs of garrisons, military commandants, commanders, and staff officers. Everything is important in the organization of guard service--from planning and the elaboration of documents which regulate it to the implementation of constant and effective monitoring. All these tasks should be accomplished with a sense of lofty service and party responsibility and with the strict accomplishment of the regulations' provisions and the requirements of the corresponding documents. Commanders and staffs are required to check the status of guard duty systematically, analyze it periodically, and adopt measures to prevent shortcomings.

The reliable guarantee of the guards' accomplishment of the missions assigned to them is the comprehensive training of the servicemen. It should be an organic continuation of the entire process of the training and indoctrination of the personnel of units and subunits. Well organized service, training, and model living conditions and organized leisure time mold in the men the high moral-

political, psychological, and combat qualities which are necessary for the successful accomplishment of missions as members of guards. This is also furthered by drills, briefings, and lessons at specially equipped sites. It is important to instill in the men a sense of personal responsibility for the accomplishment of the mission by the guard, to develop boldness, resolve, and initiative in them, and to improve their psychological and physical tempering.

For example, they approach the training of the personnel for the performance of guard duty with great responsibility in the Guards tank regiment where Guards Lieutenant Colonel S. Nyzhin serves. Here much attention is devoted to training the commanders of the guard. Lessons are organized regularly for them with the working out of practical actions upon the announcement of the signal "Assembly" in the unit or garrison, with an attack on the posts or guardhouse, and during fires and natural disasters. The experience of those who are coping excellently with the duties of commander of the guard is studied painstakingly, generalized, and introduced. Great attention is also devoted to the training of other guard personnel. The guardhouse and posts have been equipped with observance of existing requirements. The regimental staff has worked out and introduced into operation an effective system for checking guard duty. The status of this duty is analyzed periodically, concerning which a unit order is issued monthly.

There are many examples of the skillful, clear, and creative approach to the training of the guards. But the facts appear the more unattractive when some commanders of battalions and companies limit work with the guard personnel to only short briefings or transfer it to subordinate officers who do not always display proper responsibility. As a result, some of the men master the prescribed duties, the content of guard post lists, and other documents poorly. Shortcomings of this type were found once in the garrison where Lieutenant Colonel P. Vyazovov serves, and this did not have the best effect on the men's accomplishment of their duties when on guard.

An analysis of guard duty shows: its status depends in large measure on the correctly organized monitoring of it. However, at times in some garrisons, units, and subunits this monitoring is accomplished formally. It happens that the schedules worked out by the staffs for checking the guards are not accomplished in full measure. Sometimes the checks are conducted at the very same time and usually--during the day. But you see, it is precisely at night that special vigilance is needed on the posts and thorough, regular checks further its increase. The role of night checks is increasing with the onset of autumn when the light time of the day is reduced.

Duty by guards when guarding transport with military cargoes has its special features. Service en route entails additional difficulties. And furnishing a detail for the road, they should be provided with everything necessary for the successful accomplishment of the combat mission and the men should be reminded of the great responsibility which has been placed on them and of the confidence which is being placed in them.

Observance of high vigilance when performing guard duty is furthered by purposeful party-political work. In this matter, let us say, it is not enough simply to determine the agitator and editor of the operational news sheet and distribute communists and Komsomols among the posts and reliefs. It is important to



organize their work and attune it so as to inspire all men for exemplary duty by word and personal example. In the Nth Radiotechnical Unit, for example, it has become the rule for the commander and his deputies not only to check the vigilance of the sentinals on the posts and order in the guardhouse, but also to be interested in how the party and Komsomol activists perform their duties as members of the guard, and they themselves conduct talks with the men on the military oath and regulations and comment on the most important events in the country and abroad.

Talks about the exploits of hero-guards and the discussion of books and motion pictures on this subject exert a great influence on the men. Preparations for the 40th anniversary of the great victory are creating favorable conditions for such work.

The constant improvement of the performance of duty by the guards is an important duty of commanders, staff officers, and political organs. To ensure strict order in the guards and the reliable guarding and defense of facilities means furthering the systematic life and activity of the troops and naval forces and the maintenance of their high combat readiness.

6367

CSO: 1801/46

GIFTS MIGHT BE VIEWED AS BRIBES

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Oct 84 p 2

[Article by Lt Col G. Ivanov, Red Banner Central Asian Military District:  
"Dinner in the Dispensary"]

[Text] The aviators prepared for an exercise. They were to accomplish a flight to maximum range and operate in an unfamiliar area. The support subunits also prepared thoroughly for the serious examination.

By the way, some were very occupied with the question of how better to organize ...the entertainment of the inspectors...far from their own garrison. Of course, as formerly this could have been entrusted to the chief of the mess, N. Butkova. But, you see, she is not taken so far away. Therefore, Warrant officer

V. Bortnikov was summoned to Major A. Yashin. He caught the meaning of the task at once and signed an application for issuing him money to be accounted for.

As was expected, at the airfield far from their own everything proceeded excellently. At the time when the pilots conducted intense battles in the air, Major Yashin's subordinates determined their own "lines of interception." They passed through the flight dispensary where the members of the commission, officers G. Basistov, Ye. Konovalov, and others, assembled in the evenings. Appearing there regularly, for example, was Major V. Shchegol'kov, delivering the next batch of bottles. This matter, of course, was troublesome and, initially, even a little dreadful--wouldn't the members of the commission understand at once? In return, how pleasant it was to learn later that they understood everything correctly and the pilots received a good grade on the check.

Clearly, immediately upon the departure of the commission the question of compensation for the sums expended arose. In the subunit, it was brought up at a service conference. The hat which was passed around returned to Warrant Officer Bortnikov with the necessary subsidy.

Of course, this incident could not remain a secret. Checks followed. Everything, as they say, received confirmation. Only this was the trouble, you see. It was learned that the efforts of the excessively hospitable hosts in no way influenced the grade which the aviators received then. The pilots' actions--and this is actually so--were graded on the basis of recorder data. And once the direct connection between the gifts and the commission's conclusions

was not discovered, talk about everything which had happened just did not go beyond the circle of the direct participants in the events. They say, those who stumbled were corrected and there is nothing more to say. But in no way can there be agreement with such an approach to the analysis of a phenomenon which is absolutely impermissible in our midst.

Is the very fact of the gift so harmless? Is it permissible not to notice serious moral losses which are inflicted on individual people and even entire collectives in this case? And really, do not such losses in fact affect the attitude of people toward matters?

At one time I had the occasion to serve in the same air regiment with officer Yu. Voyevoda, then squadron commander. I well remember the unanimous opinion which his immediate superiors had of him: an average pilot and a weak leader. But then a new meeting with my fellow-serviceman years later. Could he overcome his former shortcomings? Oh no. His extremely unintelligible reports and the harsh criticism of his work by senior commanders were recalled. And even later the officer in essence himself recognized that he is occupying a strange place and requested a post which was a little easier and, as they say, they met him half way.

A talk with Vovevoda which took place long ago surfaces in the memory. He set forth his "method" of contact with the inspectors something like a joke: the first toast in honor of their arrival, the last on their departure, and when the report about the check is written, suggest the appropriate mitigating words concerning shortcomings--"individual," "some," "sometimes".... What a pity that today you cannot look into the eyes of those who agreed with such promptings.

There is no doubt that the root of the evil is precisely in the behavior of some inspectors and in the fact that at times each of us does not give an unambiguous reproof to any manifestation of toadyism and servility. Moreover, some even try to justify such "signs of attention." It is good, they say, when informal, confidential relations are established with the inspectors. And really, they say, how can we refuse the inspector the host's traditional right of hospitality?

Well, it is true that good relations are useful. But how important it is that in so doing their particularly service goal is not lost and the moral threshold of what is permitted is not lowered. Here, I believe, we should rely first of all on such qualities as efficiency, devotion to principle and, at times, even usual delicacy and tact.

Not so long ago a senior inspector, Lieutenant Colonel S. Sobolev, inspected the financial activity of the KECh [billeting unit] where A. Kalinin is the chief engineer. The time for dinner arrived, and the inspector was invited to a restaurant where the kitchen is especially good. "I don't think it is worth going there," Sobolev noted. "We have no time to spare." Didn't those who checked officer Voyevoda at one time and, recently, the members of the commission who checked the pilots of the Nth Air Regiment lack such elementary punctiliousness?

It must be regretted that stories of this type do not always become public knowledge. Really, their proper finale usually is far from the beginning. How to

follow here whether the excessively displayed hospitality played its sad role? But the negative consequences of the gift are completely obvious. They are among the aviators on whose grade the party in the flight dispensary seemingly had no effect. For officers Yashin and Shchegol'kov frankly undertook unworthy actions. How quickly Warrant Officer Bortnikov understood the "task." And those who responded to the call for reimbursement of expenditures incurred when catering to the commission? It looks as though they had not the slightest doubt that the gift would surely be accepted and surely would exert the needed influence.

"I understood," says Senior Lieutenant P. Pavlov later, "that all the delicacies which I bought for the members of the commission were to obtain a good grade. And once the grade proved to be good, then...."

There they are--clear traces of a psychology which is foreign to us. I say more: when it became known that the grade which was obtained was objective nevertheless, not everyone believed it at once.

This means that we cannot mark the end of this unpleasant story all the same. Gifts are impermissible both in their very essence and in their moral consequences. That is why in the struggle against this negative phenomenon it is necessary to use the entire arsenal of indoctrinational means. And really, of course, we cannot leave one fact of gift-giving which has become known without the proper evaluation.

6367

CSO: 1801/46

ARMED FORCES

EDITORIAL CALLS FOR UPGRADING OFFICER TRAINING

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Nov 84 p 1

[Editorial" "Prior to the New Training Year"]

[Text] The forthcoming training year will occupy a special place in the life of our Armed Forces. It coincides in time with the period of practical preparations by the party and the people for the next, 27th, CPSU Congress and the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War. The new training year will proceed under conditions of an international situation which has been sharply aggravated through imperialism's fault and a growing military threat on the part of the United States and its NATO allies. This requires a further strengthening of the motherland's defensive capability and the combat might of the Armed Forces. Commanders, political organs, and party and Komsomol organizations are called upon to initiate ideological and mass political work even more widely and to instill in the men a sharp sense of increased military danger and a readiness to give the aggressor a crushing rebuff at any moment using accumulated experience. Everything must be done so that the preparations for the new training year further to the maximum degree the mobilization of the men for the struggle for a further rise in the combat readiness of units and ships and the strengthening of discipline, organization, and prescribed order.

As the experience of past years convinces us, the most important precondition for this is a thorough and self-critical analysis of what has been attained. In which regard in the foreground there should be the experience of the leading subunits, units, and ships which have accomplished training plans and programs and socialist obligations with high quality. Special attention is merited by the experience of the competition's initiators in the services of the Armed Forces. It is important to examine thoroughly the basis for successes which have been specifically achieved, to achieve the broad introduction of experience, and to ensure pulling all troop collectives up to the level of the leaders.

They were engaged operationally and efficiently in the generalization and study of leading experience in the Guards tank regiment commanded by Guards Lieutenant Colonel P. Kuzemchak (Red Banner Belorussian Military District). The deputy regimental commanders and specialists of the combat arms and services participate actively in this work. Special attention is devoted to the study of the most effective procedures worked out in the course of competition for intensification

of the training process with the use of simulators and other technical means of instruction, which contributes to a reduction in the times for training specialists with minimum material expenditures. Shortcomings in the training of subunits and individual servicemen are also analyzed thoroughly in the unit. Here a strict and specific demand is imposed on commanders who have permitted lagging behind and whose work style does not meet today's requirements. Such an approach to the matter, of which practice has already convinced us many times, is one of the effective means for eliminating shortcomings and pulling up the laggards.

Unfortunately, they are not genuinely concerned about this everywhere. In some places they still put up with the fact that average soldiers and laggards are alongside leaders. This is impermissible. Improvement of quality indices in combat and political training is one of the main tasks of the new training year. Its accomplishment is inseparably linked with a rise in each one's responsibility for the accomplishment of his duties, obligations in competition, and missions facing the unit and ship. Organizational and indoctrinational work should also be directed toward this.

The planning of combat and political training should become the mobilizing basis in the struggle for high quality and effectiveness of the training and indoctrination process. Here, it is important to consider all requirements of the guidance documents, the personnel's level of training, and the specific conditions under which the units and ships are to accomplish their assigned missions. It is necessary to be concerned that the plans direct people toward the struggle for the economy of training and the reasonable expenditure of material resources. They should consider requirements for the organization of the Marxist-Leninist training of the officers as well as the political training of warrant officers [praporshchik and michman] and political lessons with the soldiers, seamen, and sergeants.

The effectiveness of the plan depends to a decisive degree on the level of ideological tempering and professional training of those who organize its accomplishment. Therefore, one of the primary tasks now is improving officer training. It will be higher the more effectively assemblies, training-methods and demonstration lessons and exercises, and other measures which it is planned to conduct with officers of various categories in the days for preparation for the new training year are conducted.

An important work sector is the preparation of the training material and technical base for the lessons. It is necessary to be concerned that all its facilities are equipped in strict conformance with the requirements of the guidance documents and with consideration of leading procedures, lessons of the past training year, and the nature of contemporary battle. They proceed correctly where in preparing the training base they orient on the broader use of contemporary simulators and automated information feedback systems and control of the target situation.

A subject of special concern for commanders, political organs, staffs, and party and Komsomol organizations is the personnel's adoption of individual and collective socialist obligations. We should persistently see that the obligations are strenuous but practical and direct the men toward the improvement of

field, air, and sea training and the skillful mastery of equipment and weapons and that their accomplishment furthers the molding of lofty moral and combat qualities in the personnel, the strengthening of discipline, order, and organization, and the further unity of the troop collectives. Here it is important not to permit regulation, stereotype, and formalism and to ensure the personal participation of each serviceman in the working out and acceptance of obligations. Fixed attention should also be devoted to questions connected with the organization of the competition of units and ships and with the development of the movement for leading large unit.

It is important to discuss questions of the preparations for the new training year and the organization of competition in the course of reports and elections in party and Komsomol organizations. It is the duty of communists and Komsomols to give a purposeful character to this discussion and to be examples of objectivity and exactingness in evaluating what has been attained and of persistence in the search for unused reserves. It is necessary for commanders, political organs, and party and Komsomol committees and buros to consider suggestions on improving the organization of the training and indoctrination process and competition expressed at election meetings and to adopt measures for their implementation.

To prepare for the new training year in an exemplary manner means creating the necessary conditions for the successful accomplishment of the difficult and important tasks facing the Armed Forces for the further rise of their combat readiness.

6367

CSO: 1801/46

ARMED FORCES

JPRS-UMA-85-008  
31 JANUARY 1985

COVERAGE OF USTINOV DEATH, FUNERAL

Foreign Party Leaders' Condolences

LD232210 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1730 GMT 23 Dec 84

[Text] Telegrams of condolence in connection with the death of Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitriy Fedorovich Ustinov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR Defense Minister, have arrived for the CPSU Central Committee and for Comrade Chernenko, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, from communist and worker parties of a number of countries.

Telegrams have been set by:

Herbert Mies, chairman of the German Communist Party;

The board of the SEW of West Berlin;

Trevor Munroe, general secretary of the Worker's Party of Jamaica;

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam;

The National Assembly and the Council of Ministers of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam;

Kim Il-song, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party and president of the DPRK;

Babrak Karmal, general secretary of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and chairman of the revolutionary Council of the DRA, and Soltan Ali Keshtmand, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the republic.

Condolences have arrived from:

Ezekias Papaionnou, general secretary of the Progressive Party of the Working People of Cyprus;

Krishnan, secretary of the National Council of the Communist Party of India;



Alessandro Natta, general secretary of the Italian Communist Party;

Jesus Faria, general secretary of the Communist Party of Venezuela;

Armand Magnin, general secretary of the Swiss Labor Party;

Seydou Sissoko, chairman of the Party of Independence and Labor of Senegal,  
and Amath Dansoko, general secretary of the party;

From the Central Committee of the Guadeloupe Communist Party;

The politburo of the Marxist Communist Party of India;

From the central executive Committee of the Socialist Party of Japan.

#### More Foreign Party Condolences

LD242131 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 24 Dec 84

[From the VREMYA Newscast]

[Text] Telegrams of condolences are arriving to the CPSU Central Committee and to Comrade Chernenko, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, from communist and workers' parties in connection with the death of MSU Dmitriy Fedorovich Ustinov, eminent figure of the Communist Party and Soviet state.

The communists and all the people and revolutionary forces of Cuba have lost a comrade in arms and a true friend, who made an important contribution to the development of combat fraternity between our peoples and armies, says the telegram from Fidel Castro, first secretary of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee, chairman of the State Council and of the Council of Ministers of the republic.

Telegrams have also been received from Athos Fava, general secretary of the Argentinian Communist Party Central Committee, and from Gilberto Vieira, general secretary of the Columbian Communist Party Central Committee.

Sincere condolences have been expressed by: the Portuguese Communist Party Central Committee; the Sri Lanka Communist Party, through Pieter Keuneman, chairman of the Central Committee and Silva, general secretary of the Central Committee; the Panamanian People's Party Central Committee Politburo; the Palestine Communist Party Central Committee; Arnoldo Ferretto, chairman of the Costa Rica Popular Vanguard Party; Yoshikatsu Takeiri, chairman of the Komeito Party of Japan; Manuel Mora Valverde, general secretary of the Costa Rica People United party Central Committee; and (Gilberto Giotti), general secretary of the San Marino Communist Party.

## Ustinov Commemoration

PM091007 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Jan 85 First Edition p 1

[TASS report: "In the People's Memory"]

[Text] Dmitriy Fedorovich Ustinov's whole life was devoted to the cause of serving the people. All Soviet people have been filled with a sense of deep satisfaction by the USSR Council of Ministers' resolution to perpetuate the memory of that prominent figure in the Communist Party and Soviet state. A rally of representatives of the whole Udmurt ASSR capital was held 4 January.

"It was with a sense of pride that the inhabitants of Ikzhevsk city received the news of its change of name," B. Fayzullin, labor veteran at the Izhmas Production Association said. "It is a high honor for us to bear the name of that ardent patriot and internationalist and outstanding military chief, Dmitriy Fedorovich Ustinov, who had been closely connected with the association's collective since the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.

"He was responsive to working people and did much for the city's economic, social, and cultural development. Dmitriy Fedorovich was always distinguished by devotion to the party's cause, high principles, modesty, and warmheartedness, which earned him the love and respect of all the Soviet people."

Speakers referred to the fervent desire on the part of the autonomous republic's working people to work with even greater efficiency and to worthily greet the 27th CPSU Congress.

Workers of the Ulyanov Aviation Industrial Complex spoke at a rally to mark the conferring of D.F. Ustinov's name on the complex of their loyalty to the Soviet people's revolutionary, combat, and labor traditions and of their constant desire to increase production efficiency and the quality of all their work, and speakers stressed that they would continue to rank among the pace-setters of socialist competition and by their selfless labor strengthen the motherland's economic and defense might.

CSO: 1801/107

## INSTITUTE CHIEF ON STALIN'S ROLE IN WAR YEARS

LD142249 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1343 GMT 14 Dec 84

[Excerpts] Moscow, 14 Dec (TASS)--The USSR's decisive role in World War II lies in the fact that it wrecked the implementation of the Hitlerite plan for a blitzkrieg against the USSR and thus undermined the theoretical basis for an expansion of aggression beyond the borders of the USSR, Pavel Zhilin, a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences has stated.

The chief of the Military History Institute of the USSR Ministry of Defense was speaking today at a press conference in Moscow devoted to the principal operations of the Soviet Army in 1944. The press conference was organized by the Soviet Committee of War Veterans and the Military History Institute of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Hitler's command, firmly confident of the success of the Blitzkrieg against the USSR, issued Directive No. 36 on the continuation of the war as far back as July 1941, Pavel Zhilin recalled, answering correspondents' questions. This document, he said, envisaged that the war against the USSR would be a "victory march" through the territory of the Soviet Union to India, and thence to the Middle East, moving to Latin America, and finally seizing the United States. Owing to the heroism of the Soviet people, who stood in the path of aggression, these schemes for the seizure of world domination were foiled, the scholar stressed.

The USSR's role in the war consisted in the fact that owing to its efforts the fascist aggressors lost on the Soviet-German front all their basic means for waging war--materiel and cadres, and also confidence in the success of aggression.

And finally, Pavel Zhilin said, it is extremely important that the USSR did not limit itself to its national interests but brought the war to a victorious conclusion and accelerated the liberation of Europe from the fascist plague.

Pavel Zhilin noted that the role of the second front in the rout of the fascist aggressors is assessed positively in the USSR. "But we do not agree with attempts to exaggerate its significance," he said. The scholar recalled that the second front was opened in Europe in July 1944, when the outcome of the war was already decided. It is indicative, Pavel Zhilin noted, that even after

the landing of American and British troops in Normandy Hitler's command kept 1.8-2.8 times as many forces on the Soviet-German front as against the allied troops.

Noting the positive role of the U.S. and British economic aid to the Soviet Union during the war, Pavel Zhilin condemned attempts to exaggerate the importance of the lend-lease. The facts bear witness to the fact that the principal arsenal of victory was to be found in the USSR.

Replying to correspondents' questions about the role of Stalin in the war, the chief of the Institute of Military History said that a detailed account of this could be found in the memoirs of people who were close to Stalin--Marshals of the Soviet Union Zhukov and Vasilevskiy and Army General Shtemenko. "The role of Stalin as commander in chief, chairman of the state defense committee, and general secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee in the war years was a large one, and we have given it a fitting appraisal," Pavel Zhilin said. At the same time he stressed that the decisive role in the victory over Hitlerite fascism was played by the Soviet people and their Armed Forces, who implemented the plans of the Soviet command on the battlefield.

CSO: 1801/87

PILOTS FLY THROUGH DUSTSTORM TO REFUEL ARMORED VEHICLES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Sep 84 p 3

[Article by Capt M. Syrtlanov: "Flying Into a Storm"]

[Text] The motorized rifle battalion broke through the "enemy's" defense and began pursuit. The main thing at that point was to prevent the enemy from fortifying itself at a new position. The column of armored personnel carriers therefore traveled without a halt. The battalion commander had to resolve the problem of refueling the machines a long way from the rear service subunits. A solution was found. There was an airfield on the route ahead, and the motorized riflemen asked the airmen to help them by delivering the fuel by plane. The latter agreed.

Now the column had reached the airfield. The aircraft should be landing at any minute. Suddenly the horizon grew dark. An "Afghanets" had blown in. This is what the strong wind, which frequently raises treacherous clouds of dust is called there in Afghanistan. The transport plane appeared in the sky right then made several circles in the darkening air and departed for a different airfield.

At that critical moment personnel in the air subunit decided what to do.

"I can't order them to do it," Lieutenant Colonel M. Pushkar', subunit commander, said. "You can see for yourself what the weather is like..."

Quiet took over the tent.... Captain A. Logno stood up.

"Our crew can get through. We have flown in dust before. Permit us to take off.

Pushkar' knew that smoothly functioning crew well--Senior Lieutenant V. Artyushchikov, co-pilot, Captain S. Polyshev, one of the best navigators, Senior Lieutenant B. Musatov, skillful aircraft technician, Warrant Officer S. Khudyakov, radio operator, and Warrant Officer S. Sakharov, mechanic. They had performed many extremely difficult missions, sometimes under rebel (dushman) fire. There had been the element of risk, of course. It was not reckless risk, however. The maneuvering and the tactical procedures had all been carefully thought out and weighed in advance. And the mission needed to be accomplished, no matter what...

The heavily loaded aircraft now set out on the dangerous flight. Eddies of dust soon appeared on the route. The airfield was barely visible.

"Trial approach!" Logno ordered. "Get a mental image of everything awaiting us below."

The vehicle passed low over the runway. The crew made a note of every little feature on the barely visible ground.

Now a second circle... and the landing beam. Logno was flying the aircraft almost blindly. The reference points spotted before helped. There was the thud of the landing wheels on the ground. The aircraft had landed successfully.

"That's it..." Logno said and leaned back against his seat. He tried to remove his headset but did not succeed at once. It was wet with sweat.

...The motorized rifle unit rapidly refueled the combat vehicles. The engines of the departing column could not be heard over the roar of the duststorm.

11499

CSO: 1801/15

AIR ENGINEER DECORATED IN DRA

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Sep 84 p 3

[Article by Lt Col B. Karpov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "A Star on the Lazulite"]

[Text] The helicopter made a sharp turn, and Major V. Plyushchay immediately noticed a small flash of light from the narrow neck of a canyon. Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich rose from his seat, guessing that it was a reflection from the canopy of a helicopter damaged by the rebels (dushman). The Afghan airmen had been returning from a remote mountain community to which they had delivered food, when they came under fire.

The dark green fuselage stood out distinctly against the gray, rocky placer. With its damaged landing gear bent to the right, the helicopter resembled a wounded bird which had lost its strength and was unable to rise into the air. Major Plyushchay, aviation engineer, rushed toward the site of the accident. His Afghan comrades asked him to hurry.

He had learned the nature of the damage prior to taking off and picked up the necessary spare parts. His assumption was confirmed. The hydraulic system had been punctured in several spots. It is not so very difficult to make this kind of repairs in a stable setting. The situation was many times more difficult in the mountains, however. And no one could have anticipated what was to happen next.

Plyushchay had not completed his inspection, when the Afghan airmen came up to him and gestured toward the rocky slopes.

"There are rebels near us," the aircraft technician translated. "They have already attempted to capture the helicopter."

Plyushchay understood what a good target the two rotary-wing aircraft made and that time was the most important element in the situation. Only unerring action multiplied by skill and speed could save the situation. They set up the jacks and began replacing the damaged hoses. Immediately, they heard a blast, followed by a second and a third.... The whistling of fragments sounded right next to them. The crew which had brought Plyushchay took to the air and began searching for the mortarmen. The firing stopped for several minutes. This was enough time to complete the job. Some other damage was detected, however, which prevented a takeoff.

The delay, routine in another situation, could now have irreparable consequences. Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich carefully considered the instrument readings in an attempt to pinpoint the damage. He was perfectly aware that in this situation he was not simply a technical specialist. Here, by the damaged helicopter in the mountains, he was giving the Afghan airmen not just a lesson in detecting and repairing damage, but also a lesson in self-control and calmness. And when the firing began again, Plyushchay calmly stated, as though it were all taking place at an airfield:

"We'll take off in a few minutes."

He knew the equipment. He had been servicing just such rotary-winged aircraft more than a single year. He knew their level of survivability, their reliability and their "amenability" to repair in the field. He saw his party duty in agitation, because such action was now becoming the most important argument as to the rightness of those who were in the mountains together with the Afghan fighting-men defending the conquests of their revolution. The aircraft would now take to the air, which meant that it would be making more runs to communities far and near, serving the rightful cause of the Afghan republic.

The determination and confidence had come during his service at permanent airfields and at "sites," in the Baltic area and in the Far East. They had not come to him immediately. He would long remember a lesson he had received at that time, when he was still an aircraft technician, from Major N. Potapov. The latter was an exceptionally demanding officer, in love with the air force and with a thorough knowledge of all types of helicopters. This is how it happened. Plyushchay was preparing the equipment for flight, when he noticed that the engine was losing rpms. He was about to start making the repairs but began to doubt himself. He telephoned Potapov and asked him to send one of the specialists.

"Just what is the problem?" the officer asked.

"The sparkplugs are greasy"!

"So what?" he heard through the receiver.

"I knew how to correct the problem," Plyushchay latter recalled, "but I was hesitant. I thought about the fact that these were people and not wood or barrels on board. I was afraid of the responsibility"!

Potapov began with that. "Confidence appears," he said when they met, "when an individual is aware that he and only he is responsible for something." And then he added reproachfully: "An engineer is a thinking, deliberating individual capable of predicting problems. But if one does occur, you must know how to correct it. On your own!..."

And Plyushchay learned more than that. The equipment also does not forget errors or lack of confidence. And confidence is provided by knowledge and experience. He has been accustomed to working since childhood. After completing a seven-year school, he studied at night school and worked during the day at a metallurgical plant. His father, a naval landing expert, died at Odessa in 1944,



and the care of the family fell on the shoulders of the little boy. When he began studying an army specialty, he wanted to learn everything. A helicopter is an integrated unit, and one needs to know its every little screw. People would sometimes say: "Iron is just iron, and it will not last forever." He would answer with a categorical "no," however, and prove that any problem can be foreseen and predicted.

Plyuchchay will not tolerate hasty decisions. He believes that they are ordinarily not the best ones. And his arguments are weighty and convincing. They are based on calculation. "Think not about yourself but about the success of the entire subunit." And these are not just words. He has developed and put to use various devices and improvisations for improving the quality of periodic technical servicing and adjustment operations and reduced the time required to perform them. The training rooms contain numerous technical training devices thought up and designed by the engineer. It is not surprising that the civilian specialists also know about his skill and his ability to figure out the most complex electronic machines and circuits. They frequently ask him for help and ask his advice on how to deal with a capricious unit.

"It is interesting to work with Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich," Major F. Guberskiy says. "He is demanding and strict. With him behind you it's like being backed up by a stone wall, however. He gives the personnel an opportunity to grow, to improve themselves professionally. He will never refuse to help someone. He knows how to involve people in the search for technical answers. Invention and rationalization work is not an applied subject for us. It is taught in courses paralleling the combat training and the struggle for a trouble-free operation....

Now he was in Afghanistan. Working in the difficult circumstances raised many new questions, to which the engineer had to provide the correct answers. Without allowances for the situation.

He was once assigned the mission of evacuating a helicopter. This would seem to be a very simple matter--load it onto a trailer. The road was not without danger, however. Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich decided to evacuate it by air.

"Have you ever hauled helicopters on this type of aircraft?" the pilot asked with doubt in his voice.

"What are you concerned about?" he asked. "I'll take the responsibility. I have no doubts," he added.

And he actually did have no doubts. The engineer calculated everything. At his suggestion they removed the landing gear, the reduction gear and the propellers.. When the helicopter had been delivered to its destination, Plyushchay admitted that he had never done that sort of thing before. "But there were no alternatives, and the situation demanded it."

Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich told me about the incident with which I began this account. This was also a first for him. This time as well, however, under rebel fire, Major Plyushchay readied the helicopter for takeoff. From the instrument readings he pinpointed and corrected the problem within a few brief

minutes. They took off. This was not all there was to the victory, however. After they were already in the air a mine fragment pierced a fuel tank. Once again, Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich demonstrated self-control. He opened the hatch in the air and shut off the fuel flow from the damaged tank.

That was a difficult flight. It was just one thing after another, as they say. Plyushchay asked the pilot to find a site for a forced landing. He looked the aircraft over once again, corrected the problem and as they would later write up in the reports, "flew safely to the airfield with three defects."

The aviation engineer's military work has been singled out for two combat orders. His good professional training is also attested by the fact that all of the aviation equipment in the subunit in which he serves is in a constant state of readiness for flights. And the credit for this belongs to Communist Vyacheslav Aleksandrovich Plyushchay.

The Afghan aviators gave the Soviet specialist a small piece of lazulite in gratitude for his assistance and his knowledge. A five-pointed star, a symbol of freedom, friendship, and fraternity, is engraved on it. Major Plyushchay takes good care of it, along with letters written by his father from the front. There is deep significance in this as well.

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